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ABSTRACT
Recent years there has been a growing interest in the study of distributed control mech-
anisms for use in communication networks. A fundamental assumption in these models is
that the participants in the network are willing to cooperate with the system. However,
there are many instances where the incentives to cooperate is missing. Then, the agents
may seek to achieve their own private interests by behaving strategically. Often, such
selsh choices lead to inecient equilibrium state of the system, commonly known as the
tragedy of commons in Economics terminology. Now, one may ask the following question:
how can the system be led to the socially optimal state in spite of selsh behaviors of its
participants? The traditional control design framework fails to provide an answer as it
does not take into account of selsh and strategic behavior of the agents. The use of game
theoretical methods to achieve coordination in such network systems is appealing, as it
naturally captures the idea of rational agents taking locally optimal decisions.
In this thesis, we explore several instances of coordination problems in communication
networks that can be analyzed using game theoretical methods. We study one coordina-
tion problem each, from each layer of TCP/IP reference model - the network model used
in the current Internet architecture. First, we consider societal agents taking decisions
on whether to obtain content legally or illegally, and tie their behavior to questions of
performance of content distribution networks. We show that revenue sharing with peers
promote performance and revenue extraction from content distribution networks. Next,
we consider a transport layer problem where applications compete against each other to
meet their performance objectives by selshly picking congestion controllers. We establish
that tolling schemes that incentivize applications to choose one of several dierent virtual
networks catering to particular needs yields higher system value. Hence, we propose the
adoption of such virtual networks. We address a network layer question in third problem.
How do the sources in a wireless network split their trac over the available set of paths to
ii
attain the lowest possible number of transmissions per unit time? We develop a two level
distributed controller that attains the optimal trac split. Finally, we study mobile appli-
cations competing for channel access in a cellular network. We show that the mechanism
where base station conducting sequence of second price auctions and providing channel
access to the winner achieves the benets of the state of art solution, Largest Queue First
policy.
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1. INTRODUCTION
In recent years there has been a growing interest in the study of distributed control
mechanisms for use in communication networks. A fundamental assumption in these mod-
els is that the participants in the network are willing to cooperate with the system in that
their actions conform to the protocols stipulated by the system designer. However, there
are many instances where the incentive to cooperate is missing. Consider, for example,
routing between autonomous systems in the Internet. Ideally, the routing tables must be
congured with shortest paths. However, ISPs who own these autonomous systems are
prot driven and they prefer cheaper (protable) routes to shorter ones (e.g Hot Potato
routing). Such selsh behaviors of ISPs result in inecient operation of the system. Often,
as in the above example, it is true that selsh choices of the agents lead to bad equilibrium
states of the system [23, 60, 61], which is known as the tragedy of commons in Economics.
Now, one may ask the following question: how can the system be led to the socially op-
timal state in spite of selsh behaviors of its participants? The traditional control design
framework fails to provide an answer as it does not take into account of selsh and strate-
gic behavior of the agents. The use of game theoretical methods to achieve coordination
in such network systems is appealing, as it naturally captures the idea of rational agents
taking locally optimal decisions. In this thesis, we explore four instances of coordination
problems in communication networks, choosing one problem from each layer of the Open
Systems Interconnection (OSI) model. Below, we provide a summary of the work thus far,
and present details in the sections following.
In Section 2, we consider a societal problem of ownership of content. We analyze
the revenue loss incurring to a legitimate content distribution network that employs a
centralized client-server model to sell content, while duplicate copies of the same content
are freely available in the system. We ask the question: Can the content provider recover
lost revenue through a more innovative approach to distribution? We evaluate the benets
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of a hybrid revenue-sharing system that combines a legitimate Peer-to-Peer (P2P) swarm
and a centralized client-server approach. In the hybrid revenue-sharing scheme, we develop
reward schemes that incentivize legals, those clients who legally obtained the content, to
act as agents of legal P2P swarm.
In Section 3, we study a resource allocation game in the Internet. A large number of
congestion control protocols have been proposed in the last few years with all having the
same purpose to divide available bandwidth among dierent ows in a fair manner. We
study the interaction among numerous congestion control protocols in the Internet. We ask
the question: Suppose that each ow has a number of congestion control protocols to choose
from, which one (or combination) should it choose? We study both the socially optimal, as
well as the selsh cases to determine the loss of system-wide value incurred through selsh
decision making, so characterizing the price of heterogeneity. We also propose tolling
schemes that incentivize ows to choose one of several dierent virtual networks catering
to particular needs, and show that the total system value is greater, hence making a case
for the adoption of such virtual networks.
In Section 4, we consider a problem of multipath routing in a wireless network. Here,
each source makes a choice of trac split among all of its available paths, to attain the
lowest possible number of transmissions per unit time to support a given trac matrix.
Trac bound in opposite directions over two wireless hops can utilize the \reverse carpool-
ing" advantage of network coding in order to decrease the number of transmissions used.
We call such coded hops as hyper-links. However, there is a dilemma among sources|the
network coding advantage is realized only if there is trac in both directions of a shared
path. We develop a two level distributed control scheme that decouples user choices from
each other by declaring a hyper-link capacity, allowing sources to split their trac selshly
in a distributed fashion, and then changing the hyper-link capacity based on user actions.
Finally, in Section 5, we study an auction-theoretic mechanism for scheduling channel
resources in cellular networks. In our setting, the players are smart phone apps that
generate service requests, have costs associated with waiting, and bid against each other
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for service from base stations. We show that in a system in which we conduct a second-
price auction at each base station and schedule the winner at each time, there exists a
mean eld equilibrium (MFE) that will schedule the user with highest value at each time.
We further show that the scheme can be interpreted as a weighted longest queue rst type
policy. The result suggests that auctions can implicitly attain the same quality of service
as queue-length based scheduling. In Section 6, we conclude the thesis and discuss future
work.
3
2. APPLICATION LAYER : INCENTIVES FOR P2P ASSISTED CONTENT
DISTRIBUTION
The past decade has seen the rapid increase of content distribution using the Internet as
the medium of delivery [31]. Users and applications expect a low cost for content, but at the
same time require high levels of quality of service. However, providing content distribution
at a low cost is challenging. The major costs associated with meeting demand at a good
quality of service are (i) the high cost of hosting services on the managed infrastructure
of CDNs such as Akamai [50, 76], and (ii) the lost revenue associated with the fact that
digital content is easily duplicable, and hence can be shared in an illicit peer-to-peer (P2P)
manner that generates no revenue for the content provider. Together, these factors have
led content distributors to search for methods of defraying costs.
One technique that is often suggested for defraying distribution costs is to use legal peer-
to-peer (P2P) networks to supplement provider distribution [52,59]. It is well documented
that the ecient use of P2P methods can result in signicant cost reductions from the
perspective of ISPs [24,50]; however there are substantial drawbacks as well. Probably the
most troublesome is that providers fear losing control of content ownership, in the sense
that they are no longer in control of the distribution of the content and worry about feeding
illegal P2P activity.
Thus, a key question that must be answered before we can expect mainstream utilization
of P2P approaches is: How can users that have obtained content legally be encouraged
to reshare it legally? Said in a dierent way, can mechanisms be designed that ensure
legitimate P2P swarms will dominate the illicit P2P swarms?
In this paper, we investigate a \revenue sharing" approach to this issue. We suggest
that users can be motivated to reshare the content legally by allowing them to share the
Part of the data reported in this chapter is reprinted with permission from \Incentives for P2P-assisted
content distribution: If you can't beat 'em, join 'em" by V. Ramaswamy, S. Adlakha, S. Shakkottai and
A. Wierman. 50th Annual Allerton Conference on Communication, Control and Computing, 2012, Copy-
right@2012 IEEE.
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revenue associated with future sales. This can be accomplished through either a lottery
scheme or by simply sharing a fraction of the sale price. Recent work on using lotteries to
promote societally benecial conduct [42] suggests that such schemes could potentially see
wide spread adoption.
Such an approach has two key benets: First, obviously, this mechanism ensures that
users are incentivized to join the legitimate P2P network since they can prot from joining.
Second, less obviously, this approach actually damages the illicit P2P network. Specically,
despite the fact that content is free in the illicit P2P network, since most users expect a
reasonable quality of service, if the delay in the illegitimate swarm is large they may be
willing to use the legitimate P2P network instead. Thus, by encouraging users to reshare
legitimately, we are averting them from joining the illicit P2P network, reducing its capacity
and performance; thus making it less likely for others to use it.
The natural concern about a revenue sharing approach is that by sharing prots with
users, the provider is losing revenue. However, the key insight provided by the results in
this paper is that by discouraging users from joining illicit P2P network, the increased
share (possibly exponentially more) of legitimate copies makes up for the cost of sharing
revenue with end-users.
More specically, the contribution of this paper is to develop and analyze a model to
explore the revenue sharing approach described above. Our model (see Section 2.1) is a uid
model that builds on work studying the capacity of P2P content distribution systems. The
key novel component of the model is the competition for users among an illicit P2P system
and a legal content distribution network (CDN), which may make use of a supplementary
P2P network with revenue sharing. The main results of the paper (see Section 2.2) are
Theorems 1-4, which highlight the order-of-magnitude gains in revenue extracted by the
provider as a result of participating in revenue sharing. Further, In addition to the analytic
results, to validate the insights provided by our asymptotic analysis of the uid model we
also perform numerical experiments of the underlying nite stochastic model. Tables 2.1
and 2.2 summarize these experiments, which highlight both that the results obtained in
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the uid model are quite predictive for the nite setting and that there are signicant
benecial eects of revenue sharing.
There is a signicant body of prior work modeling and analyzing P2P systems. Per-
haps the most related work from this literature is the work that focuses on server-assisted
P2P content distribution networks [12, 36, 53, 65, 66, 77] in which a central server is used
to \boost" P2P systems. This boost is important since pure P2P systems suer poor
performance during initial stages of content distribution. In fact, it is this initially poor
performance that our revenue sharing mechanism exploits to ensure that the legitimate
P2P network dominates.
Two key dierentiating factors of the current work compared to this work are: (i) We
model the impact of competition between legal and illegal swarms on the revenue extraction
of a content provider. (ii) Unlike most previous works on P2P systems, we consider a time
varying viral demand model for the evolution of demand in a piece of content based on the
Bass diusion model (see Section 2.1). Thus, we model the fact that interest in content
grows as interested users contact others and make them interested.
With respect to (i), there has been prior work that focuses on identifying the relative
value of content and resources for dierent users [5,44]. For instance, [5] deals with creating
a content exchange that goes beyond traditional P2P barter schemes, while [44] attempts
to characterize the relative value of peers in terms of their impact on system performance
as a function of time. However, to the best of our knowledge, ours is the rst work that
considers the question of economics and incentives in hybrid P2P content distribution
networks.
With respect to (ii), there has been prior work that considers uid models of P2P
systems such as [41,57,80]. However, these all focus on the performance evaluation of a P2P
system with constant demand rate. As mentioned above, a unique facet of our approach is
that we explicitly make use the transient nature of demand in our modeling. In the sense of
explicitly accounting for transient demand, the closest work to ours is [66]. However, [66]
focuses only on jointly optimizing server and P2P usage in the case of transient demand
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in order to obtain a target delay guarantee at the lowest possible server cost.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. We rst introduce the details of our
model in Section 2.1. Then, Section 2.2 summarizes analytic and numeric results. Finally,
Section 2.4 provides concluding remarks.
2.1 Model overview
Our goal is to model the competition between illicit peer-to-peer (P2P) distribution
and a legitimate content distribution network (CDN), which may make use of its own P2P
network. Our model is a uid model, and there are four main components:
1. The evolution of the demand for content. A key feature of this paper is that we
consider a realistic model for the evolution of demand, specically, the Bass diusion
model.
2. The model of user behavior, which allows the user to strategically choose between
attaining content legally or illegally based on the price and performance of the two
options.
3. The model of the illicit P2P system.
4. The model of the legal CDN and its possibility to use \revenue sharing".
We discuss these each in turn in the following.
2.1.1 The evolution of demand
The simplest possible model of demand is that the entire population gets interested in
the content simultaneously at time t = 0: We call this the \Flash crowd model" due to the
instantaneous appearance of all the demand. While the model is simplistic, it can serve
as a foundation for developing performance results, and we will utilize it as our base case.
More complex models of demand can be considered as well. Indeed, models of the dynamics
of demand growth for innovations dates to the work of Griliches [19] and Bass [6]. The
most widely used model for dynamics of demand growth is the Bass diusion model which
7
describes how new products get adopted as potential users interact with users that have
already adopted the product. Such word of mouth interaction between users and potential
users is very common in the Internet and we use a version of Bass diusion model that
only has word of mouth spreading. We describe both models formally below.
We dene N to be the total size of the population and I(t) to be the number of users
that are interested in the content at time t. In the Flash Crowd Model,
I(t) = N; (2.1)
since all users are interested from the very beginning. In the Bass diusion model, each
interested user \attempts" to cause a randomly selected user to become interested in the
content.1 At any time t, there are N   I(t) users that could potentially be interested in
the content. Thus, the probability of nding such a users is (N   I(t))=N . Assuming that
an interested user can interact with other users at rate 1 per unit time, we get that the
rate at which interested users increase is given by the following dierential equation:
dI(t)
dt
=

N   I(t)
N

I(t): (2.2)
The above dierential equation can be easily solved and yields the so-called logistic function
as its solution.
I(t) =
I(0)et
1  (1  et) I(0)N
; (2.3)
where I(0) is the number of user that are interested in the content at time t = 0.
Though the Bass model is quite simple, it is a useful qualitative summary of the spread
of content. To highlight this, Figure 2.1 (taken from [66]) highlights a similar behavior in
a data trace from CoralCDN [17], a CDN hosted at dierent university sites. The gure
shows the cumulative demand for a home video of the Asian Tsunami seen over a month
in December 2005. For comparision, the gure on the right shows the model in equation
1Note that these \attempts" should not be interpreted literally, but rather as the natural diusion of
interest in the new content through the population.
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(2.3). The qualitative usefulness of the Bass model has been veried empirically in many
settings, and hence the Bass model is often considered as canonical [47].
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(b) Cumulative demand in Bass model
Figure 2.1: (a) shows the cumulative demand for a le over one month on Coral CDN (Dec
2005{Jan 2006). (b) shows the cumulative demand seen in a Bass diusion.
2.1.2 The progression of a user
In order to capture the strategic behavior of users in the face of competition between
a legitimate CDN using P2P and an illicit P2P network our model is necessarily complex.
Figure 2.2 provides a broad overview of the user behavior in the system, which we explain
in detail in the following.
Let us explain the model through tracking the progression of a user. We term an initial
user that wants, but has not yet attained, the content a Wanter (W). When a Wanter
arrives to the system, it has two options: get content from the illicit P2P system for free
or get content from the legitimate system for a price p. We assume that the Wanter wishes
to obtain content as quickly and cheaply as possible, and so she rst approaches the illicit
P2P swarm and then only attains the content from the legitimate system if the content is
not attained a reasonable time interval (one innitesimal clock tick in our model) from the
9
illicit P2P. This cycle repeats, if necessary, until the content is attained. In some sense,
this is the worst-case for the legitimate provider since the illicit source is tried rst.
Once the Wanter has attained the content (legally or illegally), it could stay in the
system and assist in content dissemination. We denote the probability of this event by
 < 1: Otherwise, it could simply Quit (Q) and leave the system with probability 1   :
Now, if a Wanter obtains the content legally and decides to assist in dissemination, it has
two options: (i) It might decide to use the content to assist the illicit P2P swarm, i.e., go
Rogue (R). We denote the probability this happens by  < 1. (ii) It might decide to assist
the legitimate P2P swarm (if one exists) as a Booster (B). We denote the probability of
this event by  < 1. Note that  = 0 if no legal P2P is used. Clearly +  = : However,
if a Wanter obtains content illegally and chooses to stay in the system, it can only aid the
illicit swarm as a Fraudster (F). The probability of this event is simply :
Note that the goal of revenue sharing is to incentivize Wanters to become Boosters after
attaining content legally, rather than going Rogue. The hope is that the revenue invested
toward reducing the number of \early adopters" that go Rogue keeps the illicit P2P swarm
from growing enough to provide good enough quality of service to dominate the legitimate
swarm.
To model this system more formally, we introduce the following notation. Let Nw(t) be
the number of Wanters at time t, i.e., the number of users who have not yet attained the
content, and assume Nw(0) = 0. Further, let Nl(t) and Ni(t) be the number of users with
legal and illegal copies of the content at time t. Note that the total number of interested
users at any time t satises the following equation
I(t) = Nw(t) +Nl(t) +Ni(t) (2.4)
We can break this down further by noting that the number of Rogues, Fraudsters, and
10
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Figure 2.2: An overview of the progression of a user through the systems. The labels are
dened as follows: W - Wanter, F - Fraudster, R - Rogue, B - Booster, and Q - Quit.
Boosters in the system at time t (denoted by Nr(t), Nf (t), and Nb(t) respectively) is:
Nr(t) = Nl(t) (2.5)
Nf (t) = Ni(t) (2.6)
Nb(t) = Nl(t); (2.7)
with +  < 1. The rest of legal and illegal users leave the system.
The key remaining piece of the model is to formally dene the transition of Wanters
to holders of illegal/legal content, i.e., the evolution of Ni(t) and Nl(t). However, this
evolution depends critically on the model of the two systems, and so we describe it in the
next section.
2.1.3 System models
We discuss in detail the illicit and legitimate system models below. The factors in these
models are key determinants of the choice of a Wanter to get the content legally or illegally.
When modeling the two systems, we consider a uid model, and so the performance is
determined primarily by the capacity of each system, i.e., the combination of the initial
seeds and the Fraudsters/Boosters that choose to join (and add capacity). However, other
factors also play a role, as we describe below. Throughout, we model the upload capacity
of a user as being one.
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2.1.3.1 The illicit P2P system
There are two components to the model of the illicit P2P network: (i) the eciency
of the network in terms of nding content, and (ii) the initial size of the network and its
growth.
Let us start with (i). To capture the eciency of the P2P system, we take a simple
qualitative model. When attaining the content illegally, a Wanter must contact either a
Rogue or a Fraudster. We let (t) capture the probability of a Wanter nding a Rogue
or a Fraudster when looking for one instantaneous time slot. We consider two cases: an
ecient P2P and an inecient P2P. In an ecient P2P , we model
(t) = 1;
with the understanding the the P2P allows easy lookup of content and all content is truth-
fully represented. In contrast, for an inecient P2P , we model
(t) = (Nr(t) +Nf (t))=N;
where recall that N is the total population size. This corresponds to looking randomly
within the user population for a Rogue or Fraudster. Neither of these models is completely
realistic, but they provide lower and upper bounds to the true eciency of an illicit P2P
system.
Next, with respect to (ii), we model the initial condition for the illicit network with
Ni(0) = 0, since the assumption is that the content has not yet been released, and therefore
is not yet available in the illicit P2P swarm. From this initial condition, Ni(0) evolves as
follows:
dNi(t)
dt
= min

(t)

Nw(t) +
dI(t)
dt

; Nr(t) +Nf (t)

; (2.8)
The interpretation of the above is that Nr(t) +Nf (t) is the current capacity of the illicit
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P2P and (t)

Nw(t) +
dI(t)
dt

is the fraction of the Wanters (newly arriving and remaining
in the system) that nd the content in the illicit P2P network. The min operator then
ensures that no more than the capacity is used.
2.1.3.2 The legitimate CDN
As discussed in the introduction, our goal in this work is to contrast the revenue attained
by a CDN that uses P2P and revenue sharing with one that does not use P2P. Thus, there
are two key factors in modeling the legitimate CDN: (i) the rate at which users that possess
content copies become fraudsters or boosters, and (ii) the initial size of the CDN and its
growth, which depends on the presence/absence of the legal P2P.
Let us start with (i). From a performance standpoint, the most important parameter
is ; since it determines what fraction of users stay in the system and act as servers. These
users could either support the legal system as boosters, or the illegal one as fraudsters.
The question that we wish to answer is that of how much of an impact the division of those
who stay into fraudsters and boosters would have on revenue obtained. As we saw earlier,
+  = ;
and our key result will be on their relative impact on obtainable revenue. How we might at-
tempt to control the booster factor  through dierent amounts of revenue sharing requires
further modeling of user motivation, which we will consider in greater detail in Section 2.3.
But initially we are more concerned with the impact of  and ; rather than how to socially
engineer their values.
Next, with respect to (ii), unlike for the illicit P2P swarm, the legitimate network does
not start empty. This is because it has a set of dedicated servers at the beginning which
are then (possibly) supplemented using a P2P network. We denote by CN be the capacity
of the dedicated CDN servers when the total population size is N . Note that this capacity
must scale with the total population size to ensure that the average wait time for the users
is small. As shown in [66], a natural scaling that ensures no more that O(ln lnN) delay is
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to have the capacity CN = (N= lnN). Based on this, we adopt
CN =
N
lnN
in this work. Additionally, we assume Nl(0) = 0 in the case of Flash Crowd model and
Nl(0) = I(0) in the case of Bass model.
Given these initial conditions, Nl(t) evolves as follows:
dNl(t)
dt
=
8><>: CN + Nl(t); Nw(t) > 0;minnCN + Nl(t); dI(t)dt   dNi(t)dt o Nw(t) = 0: (2.9)
The interpretation for the above is that if there are a positive number of Wanters remaining
in the system, then the full current capacity of the CDN can be used to serve them, i.e.,
CN + Nl(t). However, if there are no \leftover" Wanters, arriving Wanters that are not
served by the illicit P2P (dI(t)dt   dNi(t)dt ) are served up to the capacity of the CDN.
2.2 Results
To characterize the performance of the CDN against the illicit P2P distribution, we use
fractional legitimate copies, which is dened as follows:
Denition 1. The fractional legitimate copies, L, is dened as
L =
Nl(T1)
N
; (2.10)
where T1 is dened as the time after which only 
(lnN) users are left in the system
without a copy of the content
Using this metric, we look at the performance of the CDN in two settings: when the
CDN competes against inecient illicit P2P sharing and when it competes against ecient
illicit P2P sharing. Recall, that our models for these two cases are meant to serve as upper
and lower bounds on the true eciency of an illicit P2P system. We start by considering
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the case of an inecient, illicit P2P. Note that the theorems stated below characterize only
the asymptotic growth of the fractional legitimate copies.
2.2.1 Inecient illicit P2P
As discussed before, we look at the performance of CDN, under two simple models of
demand evolutions, namely Flash Crowd Model (2.1) and Bass model (2.3).
First, we state the result for Flash Crowd model.
Theorem 1. Suppose I(t) satises (2.1). The fractional legitimate copies attained by the
content provider in the presence an inecient, illicit P2P is
L 2 

 
ln lnN + (lnN)


lnN
!
: (2.11)
Further, when  = 0,
L 2 

ln lnN
lnN

: (2.12)
Proof. To prove theorem we analyze two processes Nl(t) and Ni(t) which bounds the
actual evolutions Nl(t) and Ni(t). Importantly, the bounding processes are equivalent to
the original processes when  = 0.
Before stating the results, we introduce a few notation. Let
1 =

2
+

2
r
1 +
4
 lnN
; 2 =

2
  
2
r
1 +
4
 lnN
;
b =  1
2
;  = 1   2; (2.13)
 =
2

ln
0@
q
1 + 4 lnN + 1q
1 + 4 lnN   1
1A ; (2.14)
Nl =
CN
1

1
1 + b



1  e

 1
2

e

1



  CN
2

1
1 + b


e(

2
)

1  e22

: (2.15)
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Finally, we are ready to dene the bounding processes used in the proof, Nl(t) and
Ni(t). Let Ni(0) = Ni(0). Furthermore, let
d Ni(t)
dt
=
 Nl(t) +  Ni(t)
N
(N   ( Nl(t) + Ni(t))): (2.16)
Similarly, let Nl(0) = Nl(0) and
d Nl(t)
dt
=
8><>: CN + 
Nl(t)
N ( Nl(t)+ Ni(t))
N ;
Nw(t) > 0;
0; Nw(t) = 0:
(2.17)
where Nw(t) = N   ( Ni(t) + Nl(t)).
We can now state our result characterizing the number of legal and illegal copies.
Lemma 1. In the presence of an inecient, illicit P2P, the number of illegal and legal
copies at the end of evolution is
Nl(T1)  Nl;
where equality holds when  = 0.
Proof. Recall that the eciency factor of an inecient illicit P2P, (t), is given by
(t) =
Nr(t) +Nf (t)
N
=
Nl(t) + Ni(t)
N
: (2.18)
The second equality follows from (2.5) and (2.6). From (2.8), the illegal growth rate is
dNi(t)
dt
(a)
= (t)Nw(t) (2.19)
(b)
= (Nl(t)+Ni(t))(N (Nl(t)+Ni(t)))N : (2.20)
(a) follows from the denition of (t) and the fact that Nw(t)  N . (b) follows from (2.18)
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and (2.4). From equation (2.9), the growth rate of legal copies is given by
dNl(t)
dt
=
8><>: CN + Nl(t); Nw(t) > 0;0; Nw(t) = 0: (2.21)
Let U(t) be the total copies of the content in the system. Then, U(t) = Nl(t) +Ni(t):
Now, we claim that,
Nl(T1)  Nl(T1); (2.22)
and the equality holds when  = 0.
The proof is as follows: First, we dene, U(t) = Nl(t) + Ni(t): We can obtain
dNi
dU and
d Ni
d U
from the pair of equations (2.19), (2.21) and (2.16), (2.17) respectively. Then, it can
be shown that
dNi
dU
jNi=x;U=y 
d Ni
d U
j Ni=x; U=y; (2.23)
and the equality holds when  = 0. Note that the range space of functions U(t) and U(t)
are identical. Since, the initial values Ni(0) and Ni(0) are equal by denition, we get the
result in (2.22).
Now, we derive Nl(t). Let  be the time at which the number of wanters in the system
vanishes to zero. Then, Nw(t) = 0 and U(t) = N for t 2 [ ; T1]. Adding (2.17) and (2.16),
for t 2 (0;  ], we get,
d U
dt
=
 
( + ) Nl(t) +  Ni(t)
 (N   ( Nl(t) + Ni(t)))
N
(f)
=  U(t)
N   U(t)
N
:
(f) follows from the fact that +  =  and the denition of U(t).
The above dierential equation is in the form of a standard Riccatti equation, and it's
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solution can be written as
U(t) =
N2

+
N=
1 + be t
; (2.24)
where  = 1 2. 1; 2 and b are given by equation (2.13). From the relation, U() = N ,
we get (2.14).
Now, from (2.17), for t 2 (0;  ], we get
d Nl(t)
dt
= CN +  Nl(t)
N   ( Nl(t) + Ni(t))
N
:
A lower bound on the solution of the above dierential equation is provided by Lemma 8
in Section 2.5. From the dentions of b and  , given by (2.13) and (2.14), it is clear that
b > 1 and  > ln b=. Then, by evaluating (2.147) at t =  with Nl(0) = I(0), we get Nl
in (2.15). Also, when  = 0, the lemma yields an exact solution of the above dierential
equation. Hence proved.
As mentioned in the statement of Lemma 1, the inequality is exact in the case of  = 0.
Additionally, in this case, the form of Nl(T1) simplies.
Corollary 1. Let  = 0. In the presence of an inecient, illicit P2P, the number of illegal
and legal copies is given by
Nl(T1) =
2CN

ln
0@
q
1 + 4 lnN + 1q
1 + 4 lnN   1
1A : (2.25)
Now that we have characterized the number of legal and illegal copies precisely, at-
taining the statement in the theorem is accomplished by studying the asymptotics of the
results in Lemma 1 and Corollary 1.
To begin, recall from (2.10) that,
L =
Nl(T1)
N

Nl
N
; (2.26)
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where Nl is dened by (2.15). Following a few algebraic steps, from the above equation,
we get that
L 2 

 
ln lnN + (lnN)


lnN
!
(2.27)
and L 2    ln lnNlnN  if  = 0, which completes the proof.
The interpretation of this theorem is striking. When booster factor, , is zero, the
fractional legitimate copies is exponentially small, 
 
ln lnN
lnN

. However, as  increases, the
fractional legitimate copies grows by orders of magnitude.
Now, we consider the second model for demand evolution, Bass model. For analytic
reasons, we are not able to work with the exact Bass model. Thus, we approximate the
logistic curve, (2.3), as follows:
I(t) =
8>>>>>>><>>>>>>>:
NI(0)et
N I(0)+I(0)et 0  t  T1 : Phase 1
I2 = N= lnN T1 < t  T2 : Phase 2
I3 =
N
2 T2 < t  T3 : Phase 3
I4 = N T3 < t < T4 : Phase 4;
(2.28)
where we have T1 = ln(N=(I(0) lnN)), T2 = ln(N=I(0)), T3 = 2 ln(N=I(0)) and T4 =
3 ln(N=I(0)).2 Notice that the rst stage is the exact Bass diusion, while the other stages
are order sense approximations of the actual expression. Though this model is approximate,
it yields the same qualitative insight as the original model. Now, we are ready to state the
result.
Theorem 2. Suppose I(t) satises (2.28). The fractional legitimate copies attained by the
content provider in the presence an inecient, illicit P2P is
L 2 

 
ln lnN + (lnN)


lnN
!
(2.29)
2Note that the value of T1 has been chosen such that limN!1 I(T1) = N= lnN:
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Further, when  = 0,
L 2 

ln lnN
lnN

: (2.30)
Proof. To prove the theorem, we will go through a sequence of intermediate results charac-
terizing the number of legal/illegal copies at the transition points of the approximate Bass
model.
We start by characterizing the number of legal and illegal copies at the end of Phase 1.
Lemma 2. In the presence of an inecient, illicit P2P, the number of illegal and legal
copies at the end of Phase 1 of the approximate Bass model are given by
Ni(T1) =

I(0)
   +
N
(  )2

exp (BN )
  I(T1)
    
N
(  )2 (2.31)
Nl(T1) = I(T1) Ni(T1); (2.32)
where
I(T1) =
N
lnN
N
N   I(0) + (N= lnN)
BN =

(  )
N
(I(T1)  I(0))

:
Note that in the above, we have allowed , , and  to be arbitrary. In fact, in this case,
 is inconsequential since the full amount of interested copies can be served by the dedicated
capacity of the CDN. Note that in the case when  = , things simplify considerably.
Corollary 2. Let  = . In the presence of an inecient, illicit P2P, the number of illegal
and legal copies at the end of Phase 1 of the approximate Bass model are given by
Ni(T1) =
(I2(T1)  I2(0))
2N
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Nl(T1) = I(T1) Ni(T1);
where I(T1) =
N
lnN
N
N I(0)+(N= lnN) .
We now prove the lemma.
Proof of Lemma 2. From equation (2.28), the population of interested copies in phase I is
given by
I(t) =
NI(0)et
N   I(0) + I(0)et : (2.33)
From the above equation, it is easy to verify that the rate of growth of interested copies is
less than the server capacity CN , i.e., dI(t)=dt  CN . Thus, any interested user is served
instantaneously either by a legal or illegal mechanism. Hence, the number of Wanters
in the system is zero, i.e, Nw(t) = 0. Therefore, it follows from equation (2.4) that
Nl(t) +Ni(t) = I(t).
Next, from equation (2.8), we get that
dNi(t)
dt
= min

(t)
dI(t)
dt
;Nr(t) +Nf (t)

(a)
= (t)
dI(t)
dt
; (2.34)
where the equality (a) follows from the denition of (t) and the fact that dI(t)=dt  CN <
N .
Because we are considering an inecient P2P, we have
(t) =
Nr(t) +Nf (t)
N
;
(b)
=
Nl(t) + Ni(t)
N
;
(c)
=
(I(t) Ni(t))
N
+
Ni(t)
N
;
=
I(t)
N
+
(  )Ni(t)
N
:
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where equality (b) follows from (2.5), (2.6) and the equality (c) follows from the fact that
Nl(t) = I(t) Ni(t). Substituting the above result in equation (2.34), we get
dNi(t)
dt
=
dI(t)
dt
I(t)
N
+
dI(t)
dt
(  )Ni(t)
N
:
The solution of the above dierential equation is given by
Ni(t) = K exp

I(t)(  )
N

  I(t)
    
N
(  )2 ;
where the constant K can be obtained from the fact that Ni(0) = 0. Thus, the evolution
of illegal copies is given by
Ni(t) =

I(0)
   +
N
(  )2

exp

(  )
N
(I(t)  I(0))

  I(t)
    
N
(  )2 :
The number of illegal copies at the end of Phase 1 can be obtained by evaluating the above
expression at t = T1. The remaining population get the content legally, i.e, Nl(T1) =
I(T1) Ni(T1).
Now that we have characterized the number of legal and illegal copies at the end of
Phase 1, we can move to Phases 2-4. Unfortunately, the resulting number of legal and
illegal copies at the end of these phases is much more complicated. However, much of this
complicated form is only necessary to specify the exact analytic values. Once we focus on
the asymptotic form (as in Theorem 1), it simplies considerably.
Before stating the result, we need to introduce a considerable amount of notation.
This notation stems from the fact that we do not analyze the exact process of Nl(t) and
Ni(t). Instead, we dene a processes Nl(t) and Ni(t) which bounds Nl(t) and Ni(t) and
analyze these processes. Importantly, the bounding processes are equivalent to the original
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processes when  = 0, i.e., the case of no revenue sharing. Before dening Nl and Ni, Let
2 =
1
 lnNZ1
ln
0@Z1 + 1  2I(T1)(N= lnN)
Z1   1 + 2I(T1)(N= lnN)
1A
+
1
 lnNZ1
ln

Z1 + 1
Z1   1

; (2.35)
3 =
2
Z2
ln
 
Z2 + 1  4lnN
Z2   1 + 4lnN
!
+
2
Z2
ln

Z2 + 1
Z2   1

; (2.36)
4 =
1
Z3
ln

Z3 + 1
Z3   1

; (2.37)
where Z1 =
q
1 + 4 lnN ; Z2 =
q
1 + 16 lnN ; Z3 =
q
1 + 4 lnN and I(T1) =
N
lnN
N
N I(0)+(N= lnN) .
In addition, let
j1 = 
Ij
2N
+
1
2
s
Ij
N
2
+
4
lnN
; (2.38)
j2 = 
Ij
2N
  1
2
s
Ij
N
2
+
4
lnN
; (2.39)
j = 
j
1   j2 and
bj =
N1;j   I(Tj 1)
I(Tj 1) N2;j : (2.40)
Note that, in the above denition, in fact I(Tj 1) = Ij 1 for j = 3 and 4.
Furthermore, for j = 2; 3 and 4, let
dj = (bj + exp(jj)) (2.41)
qj1 =
 
j2

  Ij
N
!
(2.42)
qj2 =
j1

  Ij
N
(2.43)
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Finally, we are ready to dene the bounding processes used in the proof, Nl(t) and
Ni(t). Let Ni(T1) = Ni(T1). Furthermore, during Phase j, let
d Ni(t)
dt
=
 Nl(t) +  Ni(t)
N
(Ij   ( Nl(t) + Ni(t))): (2.44)
Similarly, let Nl(T1) = Nl(T1) and, during Phase j,
d Nl(t)
dt
=
8><>: CN + 
Nl(t)
Ij ( Nl(t)+ Ni(t))
N ;
Nw(t) > 0;
0; Nw(t) = 0:
(2.45)
where Nw(t) = Ij   ( Ni(t) + Nl(t)). Finally, let
U(t) = Nl(t) + Ni(t):
To state the result, we use a bit more notation about these processes. Let N1l = Nl(T1)
and for j = 2; 3; and 4 dene Nl(Tj) recursively as follows:
N jl =
N j 1l

1 + bj
dj


e( q
j
1j)+
+ CN

bj
dj


e( q
j
1j)
0B@e

qj1
ln bj
j

qj1
  1
qj1
1CA1b1
+ CN

1
dj


e( q
j
1j)
0BBB@e(q
j
2j)
qj2
  e
 
q
j
2 ln bj
j
!
1b1
qj2
1CCCA
  CN

1
dj


e( q
j
1j) 1
qj2
(1  1b1); (2.46)
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where 1b1 is given by
1b1 =
8><>: 1 b  1;0 b < 1: (2.47)
We can now state our result characterizing the number of legal and illegal copies at the
end of Phases 2-4.
Lemma 3. In the presence of an inecient, illicit P2P, the number of illegal and legal
copies at the end of Phase j, j 2 f2; 3; 4g of the approximate Bass model are given by
Nl(Tj)  N jl ;
where equality holds when  = 0.
From the approximate Bass model (2.28), the evolution of demand in Phase j, for
j = 2; 3 and 4, is given by,
I(t) = Ij ; where t 2 [Tj 1; Tj):
Note that in these three phases, a change in the number of interested copies occurs only
at the beginning of the phase and then, it remains constant throughout the phase. That
means, the dynamics of evolutions of Nl(t) and Ni(t) in these phases are similar to that
of Flash Crowd model discussed in Lemma 1. Also, it can be shown that each of these
phases is long enough so that every interested user appearing at the beginning of a phase
is being served by the end of that phase. Therefore, we can analyaze each of these phases
independently. Now, by recursively applying the analysis of Lemma 1 for each of the three
phases, we get Lemma 3. A detailed proof of the above lemma is given below.
Proof. From the approximate Bass model (2.28), the evolution of demand in Phase j is,
I(t) = Ij ; where t 2 (Tj 1; Tj ];
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and the number of Wanters in Phase j is Nw(t) = Ij   (Nl(t) +Ni(t)).
Recall that the eciency factor of an inecient illicit P2P, (t), is given by
(t) =
Nr(t) +Nf (t)
N
=
Nl(t) + Ni(t)
N
: (2.48)
The second equality follows from (2.5) and (2.6).
From equation (2.8), the illegal growth rate in Phase j is
dNi(t)
dt
(a)
= min f(t)Nw(t); Nr(t) +Nf (t)g ;
(b)
= (t)Nw(t) (2.49)
(c)
=
Nl(t) + Ni(t)
N
(Ij   (Nl(t) +Ni(t))): (2.50)
Here (a) follows from the fact that I(t) is constant in the last three phases. (b) follows
from the denition of (t) and the fact that Nw(t)  N . (c) follows from (2.48).
From equation (2.9), the growth rate of legal copies in Phase j is given by
dNl(t)
dt
=
8><>: CN + Nl(t); Nw(t) > 0;0; Nw(t) = 0: (2.51)
The second equality follows from the fact that dNidt = 0 when there are no Wanters in the
system (from (2.49)) and I(t) is constant.
Let U(t) be the total copies of the content in the system. Then,
U(t) = Nl(t) +Ni(t):
Note that the growth rate Nl(t) is at least equal to CN when Nw(t) > 0. In that case,
it can be shown that
CN  (Tj   Tj 1) > (I(Tj)  I(Tj 1)):
since I(0) << CN , by assumption. This means that every interested user generated in any
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one of the last three phases can be served within that phase itself. Furthermore, Lemma 2
shows that no Wanters are left unserved after Phase 1. Therefore, we can conclude that
Nl(Tj) +Ni(Tj) = U(Tj) = I(Tj) = Ij : (2.52)
The same arguments hold true in the case of Nl(t), i.e,
Nl(Tj) + Ni(Tj) = U(Tj) = I(Tj) = Ij : (2.53)
Now, we claim that,
Nl(Tj)  Nl(Tj); (2.54)
and the equality holds when  = 0.
We can derive dNidU and
d Ni
d U
from the pair of equations (2.49), (2.51) and (2.44), (2.45)
respectively. Then, it can be shown that
dNi
dU
jNi=x;U=y 
d Ni
d U
j Ni=x; U=y; (2.55)
and the equality holds when  = 0. Note that the range space of functions U(t) and U(t)
are identical; in fact they are equal to [I(Tj 1); I(Tj)] in Phase j which follows from (2.52)
and (2.53). Furthermore, recall that the initial values of Ni(T1) and Ni(T1) are equal by
denition. Hence, the conclusion is
Ni(Tj)  Ni(Tj):
Then, the claim in (2.54) is true from the facts that Nl(Tj) = I(Tj) Ni(Tj) and Nl(Tj) =
I(Tj)  Ni(Tj).
Our objective is to derive an expression of Nl(t). Then, evaluate the expression at
t = Tj in order to obtain a lower bound on the number of legal copies at the end of each
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Phase j.
Let j be the time such that U( j) = Ij . This event happens within Phase j itself (from
(2.53)). i.e, j 2 (Tj 1; Tj ]. In addition,
Nw(t) = 0 when t 2 (j ; Tj ]:
Adding (2.45) and (2.44), for t 2 (Tj 1; j ], we get,
d U
dt
=
 
( + ) Nl(t) +  Ni(t)
 (Ij   ( Nl(t) + Ni(t)))
N
(e)
=
 
 Nl(t) +  Ni(t)
 (Ij   ( Nl(t) + Ni(t)))
N
(f)
=  U(t)
Ij   U(t)
N
:
(e) follows from the fact that +  = . (f) follows from the denition of U(t) in Phase j.
The dierential equation given above is a standard Riccatti equation. Its solution is
given by
U(t) =
N2;j

+
Nj=
1 + bje j(t Tj 1)
; (2.56)
where j = 1;j   2;j . 1;j ; 2;j and bj are given by equations (2.38), (2.39) and (2.40)
respectively.
Let j = j   Tj 1. Recall that j is the solution of the equation U(j) = Ij . Hence,
from the above result, we get,
j   Tj 1 = 1
j
ln
0@
q
1 + 4 lnN j + 1 
2I(Tj 1)
I(Tj)q
1 + 4 lnN j   1 +
2I(Tj 1)
I(Tj)
1A
+
1
j
ln
0@
q
1 + 4 lnN j + 1q
1 + 4 lnN j   1
1A : (2.57)
The above expression yields (2.35), (2.36) and (2.37) respectively, when I(Tj) is substituted
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by actual values from the bass model.
Now, applying the above expression in (2.45), for t 2 (Tj 1; j ], we get
d Nl(t)
dt
= CN +  Nl(t)
Ij   ( Nl(t) + Ni(t))
N
:
A lower bound on the solution of the above dierential equation is provided by Lemma 8
in Section 2.5. It can be shown that b exp( jj) << 1. Then j satises the condition
stipulated by that lemma and a lower bound on the number of legal at the end of Phase j
can be obtained by evaluating (2.147) at t = j , which yields N
j
l in (2.46). In case  = 0,
(2.147) is an exact solution of the above dierential equation.
As mentioned in the statement of Lemma 3, the inequality is exact in the case of  = 0.
Additionally, in this case, the form of Nl(T4) simplies.
Corollary 3. Let  = 0. In the presence of an inecient, illicit P2P, the number of illegal
and legal copies at the end of Phase 4 of the approximate Bass model is given by
Nl(T4) = Nl(T1) + CN
4X
j=2
j (2.58)
where Nl(T1) is given by Corollary 2.
Now that we have characterized the number of legal and illegal copies at the end of
Phase 4 precisely, attaining the statement in theorem is accomplished by taking studying
the asymptotics of the results in Lemma 3 and Corollary 3. Throughout, we use AN  BN
to denote limN!1 ANBN = 1:
To begin, recall from (2.10) that,
L =
Nl(T1)
N
=
Nl(T1)
N
(2.59)

N4l
N
; (2.60)
where N4l is recursively dened by (2.46) in terms of
N1l ;
N2l and
N3l . As N goes larger,
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from the above equation, we get that
L 2 

 
ln lnN + (lnN)


lnN
!
(2.61)
and L 2    ln lnNlnN  if  = 0, which completes the proof.
Note that the results of the above theorem match with that of Theorem 1. That means,
the fractional legitimate copies attained by the CDN under Bass model of evolution is no
dierent from that of Flash Crowd model in asymptotic sense.
Next, let us consider the case of an ecient, illicit P2P system.
2.2.2 Ecient illicit P2P
As before, we rst consider the case of Flash Crowd model.
Theorem 3. Suppose I(t) satises (2.1). Let  2 (0; 1 I(0)=N). The fractional legitimate
copies attained by the content provider in the presence an ecient, illicit P2P is
L 2 

0@ 1
lnN
(lnN)

   1



1A : (2.62)
Further, when  = 0,
L 2 

ln lnN
lnN

: (2.63)
Proof. The proof parallels to that of Theorem 1.We mimick the approach of the proof
of Theorem 3 and dene two processes Nl(t) and Ni(t) that bound Nl(t) and Ni(t) and
analyze these processes. Importantly, the bounding processes are equivalent to the original
processes when  = 0.
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Figure 2.3: Evolution of usage in the presence of inecient illicit P2P sharing.
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
x 104
Time
N
um
be
r o
f u
se
rs
 
 
Legal users
Illegal users
(a)  = 0:4;  = 0
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
x 104
Time
N
um
be
r o
f u
se
rs
 
 
Legal users
Illegal users
(b)  = 0:4;  = 0:38
Figure 2.4: Evolution of usage in the presence of ecient illicit P2P sharing.
Let U(t) = Nl(t) + Ni(t): Further, let Nl(0) = Nl(0) = 0 and
d Nl(t)
dt
= =
8><>: CN + 
Nl(t) Nw(t) > 0;
0 Nw(t) = 0:
(2.64)
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where Nw(t) = N   U(t). Furthermore, we dene Ni(0) = Ni(0) = 0 and
d Ni(t)
dt
=
8><>: 
Nl(t) +  Ni(t) 0  U(t)  N1+ ;
N   Nl(t)  Ni(t) N1+  U(t)  N:
(2.65)
Finally, let Ni(0) = Ni(0) = 0. To state the results, we may need a bit more notation. Let
Nl =
N
lnN

e   1

: (2.66)
Furthermore,  = 11+ ln

1 + lnN(1+)H
 

1+

+ 1 ln (H) ; where H = 1 +
 lnN
(1+) . Now, we
characterize the number of legal copies and illegal copies in the following lemma.
Lemma 4. In the presence of an ecient, illicit P2P, the number of illegal copies is given
by
Nl(T1)  Nl; (2.67)
and the equality holds when  = 0.
Proof. From equation (2.8), the growth rate of illegal copies is given by
dNi
dt
a
= min fNw(t); Nl(t) + Ni(t))g (2.68)
b
= minfI(t)  U(t); Nl(t) + Ni(t))g (2.69)
where (a) follows from equations (2.5), (2.6) along with the facts that  = 1 and I(t) is
constant. (b) follows from the denition of the number of wanters in the system.
From equation (2.9), the growth rate of legal copies in Phase j is given by
dNl(t)
dt
c
= CN + Nl(t) if Nw(t) > 0;
d
= 0 if Nw(t) = 0: (2.70)
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(d) follows from the facts that dNidt = 0 when there are no wanters in the system (from
(2.68)) and I(t) is constant.
As dened before, let U(t) be the total copies of the content in the system. Then,
U(t) = Nl(t) +Ni(t):
Now, we claim that,
Nl(Tj)  Nl(Tj): (2.71)
and the equality holds when  = 0.
Note that
d Nl(t)
dt
j U=x; Ni=y
e
=
dNl(t)
dt
jU=x;Ni=y; (2.72)
d Ni(t)
dt
j U=x; Ni=y
f
 dNi(t)
dt
jU=x;Ni=y: (2.73)
and (f) is an equality when  = 0. (e) follows from (2.64) and (2.70). And (f) is due to
(2.68) and (2.65). From the above equations, we can deduce that
d Nl
d U
j U=x; Ni=y 
dNl
dU
jU=x;Ni=y: (2.74)
Note that the range of functions U(t) and U(t) are identical, [I(0); N ]. Since Nl(0) = Nl(0),
from the above equation, we get that Nl(Tj)  Ni(Tj); Also, equality holds when  = 0.
Let  be the instant at which Nw() = 0. Then, the number of legal copies, Nl(t), is
given by
Nl(t) =
8><>:

CN


et   CN t 2 (0;  ];
Nl() t >  :
(2.75)
The above result follows from (2.64) and the initial condition Nl(0) = 0. Now, we resort
to nd  . Note that, Nw() = 0 implies U() = N . Therefore, rst we derive U(t) and
then, nds the time at which U(t) reaches N .
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Note that U(0) < N1+ , by assumption. Then, from (2.64) and (2.65), we get that
d U(t)
dt
=  U(t) + CN ; if t 2 [0; ];
where  is dened as U() = N1+ . Solving the above equation with the initial condition
U(0) = 0 yields
U(t) =
CN

et   CN

; if t 2 [0; ]: (2.76)
Then, from the above result  can shown to be  = 1 ln(H); where H = 1 +
 lnN
1+ .
Now, consider the case t 2 [;  ]. Then, N1+  U(t)  N and hence, from (2.65),
dNi
dt
= N   Nl(t)  Ni(t); if t 2 [;  ]:
Solving the above equation, we get
Ni(t) = N  

Nl() +
CN


e(t )
1 + 
+
CN

+

Ni() +
Nl()
1 + 
  CN
1 + 
 N

e (t );
= N   CN

e(t)
1 + 
+
CN

 

N
1 + 
+
CNe

1 + 

e (t );
for t 2 [;  ]. Here, the second equality is obtained by replacing Ni() with U()   Nl()
and by substituting Nl() from (2.75). Then, U(t), which is eqaul to Nl(t)+ Ni(t), is given
by
U(t) = N +
CNe
t
1 + 
 

N
1 + 
+
CNe

1 + 

e (t ):
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Now, solving for t, from U(t) = N , we get that
 =  +
1
1 + 
ln

1 +
lnN(1 + )e 
1 + 

(2.77)
=
1

lnH +
1
1 + 
ln
 
1 +
lnN(1 + )H
 

1 + 
!
: (2.78)
The second result follows by susbtituting  = 1 lnH, where H = 1 +
 lnN
1+ :
Finally, substituting  in (2.75) yields Nl, which completes the proof.
As mentioned in the statement of Lemma 4, the inequality is exact in the case of  = 0.
Additionally, in this case, the form of Nl(T1) simplies.
Corollary 4. Let  = 0. Then, the number of legal copies at the end of Phase 4 is given
by Nl(T1) = CN  ;
Now that we have characterized the number of legal and illegal copies precisely, attain-
ing the statement in theorem is accomplished by studying the asymptotics of the results
in Lemma 4 and Corollary 4. From (2.10), Lemma 4, Corollary 4 and equation (2.66), we
can show that
L 2 

0@ 1
lnN
(lnN)

   1



1A ; (2.79)
and L 2    ln lnNlnN  if  = 0, which completes the proof.
Again, the fractional legitimate copies rises by an order of magnitude as the booster
factor, , increases. Interestingly, the eciency of the illicit P2P does not impact the
asymptotic order of the fractional revenue when  = 0, since in both the ecient and
inecient case it is 
 
ln lnN
lnN

. However, the eciency of the illicit P2P does aect the
fractional legitimate copies attained for positive values of booster factor. In particular, it
causes a (1   ) factor change in the fractional legitimate copies attained; however this has
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almost no eect on the asymptotic growth.
Now, we consider the second case, Bass model of evolution.
Theorem 4. Suppose I(t) satises (2.3). Let  2 (0; 1 I(0)=N). The fractional legitimate
copies attained by the content provider in the presence an ecient, illicit P2P is
L 2 

0@ 1
lnN
(lnN)

   1



1A : (2.80)
Further, when  = 0,
L 2 

ln lnN
lnN

: (2.81)
Proof. In our model, an ecient illicit P2P is characterized by eciency parameter, (t),
equal to one. Then, from (2.8), the evolution of illegal copies of content in the system,
Ni(t), is given by
dNi(t)
dt
= min

Nw(t) +
dI(t)
dt
; Nl(t) + Ni(t)

: (2.82)
And, the evolution of legal copies of the content in the system, Ni(t), is given by,
dNl(t)
dt
=
8><>: CN + Nl(t) Nw(t) > 0;minfCN + Nl(t); dIdt   dNidt g Nw(t) = 0: (2.83)
As the interest for the content evolves according to the Bass demand model, the evolution
of Nl(t) and Ni(t) traverses along multiple stages of dynamics as shown in Figure 2.5.
Below, we discuss these stages of evolution in detail.
Stage 1: By assumption, Nl(0) = I(0), Ni(0) = 0 and Nw(0) = 0 where I(0) is the
initial demand in the system. Then,
Nw(0) +
dI(t)
dt
jt=0 > Nl(0) + Ni(0):
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Figure 2.5: Evolutionary phases of the growth of legal and illegal copies of content in the
presence of an ecient illicit P2P
The above result follows from our assumption that  < 1  I(0)N . Therefore, at t = 0, from
(2.82),
dNi(t)
dt
= Nl(t) + Ni(t): (2.84)
From (2.83), the evolution of Nl(t) at time t = 0 is,
dNl(t)
dt
=
dI(t)
dt
  dNi(t)
dt
; (2.85)
=
dI(t)
dt
  (Nl(t) + Ni(t)): (2.86)
37
The rst equality follows from the facts that Nw(0) = 0 and
dI(t)
dt jt=0 < CN . Also, from
the above equations, we get that Nl(t) +Ni(t) = I(t).
The evolution exits Stage 1 when any one of the following conditions is attained,
C1 :
dI
dt
(t)  dNi
dt
 CN + Nl(t); (2.87)
C2 :
dI
dt
(t)  Nl(t) + Ni(t): (2.88)
Here, C1 occurs when the number of wanters approaching the legitimate CDN exceeds
its current capacity, Then, from (2.83), the dynamics of evolution of Nl(t) changes. C2
happens when the number of users attempting to download from the illicit P2P reduces
below the current capacity of the illicit P2P. Then, from (2.82), the dynamics of evolution
of Ni(t) changes. Next, we show if  < 1   2plnN , C1 occurs before C2 and the evolution
proceeds to Stage 2. Otherwise, Stage 1 is followed by Stage 7.
Now, let T2, be the time at which C1 is attained, i.e,
dI(t)
dt
jt=T2  
dNi(t)
dt
jt=T2 = CN + Nl(T2); (2.89)
) dI(t)
dt
jt=T2   I(T2) = CN (2.90)
) I(T2) = N(1  )
2
"
1 
s
1  4
lnN(1  )2
#
(2.91)
The second equality follows from (2.84) along with the facts that  =  +  and Nl(t) +
Ni(t) = I(t). Equation (2.91) follows from the denition of I(t). In the above equation,
T2 has a real positive solution i  < 1   2plnN . Also, let T7 be the time at which C2 is
attained, i.e,
dI(t)
dt jt=T7 = Nl(T7) + Ni(T7)
) dI(t)dt jt=T7   I(T7) =  Nl(T7): (2.92)
The second equality follows from the facts that  = +  and Nl(t) +Ni(t) = I(t). From
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(2.90), (2.92) and the denition of I(t), it can be shown that, if T2 has a real valued
solution, then T2 < T7. Therefore, Stage 1 is followed by Stage 2 if  < 1   2plnN and,
Stage 7 otherwise.
Stage 2 : The evolution enters Stage 2 from Stage 1 due to the condition C1 given by
(2.87). Then, the dynamics of Ni(t) does not change from that of Stage 1,
dNi
dt
= Nl(t) + Ni(t); (2.93)
but the dynamics of Nl(t) changes to,
dNl
dt
= CN + Nl(t): (2.94)
Also, from the above equations and (2.87), Nl(t) +Ni(t)  I(t).
A transition from this stage occurs when any one of the following conditions is satised,
C3 : CN + Nl(t)  dI(t)
dt
  dNi(t)
dt
;
Nw(t) = 0; (2.95)
C4 :
dI(t)
dt
+Nw(t)  Nl(t) + Ni(t): (2.96)
Here, C3 occurs when the number of wanters in the system goes to zero and the rate at
which newly generated population approaching the legitimate CDN falls below its current
capacity. Then, from (2.83), the dynamics of evolution of Nl(t) changes. C2 happens when
the number of users attempting to download from the illicit P2P reduces below the current
capacity of the illicit P2P. Then, from (2.82), the dynamics of evolution of Ni(t) changes.
The evolution enters Stage 3, if C3 is attained before C4. Otherwise, it proceeds to Stage 4.
Let T3 mark the time at which the evolution enters Stage 3. Then, from C3 and (2.93),
CN + Nl(T3)  dI(t)
dt
jt=T3   (Ni(T3) + Nl(T3)); (2.97)
and Nw(T3) = 0: (2.98)
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Also, let Stage 4 start at time t = T4. Then, from C4,
dI(t)
dt
jt=T4 +Nw(T4) = Nl(T4) + Ni(T4): (2.99)
Stage 3: The evolution enters Stage 3 from Stage 2 due to the condition C3 given by
(2.95). Then, the dynamics Ni(t) does not change from that of Stage 2,
dNi(t)
dt
= Nl(t) + Ni(t); (2.100)
but, the evolution of Nl(t) changes to,
dNl(t)
dt
=
dI(t)
dt
  dNi(t)
dt
; (2.101)
=
dI(t)
dt
  (Nl(t) + Ni(t)): (2.102)
This stage starts at t = T3, which is dened by (2.97) and (2.98). From the above dynamics
equations and (2.98), we get Nl(t) +Ni(t) = I(t).
We show that the evolution of Nl(t), given by (2.101), does not change as long as the
evolution of Ni(t) does not deviate from (2.100). This claim holds true if
CN + Nl(t)  dI(t)
dt
  (Nl(t) + Ni(t));
) dI(t)
dt
  I(t)  CN ; (2.103)
for all t  T3. The second inequality follows from the facts  = +  and Nl(t) +Ni(t) =
I(t). At t = T3 the above requirement is met, which follows from (2.97). Then, we get
I(T3)  N(1  )
2
; (2.104)
from the denition of I(t) and (2.103). The function dI(t)dt  I(t) is monotonically decreas-
ing if I(t) > N(1 )2 : Then, (2.103) holds for all t > T3 and that proves our claim.
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The above discussion implies that a transition from this stage happens only when the
dynamics of evolution of Ni(t) changes. From (2.82) and (2.100), the dynamics of Ni(t)
changes, when the number of users downloading from the illicit P2P reduces below the
current capacity of illicit P2P,
C5 :
dI(t)
dt
 Nl(t) + Ni(t): (2.105)
When C5 occurs, evolution enters Stage 5. Let this occurs at t = T5. Then,
dI(t)
dt
jt=T5 = Nl(T5) + Ni(T5): (2.106)
Stage 4: The evolution enters Stage 3 from Stage 2 due to the condition C4 given by
(2.96). Then, the dynamics of Nl(t) does not change from that of Stage 2,
dNl(t)
dt
= CN + Nl(t); (2.107)
but the evolution of Ni(t) changes to,
dNi(t)
dt
= Nw(t) +
dI(t)
dt
; (2.108)
This stage starts at time t = T4 dened by (2.99).
We claim that the evolution of Ni(t) follows (2.108) for all t  T4. This claim holds
true if 
Nw(t) +
dI(t)
dt

 Nl(t) + Ni(t); (2.109)
for all t  T4. Note that Equation (2.109) holds true at t = T4. Since, Nw(t) = I(t)  
(Nl(t) + Ni(t)) by denition, from Equation (2.108), we get that
dNw(t)
dt < 0: Also, using
the denition of Nw(t) in (2.99), we can show that
dI(t)
dt
jt=T4   I(T4) =  (1 + )Nw(T4)  Nl(T4) < 0:
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Then, from the denition of I(t), the above result holds for all t  T4. Then, we get
d
dt

Nw(t) +
dI
dt

<
d
dt
(Nl(t) + Ni(t));
which along with (2.99) proves (2.109).
The above discussion implies that a transition from this stage occurs when the evolution
of Nl(t) changes. From (2.107) and (2.83), the evolution of Nl(t) changes when the number
of wanters goes to zero. Then,
Nw(T6) = 0: (2.110)
where T6 marks the beginning of Stage 6.
Stage 5;6;7:
These are the nal stages of evolution. Stage 5 is preceded by Stage 3, Stage 6 is preceded
by Stage 4, and Stage 7 is preceded by Stage 1. The dynamics of all these stages are
identical,
dNl(t)
dt
= 0; (2.111)
dNi(t)
dt
=
dI(t)
dt
: (2.112)
It is easy to see that the evolutions of Nl(t) and Nl(t) stay in these stages forever once
they reach here.
In summary, if   1   2p
lnN
, the evolution of Ni(t) and Nl(t) traverse along the
sequence of phases, Stage 1 !Stage 7. Otherwise, they proceed along the sequence of
phases, Stage 1! Stage 2!Stage 3(Stage 4)!Stage 5(Stage 6). In the next section, we
analyze these two cases separately and obtain a lower bound on number of legal copies of
the content in the system at the end of evolution.
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2.2.3 Analysis
We rst consider the case,   1  2p
lnN
. Let us introduce a few notation before stating
the result. We dene
(x) =

I(0)
N

N
h
(1  ) 

;
x
N

   

   1; x
N
i
; (2.113)
and  (; x) =
R x
I(0)=N
 
1 u
u

du. Also, let
T = ln

N(1  )G
I(0) (2  (1  )G)

; (2.114)
where G = 1 +
q
1 + 4D
N(1 )2 and D = (N(1   ))

N(1 )
I(0)

. Now, we are ready to
provide the result.
Lemma 5. Assume   1  2p
lnN
. Then, a lower bound on the number of legal copies of
the content in the system at t = T1 is given by,
Nl(T1)  ((I( T )) + I(0))e T : (2.115)
where I(t) is given by (2.3).
Proof. Recall that, when   1  2p
lnN
, the evolution of Nl(t) and Ni(t) takes place in two
stages, namely Stage 1 and Stage 7. Solving the dynamics of evolution in Stage 1, given
by (2.85) and (2.84), we get
Nl(t) = ((I(t))  (I(0))et + I(0)et;
= ((I(t)) + I(0))et; (2.116)
where (x) is dened by (2.113). The second equality follows since (I(0)) = 0.
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Stage 7 starts at t = T7. Recall from (2.92) that T7 is a solution to the equation,
dI(t)
dt
  I(t) =  Nl(t)
. It is not easy to solve the above equation exactly . Hence, here, we obtain a lower bound
on T7. Let r = ln(
N(1 )
I(0) ). Note that, at t = r,
dI
dt
(t)  I(t) = 0:
Also, the function dIdt (t)  I(t) is positive for t < r and, it is monotonically decreasing for
t  r. Then, r  T7. Then, Nl(r)  Nl(T7). That implies the solution of the equation,
dI
dt
  I(t) =  Nl(r);
must be less than or equal to T7. Now, substituting Nl(r) from Equation (2.116) in the
above equation, and then, solving for t yields T , which is dened by (2.114), as the unique
solution. Since no legals are generated in Stage 7 according to (2.111), and T7  T , we
have
Nl(T1) = Nl(T7)  Nl( T ):
Now, obtain Nl( T ) from (2.116) and substitute in the above inequality to prove the lemma.
Now, we consider the second case where  < 1   2p
lnN
. We introduce a few notation
before stating the result. Let
I2 =
N(1 )
2
h
1 
q
1  4
lnN(1 )2
i
; (2.117)
T2 = ln
h
NI2
I(0)(N I2)
i
; (2.118)
I3 =
I2eT1
1  I2
N
+
I2
N
eT1
; (2.119)
T1 =
1
 ln

c

+
N(1 )
2
[1+H]
c

+
N(1 )
2
[1 H]

; (2.120)
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T2 =
1
 ln
h c

+I3
c

+I2
i
; (2.121)
T3 = T2 +T2 (2.122)
L3 =
C
 (e
T2   1) + ((I2) + I(0))e T3 ;
where H =
q
1  4
lnN(1 )2 .
Also, let
I4 = I( T3) =
I(0)e
T3
1  I(0)
N
+
I(0)
N
e
T3
; (2.123)
I5 =
N(1 )
2
h
1 +
q
1 + 4L3
N(1 )2
i
; (2.124)
T5 = ln
h
NI5
I(0)(N I5)
i
; (2.125)
L4 = ((I5)  (I4))e T5 + L3e( T5  T3);
where I(t) is the Bass demand function.
Lemma 6. Assume  < 1  2p
lnN
. Then, a lower bound on the number of legals at t = T1
is given by,
Nl(T1) 
8><>: L3 if
T5  T3
L4; else:
(2.126)
Proof. When  < 1  2p
lnN
, the evolution of of Nl(t) and Ni(t) takes place along a sequence
of stages, which is given by, `Stage 1! Stage 2!Stage 3(or Stage 4)!Stage 5(or Stage 6)'.
An exact characterization of Nl(t) and Ni(t) might be quite dicult as the analysis involves
solving many complex dierential equations. Therefore, we dene two processes Nl(t) and
Ni(t); Nl(t) bounds Nl(t) from below and Ni(t) bounds Ni(t) from above. We analyze
these bounding processes instead of the actual processes.
We go through a sequence of intermediate steps to prove this lemma.
Step 1: Dene Nl(t) and Ni(t)
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First of all, let Nl(0) = Nl(0) and Ni(0) = Ni(0). Let Nl(t) evolves as follows,
d Nl(t)
dt
=
8>>>>>>><>>>>>>>:
dI
dt   ( Nl(t) +  Ni(t)); [0; T2];
CN +  Nl(t); [T2; T3];
dI
dt   ( Nl(t) +  Ni(t)); [ T3;maxf T3; T5g];
0; [maxf T3; T5g; T1]:
(2.127)
Also, let
d Ni(t)
dt
=
8>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>:
( Nl(t) +  Ni(t)); [0; T2];
( Nl(t) +  Ni(t))
+R(t  T3); [T2; T3];
( Nl(t) +  Ni(t)); ( T3;maxf T3; T5g];
dI
dt [maxf T3; T5g; T1]:
(2.128)
where T2 is given by (2.118), T3 is dened by (2.122), T5 is dened by (2.125), R =
I( T3)   (Nl( T3) + Ni( T3)) and (t) is Kronecker delta function. It can be veried that
T3 > T2. Also, the following equations can be veried:
dI(t)
dt

t= T3   I( T3)  CN ; (2.129)
Nl(t) + Ni(t) < I(t)for T2 < t < T3; (2.130)
dI(t)
dt

t= T5   I( T5) =  Nl( T3): (2.131)
Also, we dene Nw(t) = I(t) ( Nl(t)+ Ni(t)): In the next step, we show that Nl(t)  Nl(t)
for all t.
Step 2: We claim that Nl(t)  Nl(t):
Recall that, the actual processes may pass through either Stages 3 and 5 or Stages 4 and
6. We analyze these two cases separately.
Case 1: The evolution of Nl(t) and Ni(t) takes place along Stages 3 and 5
First of all, we have Nl(0) = Nl(0) and Ni(0) = Ni(0) from the denition of the
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bounding processes. Now, suppose T3  T3. Then, comparing Stage 1 dynamics, (2.85,
2.84), and Stage 2 dynamics (2.94, 2.93) with the bounding process dynamics (2.127, 2.128),
we get that, for t 2 [0; T3],
d Nl(t)
dt
=
dNl(t)
dt
and
d Ni(t)
dt
 dNi(t)
dt
:
Then,
Nl(t) = Nl(t) if t 2 [0; T3]: (2.132)
Also, suppose T5  T5. Then, comparing Stage 2 dynamics, (2.94, 2.93), Stage 3
dynamics (2.101, 2.100) and Stage 5 dynamics (2.111, 2.112) with the bounding process
dynamics (2.127, 2.128), we get that, for t 2 [ T3; T1],
d Nl(t)
dt
 dNl(t)
dt
and
d Ni(t)
dt
 dNi(t)
dt
:
Then, Nl(t)  Nl(t) for t > T3. To complete the proof, we must show that T3  T3 and
T5  T5.
Show that T3  T3: Recall that Stage 3 begins at T3 in the evolution of the original
processes. From the denition of T3, given by (2.97),
dI(t)
dt jt=T3   (Nl(T3) + Ni(T3))  CN + Nl(T3);
) dI(t)dt jt=T3   I(T3)  CN : (2.133)
The second inequality follows from the facts that  = +  and Ni(T3) +Nl(T3) = I(T3)
(since Nw(T3) = 0 from (2.98)).
First, we guess a lower bound for T3. Suppose, at time t = r,
I(r) =
N(1  )
2
"
1 +
s
1 +
4
lnN(1  )2
#
;
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is satised. Note that I(r) > I(T2) and hence, r > T2. It can be shown that if t 2 [T2; r],
dI
dt
(t)  I(t)  CN ;
with equality at t = T2 and t = r. Also, the function,
dI
dt (t)   I(t) strictly decreasing if
t  r. Then, from (2.133) and the fact that T3 > T2, we conclude that r  T3.
Now, obtain a better lower bound for T3. Let us dene U(t) = Nl(t) + Ni(t): From
(2.98), we have Nw(T3) = 0, which implies that U(T3) = I(T3). We know that U(r)  I(r).
Find t0 such that U(t0) = I(r). Then, U(t0)  I(t0). Then, get s such that U(s) = I(t0).
Since U(t) and I(t) are monotonically increasing, we have r  t0  s  T3.
From the dynamics of evolution of Stage 2, given by (2.93) and (2.94), we can show
that during the interval [T2; T3],
U(t) =

C

+ I2

e(t T2)   C

:
Then, it can be shown that t0 = T2 +T1; I3 = I(t0) and s = T3. Hence, T3  T3.
Show that T5  T5: Recall that Stage 5 begins at T5. From (2.106),
dI(t)
dt
jt=T5   I(T5) =  Nl(T5):
The above result is due to the facts that  = + and Ni(t)+Nl(t) = I(t) in Stage 3 and
5.
We guess a lower bound for T5. From, (2.131),
dI(t)
dt

t= T5   I( T5) =   Nl( T3):
is satised. If T5  T3, then T5  T3  T5. Suppose T5 > T3. Recall that T3  T3  T5 and
Nl( T3) = Nl( T3) (from (2.132)). Then, Nl( T3)  Nl(T5). Also, dI(t)dt  I(t) is a decreasing
function of t when its value is negative. Combining these facts with the denitions of T5
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and T5, we can assert that T5  T5.
Case 2: The evolution of Nl(t) and Ni(t) takes place along Stage 4 and Stage 6.
We have to consider two cases, T4 < T3 and T4  T3 respectively.
Suppose T4 < T3: First, we show that,
Nl( T3) = Nl( T3): (2.134)
Note that the dynamics of actual and the bounding processes are identical untill t = T4.
Then, Nw(T4) = Nw(T4). Also, during T4 < t  minfT6; T3g, Ni(t) grows faster than
Ni(t), while Nl(t) grows at the same rate as that of Nl(t). Therefore, to prove (2.134)
holds true, we just need to show that T6  T3, which is done as follows: Note that, when
t 2 [T4;minfT6; T3g], the growth rate of Nl(t)+Ni(t) is less than that of Nl(t)+ Ni(t), and
hence Nw(t)  Nw(t). Then, from (2.130) and the denition of Nw(t), we get Nw(t) > 0
when T4 < t < T3 (since T4 > T2 by denition). Then, from (2.110), we get that T6 cannot
be less than T3.
Now, suppose T5  T3. Then, from (2.134) and (2.127),
Nl(T1) = Nl( T3) = Nl( T3)  N(T1);
which proves our claim. Now, we show that T5  T3 as follows: For all t > T4, (2.109) is
satised. Then, we get
dI(t)
dt

t= T3   I( T3)   Nl( T3):
due to the assumption, T4 < T3 and the denition of Nw(t). But, from (2.131) and (2.134),
dI(t)
dt

t= T5   I( T5) =  Nl( T3):
Therefore, T5  T3 since dIdt   I(t) is decreasing in t once it goes negative.
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Suppose T4  T3: Note that the dynamics of actual and the bounding processes are
identical untill t = T3. To prove the claim, we show that
dNl(t)
dt
 d
Nl(t)
dt
when t  T3: (2.135)
At t = T3, from (2.129), the dynamics of actual and the bounding processes, the above
expression holds true. Also, during t 2 [ T3; T6], dNl(t)dt and d
Nl(t)
dt are increasing and de-
creasing functions respectively. Hence, (2.135) holds true until t  T6. Now, we show that
T5 < T6, and hence the growth rate of Nl(t) is zero for t  T6. This asserts that (2.135)
holds for t  T6. The proof is as follows: From (2.99) and the denition of Nw(t), we get
dI(t)
dt
jt=T4   I(T4) =  Nl(T4)  (1 + )Nw(T4): (2.136)
Then, T5  T4 due to these reasons: 1) T5 satises (2.131), 2)  Nl( T3) = Nl( T3 <
Nl(T4) + (1 + )Nw(T4) since T3 < T4 by assumption, 3)
dI(t)
dt   I(t) is decreasing once
its value goes negative. Now, since T4 < T6, we have T5 < T6, and hence (2.135) is attained.
Having shown that Nl(t) bounds Nl(t) from below, we evaluate Nl(T1) in the next
step.
Step 5: Evaluate the bounding process, Nl(T1):
Find Nl(T2): The evolution of the bounding processes during [0; T2] are given by (2.127)
and (2.128). Solving them, we get
Nl(t) = ((I(t))  (I(0))et + I(0)et;
= ((I(t)) + I(0))et;
where (x) is dened by (2.113). The second equality holds true since (I(0)) = 0.
Substituting T2 from (2.118) in the above result,
Nl(T2) = ((I2) + I(0))e
T2 ;
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where I2 = I(T2).
Find Nl( T3): Solving the growth equations given by (2.127) and (2.128), for the interval
[T2; T3], we get
Nl(t) =

C

+ Nl(T2)

e(t T2)   C

:
Substituting, T3 from (2.122), and Nl(T2) in the above expression, we get
Nl( T3) =
C

(eT2   1) + ((I2) + I(0))e T3 = L3:
where L3 is given by (2.123).
Let T3 < T5. Find Nl( T5): Solving the growth equations given by (2.127) and (2.128),
for the interval [ T3; T5], we get
Nl(t) = ((I(t))  (I( T3))et + Nl( T3)e(t  T3);
Substituting T3; T5 and Nl( T3) in the above equation, we get
Nl(t) = ((I5)  (I4))et + L3e( T5  T3) = L4;
where I5; I4; L3 and L4 are given by (2.124), (2.123), (2.123) and (2.126) respectively.
Find Nl(T1): From (2.127), we have
d Nl(t)
dt = 0, for t  maxf T3; T5g. Therefore, we
have Nl(T1) = Nl(maxf T3; T5g). Then,
Nl(T1)  Nl(T1) =
8><>:
Nl( T3) = L3 if T5  T3
Nl( T5) = L4; else:
We have characterized the number of legal copies generated in the system in the presence
of an ecient illicit P2P in the previous two lemmas. Attaining the statement in the
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theorem is accomplished by studying the asymptotics of the results in Lemma 5 and 6. We
start by introducing a few notation.
T3 =
1

ln [(1  ) lnN + (1  )] ;
~T3 = T2 +T3; (2.137)
T4 =
1

ln

(1  )
1 + 
lnN + (1  )

; (2.138)
~T4 = T2 +T4: (2.139)
Also, we say, AN  BN , if limN!1 ANBN = 1, AN  BN , if limN!1
AN
BN
 1: and, AN  BN ,
if limN!1 ANBN  1: Now, we are ready to prove the theorem.
As N goes large, for any given , the assumption of Lemma 6 that  < 1   2p
lnN
is
attained. Therefore, in the asymptotic case, we use the result of Lemma 6. That lemma
says,
Nl(T1) 
8><>: L3; if
T5  T3
L4; else:
(2.140)
where T3; L3; T5 and L4 are given by (2.122), (2.123), (2.125) and (2.126) respectively. The
proof is done in two steps. First, we evaluate L3. Next, we show that T3  T5. Then, from
the above equation, we get that Nl(T1)  L3.
Evaluate L3: As N goes larger, it can be shown that,
I2  N
lnN(1  ) ; T2 
1

ln ((1  ) logN) ;
T2  ln

N
I(0)(1  ) lnN

;
T3  ln
"
N((1  ) lnN) 1
I(0)(1  ) lnN
#
:
(I2) 

I(0)
N

N
(1  )
(1  )

1
(1  ) lnN
1 
:
The above results follows from (2.117), (2.121), (2.118), (2.122) and (2.113) respectively.
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Substituting the above results in (2.123), we get that
L3  N
lnN
 
(lnN(1  ))
(1  )   1
!
: (2.141)
Show that T3  T5: First of all, from (2.125) and (2.124), note that, I( T5) = I5 and
I5  N . Also, for large values of N , from (2.122) and the denition of I(t), we can show
that, I( T3)  N . Combining these two results, we get I( T5)  I( T3) This result in turn
implies that T5  T3, since I(t) is monotonically increasing.
Hence, from (2.140),
Nl(T1)  L3:
From (2.141), the above equation, and (2.10), we get (2.62), which completes the rst part
of theorem.
The second part of the theorem deals with the case  = 0. From, (2.62), we have,
L 2 


ln lnN
lnN

: (2.142)
Now, to complete the proof, it suces to prove the following lemma.
Lemma 7. When  = 0,
L 2 o

ln lnN
lnN

.
Proof. Recall that when  < 1  2p
lnN
; which holds for any  when N is large, the evolution
of Nl(t) and Ni(t) takes place along the sequence of phases,`Stage 1! Stage 2!Stage 3 (
or Stage 4)!Stage 5 ( or Stage 6)'. We analyze each of these phases and obtain an upper
bound on Nl(T1) as follows.
Stage 1: An upper bound on the number of legal copies at the end of this stage is given
by,
Nl(T2)  N
lnN(1  ) : (2.143)
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which follows from the facts that Nl(t)  I(t) for all t and I(T2)  NlnN(1 ) . Stage 2:
First we show that as N goes large, T4  T3 and hence, in the asymptotic case Stage 2 is
followed by Stage 4. The proof of this claim proceeds as follows. Let, U(t) = Nl(t)+Ni(t).
From the dynamics of evolution of Stage 2, given by (2.93) and (2.94),
U(t) =

C

+ I2

e(t T2)   C

; (2.144)
where I2 is given (2.117) and T2 is given by (2.118). Now, substituting ~T3 from (2.137) in
the above equation, we get
U( ~T3)  I( ~T3):
Also, it is easy to verify that T3 satises (2.97). These results along with the denition of
T3, given by (2.97-2.98), implies that ~T3  T3. Similarly, substituting ~T4 in (2.144), we can
show that
U( ~T4)  1
1 + 

I( ~T4) +
dI
dt
( ~T4)

:
This result along with the denition of T4, given by (2.99), implies that ~T4  T4.
We have, ~T4  ~T3, since
U( ~T4) =
N
1 + 
< N = U( ~T3);
and U(t) is monotonically increasing. Therefore, we conclude that T4  T3. And hence,
this stage is always followed by Stage 4.
Then, from the dynamics of Nl(t), given by (2.94),
Nl(T4) = Nl(T2) + CN (T4   T2):
Now, from (2.143) and the denitions of ~T4 and T2, we get
Nl(T4)  N
lnN(1  ) +
N
 lnN
ln

lnN
(1  )
1 + 
+ 1  

: (2.145)
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Stage 4: This stage starts at time t = T4. From the discussion given above (in Stage 3
analysis), T4  ~T4. Then, from (2.139), I(T4)  I( ~T4)  N and dIdt (T4)  dIdt ( ~T4)  0: Also,
Nw(T4) = I( ~T4)  U( ~T4)  N1+ : Recall that U(t) = Nl(t) +Ni(t). And U( ~T4) is obtained
from (2.144) and (2.139).
Using these facts and the dynamics of Ni(t) and Nl(t) given by (2.108) and (2.107)
respectively, we show that,
U(t) = (CN +N)(1  e t) + U( ~T4)e (t  ~T4):
This stage terminates, when no Wanters are left to be served, i.e U(t)  N . Let ~T6
marks this event. Then,
~T6  ln

lnN
1 + 

:
The legal copies of content generated in this phase is CN  ( ~T6  ~T4) from the dynamics of
Nl(t) given by (2.107). Then, from the above result and (2.145), we get
Nl(T1)  N
lnN
ln
"
(lnN)(
1

+1)
1 + 

(1  )
(1 + )
 1

#
;
which completes the proof.
The above theorem along with Theorem 3 asserts that the fractional legitimate copies
attained by the CDN under Bass model of evolution is no dierent from that of Flash
Crowd model in asymptotic order.
Since Theorems 1 and 3 rely on a uid model, and characterize only the asymptotic
growth rate of the fractional legitimate copies produced in the system, we present numerical
simulations to verify the qualitative insights in discrete systems with nite N .
To simulate the underlying discrete stochastic system, we assume time is discrete and
that there are N = 100; 000 users in the system. A Bass model based interest evolution
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is assumed. That means, at each time slot, each user picks a Poisson distributed number
(with mean 1) of other users to spread interest to. The server has a FIFO policy with
service rate C = 8000  N= lnN .
Figure 2.3 illustrates the evolution of legal and illegal copies of the content in the case
of an inecient illicit P2P system with  = 0:75. In Figure 2.3(a), where  = 0, the
nal number of legal copies produced in the system is 63; 000. When the booster factor
increases, as shown in Figure 2.3(b) where  = 0:52, the number of legal copies increases
to 88; 888; In fact, the fractional legitimate copies increases by more than 25%.
Table 2.1: Fractional revenue ratio of inecient illicit P2P


 = 0:75  = 0:5
Simulation Analytical Simulation Analytical
0 0.64 0.60 0.69 0.67
0.10 0.71 0.71 0.77 0.75
0.24 0.77 0.72 0.82 0.77
0.41 0.81 0.75 0.86 0.79
0.63 0.87 0.79 0.92 0.80
0.92 0.97 0.85 0.98 0.82
In Table 2.1, we compare the simulation results against our analytical results from
Lemma 3 and Corollary 3, for various combinations of  and . As expected from Corol-
lary 3, our analytical predictions closely match with the simulation results in the case,
 = 0. In the case,  > 0, the predicted values are less than those obtained using simula-
tion, which agrees with Lemma 3; nevertheless, the dierences are quite small. Also observe
that, as  increases, the fractional legitimate copies improves signicantly. Especially, in
the case,  = 0:75, as booster factor increases from  = 0 to  = 0:92, the fractional
legitimate copies increases by 150%.
Next, we move to the case of an ecient illicit P2P. Figure 2.4 illustrates the case of
an ecient illicit P2P system. In Figure 2.4(a), where  = 0, the nal number of legal
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copies produced in the system is 45; 920. When the booster factor increases, as shown in
Figure 2.4(b) where  = 0:38, the number of legal copies increases to 96; 380; In fact, the
fractional legitimate copies increases by more than 100%.
Table 2.2: Fractional revenue ratio of ecient illicit P2P


 = 0:75  = 0:5  = 0:25
Simulation Analytical Simulation Analytical Simulation Analytical
0 0.03 0.03 0.15 0.15 0.42 0.37
0.48 0.07 0.07 0.28 0.26 0.56 0.50
0.69 0.18 0.14 0.40 0.38 0.67 0.59
0.84 0.30 0.24 0.54 0.52 0.77 0.68
0.95 0.55 0.41 0.78 0.69 0.9 0.78
In Table 2.2, we tabulate the simulation results and the analytical results. The ana-
lytical results are obtained from Lemma 5 and Lemma 6. The simulation results are in
agreement with our analytical predictions. Also note that, the improvement attained in
the fractional legitimate copies, as  increase, is phenomenal. For example, in the case,
 = 0:75, as booster factor increases from  = 0 to  = 0:95, the fractional legitimate
copies increases by 1833%.
2.3 Revenue sharing model
In the previous sections, we studied the impact of the three parameters ;  and  on
the eventual number of legal content copies in the system. We made the assumption that
 +  = ; following the intuition that  is the xed probability of a user who has the
content being willing to redistribute it, and which P2P swarm is joined aects the number
of legal copies. We now consider the motivation behind the users' decisions on which swarm
to join.
Suppose that the purchase price of a copy of the content is p: Hence, a user that wishes
to obtain a legal copy of the content must pay the content generator the sum p through
some kind of online banking system. Suppose that the content owner utilizes a simple
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model for revenue sharing, where a user receives p for each piece of content it distributes
when taking part in the legitimate network as a Booster. Thus,  = 0 corresponds to no
revenue sharing. Note that this could potentially be implemented on a system such as
BitTorrent by simply keeping track of amount uploaded by each peer3. The value  can be
viewed either as a share of the revenue from each download or as the expected payo of a
lottery scheme operated by the CDN.
While it is dicult to exactly predict the eect of revenue sharing, it seems reasonable
that increased revenue sharing should limit the likelihood of a Wanter going rogue after
attaining the content legally. To qualitatively capture this eect, we model  as a decreasing
function of . A specic form could be
 = ();
where (:) is a decreasing function with (0) = 1 and (1) = 0.
Recall that we dened the parameter R as the fractional revenue, also the fraction of
legitimate copies in the system at T1: It is clear that the prot obtained by the content
owner also depends on the amount of revenue shared with the boosters, which in turn
depends on the exact form of (): Hence, the content owner would have to determine the
optimal amount of revenue sharing in order to maximize prot. For illustration, let us
choose
() = N ;
in our simulations. The results are shown in Figure 2.6, which illustrates the impact of
the amount of revenue sharing on the fractional revenue ratio of the CDN in the cases of
inecient and ecient illicit P2Ps. We use  = 0:75 in the simulation. The key point
to observe in the gure is that there is a clear optimal amount of revenue sharing for the
provider. In both cases, this amount is fairly small, however, it is clearly desirable to share
more revenue in the presence of an ecient illicit P2P than in the presence of an inecient
3BitTorrent Trackers already collect such information in order to gather performance statistics.
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Figure 2.6: Impact of the amount of revenue sharing on the fractional revenue attained by
the CDN.
illicit P2P. In fact, sharing nearly zero percent of the revenue still provides fairly close to
the optimal fractional revenue in the inecient case, while one must share more than 10%
of the revenue to be near-optimal in the case of an ecient, illicit P2P.
2.4 Conclusion
Our goal in this work is to quantify the ramications of coopting legal P2P content
sharing, not only as a means of reducing costs of content distribution, but, more impor-
tantly, as a way of hurting the performance of illegal P2P le sharing. The model that we
propose internalizes the idea that demand for any content is transient, and that all content
will eventually be available for free through illegal le sharing. The objective then is not
to cling to ownership rights, but to extract as much revenue from legal copies as possible
within the available time. We develop a revenue sharing scheme that recognizes the impor-
tance of early adopters in extending the duration of time that revenue may be extracted.
In particular, keeping users from \going rogue" (becoming seeds in illegal networks) by
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allowing them to extract some revenue for themselves (and so defray part of their expense
in purchasing the content in the rst place), provides order sense improvements in the ex-
tractable revenue. We realize that our paradigm is contrary to the \conventional wisdom"
of charging more rather than less to early adopters, and also to discourage le sharing
using legal threats. However, as many recent studies have demonstrated, incentives work
better than threats in human society, and adoption of our revenue sharing approach might
result in a cooperative equilibrium between content owners, distributors and end-users.
Future work includes a characterization of the exact value of users based on their times of
joining the system, as well as considering content streaming, which requires strict quality
of service guarantees.
In the next chapter, we study a transport layer control problem. Recently a number
of congestion control protocols has been proposed for use in the Internet. These proto-
cols dier in the way they indicate congestion to the sources. For example, TCP Reno
uses packet loss as the congestion indicator, while TCP Vegas uses end to end delay to
mark congestion. However, the relative value of one protocol against another is not well
understood. For instance, when ows choose distinct protocols, they may not receive the
same throughput. We study a scenario where a group of applications compete for network
resources to achieve their service requirement ( may be a function of delay, throughput
or both) by strategically choosing protocols. Then, we ask the following questions: How
should applications choose protocols? Should a delay sensitive application pick a delay
based congestion controller? Does the selsh interaction among these applications lead to
an equilibrium ? If so, what is the eciency of the equilibrium relative to the socially
optimal case? We try to answer these questions in the following chapter.
2.5 Supplemental
Lemma 8. Consider a dierential equation given
dy
dt
= CN +
y
N
(I   U(t)) (2.146)
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where
U(t) =
N2

+
N=
1 + be (t T )
:
Then for all t T > ln b , the solution to the above dierential equation satises the inequality
y(t)  y(T )  1+bd  e( q1(t T ))
+CN
 
b
d

 e( q1(t T ))

e(q1
ln b
 )
q1
  1q1

1b1
+CN
 
1
d

 e( q1(t T ))

e(q2j)
q2
  e(q2
ln b
 )
q2
1b1

 CN
 
1
d

 e( q1(t T )) 1q2 (1  1b1); (2.147)
where d = (b + exp((t   T ))), q1 =

2
   IN

and q2 =
1
   IN . Furthermore, for
 = 0, equality holds.
Proof. A general solution to the above dierential equation is
y(t) =
R
CN exp(
R
Pdt) +MR
Pdt
(2.148)
where P (t) =   N (I   U(t)). We have
Z
Pdt =  It
N
+
2t

+


ln (1 + (1=b) exp((t  T ))) :
Then,
CNe
R
Pdt = CNB(t) exp

2

  It
N

t;
where
B(t) = (1 + (1=b) exp((t  T ))) :
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For b  1, we can lower bound B(t) as
B(t) 
8><>: 1 t 
ln b
 + T 
1
b

 exp


(t  T )

t > ln b + T:
(2.149)
On the other hand, if b < 1,
B(t) 

1
b


exp



(t  T )

; 8t: (2.150)
Let us now evaluate A(t). We have
A(t) =
Z
CNe
R
Pdtdt:
Initially consider the case b  1. For t < ln b + T , it is easy to verify that
A(t)  CN
exp

2
   IN

t

2
   IN
(2.151)
where the inequality follows from (2.149). For t > ln b + T , we have
A(t)  A( ln b

+ T ) +
Z t
ln b

+T
CNe
R
Pdt (2.152)
 CN exp (q1T ) exp

q1
ln b


1
q1
+ CN exp (q1t)

1
b

 exp


 (t  T )

q2
  CN exp (q1T )

1
b

 exp
 
q2
ln b


q2
:
where q1 =

2
   IN

and q2 =
1
   IN .
In the second case, in which b < 1, for all values of t, we have,
A(t)  CN exp (q1t)

1
b

 exp


 (t  T )

q2
:
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where the inequality follows from (2.150).
Then, combining the expressions of A(t) in both cases, for t > ln b + T , we have,
A(t)  CN exp (q1T ) exp

q1
ln b


1
q1
1b1 (2.153)
+ CN exp (q1t)

1
b

 exp


 (t  T )

q2
  CN exp (q1T )

1
b

 exp
 
q2
ln b


q2
1b1:
where 1b1 is the indicator function dened by (2.47).
Using the above result in equation (2.148), we get that for t > ln b + T ,
y(t) =
M
exp(
R
Pdt)
+
A(t)
exp(
R
Pdt)
(2.154)
M

b
d


exp ( q1t)
+ CN

b
d


exp ( q1(t  T )) exp

q1
ln b


1
q1
1b1
+ CN

1
d

 exp


 (t  T )

q2
  CN

1
d


exp ( q1(t  T ))
exp
 
q2
ln b


q2
1b1: (2.155)
where d = (b+ exp((t  T ))). Using boundary conditions, we can show that
M =

1 + b
b


exp (q1T )
 
y(T )  CN

b
1 + b

 1
q1
1b1
!
 

1 + b
b


 
CN

1
1 + b

 1
q2
(1  1b1)
!
:
Substituting the above equation in equation (2.155) and rearranging yields (2.147). For  =
0, the inequalities in equations (2.149) and (2.150) become equalities and we get the
lemma.
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3. TRANSPORT LAYER: MUTUAL INTERACTION OF HETEROGENEOUS
CONGESTION CONTROLLERS
Recent years have seen the design of a large number of congestion control protocols
for use on the Internet. Their designs all revolve around the idea that link congestion is
indicated by some notion of \price", which the source can respond to. Dierent conges-
tion price metrics include packet loss, packet marks, packet delays or some combination
thereof. However, the relative value of one protocol versus another is not well understood.
For example, it might be conjectured that a delay sensitive application would consider
using a protocol that has a delay-based congestion metric, and a throughput maximizing
application might favor a loss-based metric. How should applications choose the protocol
to use?
An analytical framework for network resource allocation was developed in seminal work
by Kelly et al. [26]. If the ow i has a rate xi  0 and the utility associated with such a
ow is represented by a concave, increasing function Ui(xi), the objective is
max
X
i2N
Ui(xi) (3.1)
s.t. yl  cl; 8 l 2 L (3.2)
where N is the set of sources, L the set of links, cl the capacity of link l 2 L. Also let R be
the routing matrix with Rli = 1 if the route associated with source i uses link l. The load
on link l is yl =
P
r2N Rlrxr. The problem can be solved using ideas based on Primal-Dual
system dynamics [26,30,37,67,69] to yield a set of controllers. At the source we have
Source: _xi(t) = i
 
U 0i(xi(t)) 
X
l:l2L
Rlipl(t)
!+
xi
; (3.3)
Part of the data reported in this chapter is reprinted with permission from \Which protocol? Mutual
interaction of heterogeneous congestion controllers" by V. Ramaswamy, D. Choudhury and S. Shakkottai.
Proc. of IEEE INFOCOM, 2011, Copyright@2011 IEEE.
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where ki > 0;, and the notation ()
+
 is used to denote the function
()+ =
8><>:   > 0maxf; 0g  = 0: (3.4)
(3.4) ensures that x is non-negative. The controller in (3.3) has an attractive interpretation
that the source rate of ow i responds to feedback in the form of link prices pl(t); with the
end-to-end price being calculated as the sum of prices on all links that the ow traverses|
something that is common to all congestion control protocols. Source rate is always non-
negative, which is enforced by the denition of the function in (3.4). The price pl(t) at link
l is calculated using
Link: _pl(t) = (pl(t))
0@X
j2N
Rljxj(t)  cl
1A+
pl(t)
: (3.5)
(3.5) ensures that the price is non-negative. Each link has a buer in which packets are
queued. If the total load at a link l given by
P
j2N Rljxj(t) is greater than the capacity cl;
the queue length increases, while if it is less than cl; the queue length decreases as seen in
(3.5). The queue length is always non-negative, as enforced by the denition in (3.4). The
gain parameter (pl) is any positive function. Thus, the link-price pl(t) can be identied
with the queue length at link l. It has been shown [26,30,37,67,69] that the above control
scheme converges to the optimal solution to the problem in (3.1).
While this framework indicates that the fundamental price of a link is proportional
to queue length, congestion control protocols use several dierent congestion metrics. For
example, TCP Reno [70] uses packet drops (or marks) as its price metric, while TCP Vegas
uses end-to-end delay [37]. Other protocols include Scalable TCP [27] (that uses loss-
feedback, and allows scaling of rate increases/decreases based on network characteristics),
FAST-TCP [78] (that uses delay-feedback, and is meant for high bandwidth environments),
and TCP-Illinois [35] (that uses loss and delay signals to attain high throughput). However,
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drops, marks, and delays are all functions of the queue length. Thus, a key dierence
between protocols is their way of interpreting queue length information.
A fall out of dierent price-interpretations is that when ows choose distinct congestion
control protocols, they do not obtain the same throughput on shared links. For example,
studies such as [45, 71{73] study inter-protocol as well as intra-protocol fairness, while [4]
considers a game of choosing between protocols, assuming that a certain throughput would
be guaranteed per combination.
Throughput alone does not fully capture the performance of an application, since it
might also be impacted by queueing eects such as delay and packet loss. We consider
applications that might have dierent sensitivities to queueing. Indeed, a large fraction of
Internet trac consists of le transfers (less delay sensitive) and buered video streams
(more delay sensitive) from data centers or content distribution networks. We model these
ows as having (possibly dierent) utilities for throughput, and disutilities for the queueing
encountered on their respective paths.
We anticipate for a future Internet architecture where multiple congestion controlling
schemes are available to cater the needs of dierent service classes and the ows are allowed
choose the ones according to their service preferences. Hence, we assume that ows play
\fair" in that they choose to follow the constraints imposed by employing some form of
congestion control. Thus, the ows choose from a set of \reasonable" congestion control
mechanisms, for example variants of TCP, so as to maximize their payo that is utility
minus disutility.
Our objective is similar to the proposal in [55], where a system design for virtual links
tailored for ows that are rate sensitive (R) and delay sensitive (D) is presented. The idea
is that an R-ow would pick the virtual link where it is guaranteed higher rate, whereas a
D-ow would pick one where it is guaranteed a lower delay. However, unlike that work, we
have two basic dierences. First, we explicitly model utility (for throughput) and disutility
(for queuing) for all kinds of ows, rather than assume that D-type ows would be willing
to live with smaller rate. This enables us to explore the space of multiple classes of service
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with tolling, since it gives an objective measure on the choice made by the ow. Second,
we allow a choice between TCP avors (i.e., interpretation of queue length by congestion
controllers) according to the application in question. However, in [55] the only way to
reduce delay is to have short buers for the D service class, which might also result in
more losses.
Our nding is that if the number of ows in the system is large, the optimal strategy
of a ow is to choose a price interpretation from among the space of available ones that
is most similar to its disutility function. Using this nding, we can characterize the total
system value to all ows, and we show that the ratio of this value to the optimum value
can be arbitrarily small. Finally, we consider the situation in which we create multiple
virtual networks with tolling, with each ow having a choice between networks and between
protocols. We show that we can x the tolls such that the overall system value can be
increased signicantly, in-spite of the toll. We next present our model and summarize our
main results.
3.1 Model and main results
We consider a system in which each ow i 2 N has a so-called  fair utility function
[46],
Ui(xi) , wix1 ii =(1  i); (3.6)
with i  1; and a disutility that depends on the vector of link prices p as
~Ui(xi; p) ,
X
l2L
Rli(pl=i)
xi; (3.7)
where  > 1 is a constant. The overall payo is the dierence of the two, given by
Fi(xi; p) , Ui(xi)  ~Ui(p): (3.8)
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The  fair utility function was proposed by Mo et. al [46] as a method of capturing a
large class of fairness measures based on the value of  used. For instance, they showed
that ! 1 results in proportional fairness, while !1 results in max-min fairness. The
form of the disutility function is such that based on ; the disutility can be (almost) linear
in queue length (which in turn is proportional to delay, weighted by the parameter T ),
to gradually increasing convexity as  rises, to a sharp cuto for large : The threshold
parameter i in (3.7) models the ow's sensitivity to queue length, with a small value of i
indicating high sensitivity (e.g., delay sensitive applications need short queue lengths) and
a large value indicating low sensitivity (e.g., loss sensitive applications are aected only by
buer overow).
We dene a set of protocols T ; with cardinality T = jT j: Each protocol z 2 T is
associated with a price-interpretation function mz(pl) , (pl=Tz): Note that these price-
interpretation functions take the same form as disutilities, and model the way in which a
particular protocol z 2 T interprets link prices1. Again, a loss-based protocol would have
a high value of Tz; while a dealy-based protocol would have a low value. This corresponds
to the fact that in a protocol that is modulated by buer over ows such as TCP Reno, the
queue length has no impact until a maximum threshold (buer size) is reached, after which
the price is very high (Tz = buer size here). Similarly, TCP Vegas (approximately) decides
on whether the achieved throughput is too high or too low as compared to a threshold,
which in turn can be related to a threshold on the per-packet delay seen by the ow (Tz
is less than the buer size here). Now, while a ow i cannot change its disutility function
parameterized by i it can choose to use a combination of protocols as it nds appropriate.
A particular ow i's choice could take the form
qi(p) ,
X
z2T
zi
LX
l=1
Rlim
z(pl) (3.9)
where
P
z2T 
z
i = 1; and 
z
i  0: The convex combination models the idea that a ow
1We will refer to \price-interpretation functions" and \protocols" interchangeably.
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sometimes measures price in one way (e.g., delay-based) and sometimes in another way
(e.g., loss-based). zi can be thought of as the probability with which ow i uses protocol z:
For example, this situation might correspond to a ow using delay and loss measurements
simultaneously, and responding to congestion signals (loss or delay) probabilistically. We
refer to the choice [1i ; 
2
i ;    Ti ], made by ow i as i 2 Ei , fi :
P
z2T 
z
i = 1; 
z
i  0g:
Further, we denote aggregate choices of all ows by  2 E , i2NEi, and will refer to  2 E
as a protocol-prole.
We rst show in Section 3.2 that for a given protocol-prole, the bandwidth allocations
(and hence the payos) are unique. Further, a primal-dual type control will converge to
this unique bandwidth allocation. The result is essentially a consistency check that allows
us to analytically determine the payos as a function of the protocol-prole chosen.
We show in Section 3.3 that all bandwidth allocations that are attainable by a protocol-
prole over T protocols with m1(p)  m2(p)      mT (p) are attainable by a protocol-
prole over just the two protocols m1(p) and mT (p): The result has the appealing in-
terpretation that when mz(p) = (p=Tz)
; it is sucient to only consider the \strictest"
interpretation (smallest Tz, which can be thought of as delay-based feedback) and the
most \lenient" (largest Tz; associated with loss-based feedback). We next show that with
two protocols with Ts < Tl; the bandwidth allocation received by a ow i is decreasing in
the weight it places on the strict protocol. Although the proof is involved, the result is
intuitive since a strict protocol would always interpret p as a larger congestion than the
lenient protocol. However, since payos are the sum of utility and disutility, it does not
follow that all ows would choose the protocol with the higher threshold.
We show in Sections 3.4 and 3.5 that in many cases, the total system value is maximized
when all ows choose to use only m1(p) = (p=Ts)
: On the one hand if ows have price-
insensitive payos, the protocol-prole used does not matter as long as all of them use the
same prole. On the other hand, if there is a mix of ows, some of which have a large
disutility function (price-sensitive) and others which do not (price-insensitive), using the
strict price-interpretation m1(p) = (p=Ts)
; ensures that the price does not become too
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large for all ows, which maximizes system value.
In Sections 3.4 and 3.5, we also consider the case ows use selsh optimizations to choose
their protocol-proles and study the Nash equilibrium. If all ows have price-insensitive
payos, then they all choose the lenient price-interpretationm2(p) = (p=Tl)
: This case can
be mapped to throughput maximizing ows all choosing TCP Reno. If we have a mix of
ow types sharing a link, it turns out that the price-sensitive ows with disutility function
parametrized by   Ts, choose the strict price-interpretation m1(p) = (p=Ts); regardless
of the choice of others. Similarly, the price-sensitive ows with disutility threshold   Tl,
choose the lenient price-interpretation m2(p) = (p=Tl)
. While the other ows may employ
mixed strategies. When the number of ows in the system is large, a ow with disutility
threshold  picks a mixed strategy that yields an eective price interpretation (p=). The
result is interesting since it suggests that a delay sensitive application cannot do any better
in terms of overall payo even if it chooses a more lenient protocol. We also characterize
the ratio of system value in the game versus the social optimum for the single-link case to
determine an eciency ratio, which can be quite high.
Finally, in Section 3.7 we introduce virtual networks, each of which is assigned a certain
fraction of the capacity, and chooses a toll. Flows can choose a network and protocols.
The idea is similar to Paris Metro Pricing (PMP) [11,51,68], and we show that the system
value at Nash equilibrium can be higher overall in spite of tolling. The result suggests
that the Internet might benet by having separate tiers of service for delay-sensitive and
loss-sensitive ows.
3.2 Problem formulation
We assume that for each link, there exists at least one ow that uses only that link.
The assumption implies that all links have a non-zero price. We hypothesize from (3.3)
and (3.5) that the payos should be determined by the protocol-prole  as
xi (p
; i) = (U 0i)
 1
 
TX
z=1
zi
LX
l=1
Rlim
z(pl )
!
; (3.10)
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with i 2 Ei and for all l 2 L:
NX
i=1
Rlix

i (p
; i) = cl pl > 0; (3.11)
Note that although we have denoted x as depending on both  and p; the prices themselves
depend on  through x; and the solution (x(); p()) (if it exists) is solely a function of
: We show that the equilibrium exists, and can be reached using Primal-Dual dynamics.
We have the following proposition.
Proposition 1. Given any protocol-prole , Primal-Dual dynamics converge to the unique
solution (x; p) of the conditions (3.10) and (3.11).
Proof. For price-interpretation functions of the form (p=Tz)
; the source dynamics in (3.3)
can be re-written as
_xi(t) = i
 
U 0i(xi) 
 
TX
z=1
zi

T1
Tz
! LX
l=1
Rlim
1(pl)
!+
xi
where m1(pl) = (
pl
T1
). Let Ui(xi) = 1iUi(xi) where i =
PT
z=1 
z
i (
T1
Tz
), and let i = i.
Then the above equation can be modied as
_xi(t) = i
 
U 0i(xi(t)) 
LX
l=1
Rlim
1(pl(t))
!+
xi
: (3.12)
Now, in (3.5) choose (pl) =
1
m01(pl)
, where m01 is derivative of m1. Then the price-update
equation can be re-written as,
_m1(pl(t)) =
 
NX
i=1
Rlixi(t)  cl
!+
pl
: (3.13)
Equations (3.12) and (3.13) correspond to the primal-dual dynamics of the following convex
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maximization problem
max
x>0
NX
i=1
Ui(xi)
subject to
NX
i=1
Rlixi  cl; 8l 2 L:
The above is a convex optimization problem with a unique solution satisfying (3.10) and
(3.11). Thus, by the usual Lyapunov argument [30, 37, 67, 69] Primal-Dual dynamics con-
verge to this solution. Note that our choice of price interpretation makes it a special case
of the result in Appendix A Case-1 of [72].
We are now in a position to ask questions about what the ows' payos would look
like at such an equilibrium, and how this would impact the choice of the protocol-prole.
Recall that the payo obtained by a ow when the system state is at x(); p() is given
by
Fi() = Ui(x

i ())  ~Ui(p()): (3.14)
We dene a system-value function V , which is equal to the sum of payo functions of all
ows in the network,
V () =
NX
i=1
Fi(): (3.15)
Our rst objective is to nd an optimal protocol-prole that maximizes the system-value
function.
Opt: max
2E
V (): (3.16)
Let S be an optimal prole vector for the above problem. Then we refer to VS = V (

S)
as the value of the social optimum.
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An alternative would be for ows to individually maximize their own payos. However,
such a proceeding might not not lead to an optimal system state that maximizes the
value function (3.15). We characterize the equilibrium state of such a selsh behavior by
modeling it as a strategic game.
Let G =< N ; E ;F > be a strategic game, where N is the set of ows (players), E is
the set of all protocol proles (action sets) and F = fF1; F2;    ; FNg, where Fi : E ! R is
the payo function of user i dened in (3.14). Dene  i = [1; 2;    ; i 1; i+1; N ]; i.e.,
this represents the choices of all ows except i. Then  = [i;  i]. For any xed  i; ow i
maximizes its payo as shown below.
Game: max
i2Ei
Fi(i;  i) 8i 2 N : (3.17)
The game is said to be at a Nash equilibrium when ows do not have any incentive to
unilaterally deviate from their current state. We dene G as a Nash equilibrium of the
game G if
(G)

i = arg max
i2Ei
Fi(i; (G)

 i); 8i 2 N
We refer to VG = V (

G) as the value of the game. Finally, we dene the \Eciency
Ratio ()" as
 =
VG
VS
: (3.18)
3.3 Basic results
We rst show that a T -protocol network can be replaced with an equivalent 2-protocol
network. Consider a T -protocol network with price interpretation functions [m1;m2;    ;mT ].
Let  2 ET be a prole state in the T -network. Then the equilibrium rate vector x()
and price vector p() satisfy the equilibrium conditions (3.10) and (3.11). Now, con-
sider a 2-protocol network with price interpretation functions m1 and mT . Note that
m1  mz  mT ; z = 2;    ; T   1. Let  2 E2 be a prole state in the 2-protocol network.
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Proposition 2. For any equilibrium (x(); p()) in a T -protocol network, 9 a protocol-
prole  s.t. (x(); p()) is also an equilibrium for the 2-protocol network.
Proof. For any given  2 ET , let (x(); p()) be an equilibrium pair that satises the
equilibrium conditions (3.10) and (3.11), which are reproduced below for clarity.
xi () = (U
0
i)
 1
PT
z=1 iq
z
i

; 8i 2 N ;
Rx() = c; pl > 0; 8l 2 L:
where qzi =
PL
l=1Rlim
z(pl ()). The fact that m
T  mz  m1, implies, qTi  qzi 
q1i ; 8i 2 N ; Z 2 T . Since both m1 and mT are strictly increasing functions, there exists
a unique i 2 [0; 1], such that,
TX
z=1
zi q
z
i = iq
1
i + (1  i)qTi :
Now, we have
xi () = (U
0
i)
 1
 
TX
z=1
zi q
z
i
!
= (U 0i)
 1  iq1i + (1  i)qTi  ; 8i 2 N ;
Rx() = c; pl > 0;8l 2 L:
The above equations correspond to the equilibrium conditions of a 2-protocol network
with price interpretation functions m1 and mT . Therefore, there exists a protocol-prole
 = [1;    ; N ] such that (x(); p()) is an equilibrium pair of 2-protocol network.
The above proposition shows that any equilibrium state of a T -protocol network can
be obtained with an equivalent 2-protocol network. Therefore we restrict our study to
2-protocol networks with a \strict" price interpretation ms = ( pTs )
 and a \lenient" price
interpretation ml = ( pTl )
; i.e., Ts < Tl. Also, we redene the protocol prole of ow i, i,
as is i = 
1
i , where 
1
i is the weight applied on the strict price interpretation. Finally, the
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equilibrium rate of ow i can be written in terms of ms and ml as follows:
xi () = (U
0
i)
 1
 
LX
l=1
Rli

im
s(pl ) + (1  i)ml(pl )
!
= (U 0i)
 1
 
(i + (1  i)(Ts
Tl
))
LX
l=1
Rlim
s(pl )
!
: (3.19)
where  = [1; 2;    ; N ] is the system protocol-prole. The above result follows from
(3.10).
We next show that the bandwidth allocation received by a ow i is decreasing in the
weight it places on the strict protocol ms(p) = (p=Ts)
:
Proposition 3. Let xi () be the equilibrium rate of ow i for any  2 E2. Then,
@xi
@i
 0; 8i 2 N ;
Proof. From (3.19), we have
U 0i(x

i ) =
LX
l=1
Rlim
s(pl )
 
i + (1  i)

Ts
Tl
!
:
Then, dierentiating above equation with respect to j , we get,
@xi
@j
= Aij +
LX
l=1
@pl
@j
Bil; (3.20)
where
Aij =
(1  (TsTl ))
PL
l=1Rlim
s(pl )

U 00i (x

i )
ij ; and
Bil =
Rli(m
s)0(pl )(i + (1  i)(TsTl ))
U 00i (x

i )
:
Also, ij = 1 if i = j; and zero otherwise. At equilibrium,
PN
i=1Rlix

i () = cl; 8l 2 L. Now,
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dierentiating this equation with respect to j , we get
NX
i=1
Rli
@xi
@j
= 0; 8l 2 L: (3.21)
Replacing
@xi
@j
with (3.20), we obtain
NX
i=1
Rli
(i + (1  i)(TsTl ))
U 00i (x

i )
LX
k=1
Rki(m
s)0(pk)
@pk
@j
+ Rlj
(1  (TsTl ))
PL
k=1Rkjm
s(pk)

U 00j (x

j )
= 0:
Now, rearranging terms in the above expression, we get,
LX
k=1
(ms)0(pk)
@pk
@j
NX
i=1
RliRki
(i + (1  i)(TsTl ))
 U 00i (xi )
= Rlj
(1  (TsTl ))
PL
k=1Rkjm
s(pk)

U 00j (x

j )
:
We can represent the above in a matrix form as
RWRT  = r;
where
W = diag
(i + (1  i)(TsTl ))
 U 00i (xi )
 =

(ms)0(p1)
@p1
@j
(ms)0(p2)
@p2
@j
   (ms)0(pL)@p

L
@j
T
r =
(1  (TsTl ))
PL
k=1Rkjm
s(pk)

U 00j (x

j )
[R1j    RLj ]T :
Note that Ui is a strictly concave function and hence U
00
i (x

i ) < 0. Therefore, RWR
T is a
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positive denite matrix. Now, we have
 = (RWRT ) 1r: (3.22)
Let H = (RWRT ) 1, where H is an L  L matrix. Let us represent its elements using
hlm. Thus, from (3.22), we have
@pl
@j
=
PL
k=1Rkjhlk
(ms)0(pl )
(1  (TsTl ))
PL
k=1Rkjm
s(pk)

U 00j (x

j )
: (3.23)
Let V =WRT (RWRT ) 1R. Then, from (3.20) and (3.23), we get
@xj
@j
=
(1 (Ts
Tl
))(
PL
l=1Rkjm
s(pk))
U 00j (x

j )
(1  vjj) ; (3.24)
@xi
@j
=   (1 (
Ts
Tl
))(
PL
k=1Rkjm
s(pk))
U 00j (x

j )
vij ; (3.25)
where vij represent elements of V .
Now, we show that
@xj
@j
is negative given the assumption in the lemma. Note that V
is a projection matrix. The diagonal elements of a projection matrix are positive and less
than or equal to unity. i.e, vjj  1. Then, from (3.24), we conclude that @x

j
@j
 0 and hence
have proved the proposition.
The above proposition is intuitive in that a strict protocol would force the ow to cut
down its rate for the same price as a lenient protocol.
Corollary 5. In the single link case, the link-price p and the rate vector x satises,
@p
@j
< 0 and
@xi
@j
> 0 if i 6= j; 8i; j 2 N .
Proof. From (3.23), (3.24) and (3.25), we have
@p
@j
=
(1  (TsTl ))ms(p)
(ms)0(p)U 00j (x

j )
1PN
r=1 r
; (3.26)
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@xi
@j
=
(1  (TsTl ))ms(p)
U 00j (x

j )
 
ij   jPN
r=1 r
!
; (3.27)
where
i =  
i + (1  i)(TsTl )
U 00i (x

i )
=
xi
ims(p)
:
The above result follows from (3.19) and the fact that U 00i (x

i ) =
 i
xi
U 0i(x

i ). Note that
U 00i (x) < 0 since Ui is strictly concave. Now, the corollary is straightforward from the
above results.
Now, we now study dierent mixes of ow types in order to understand the system
value in each case.
3.4 Flows with price-insensitive payo
We associate each ow i 2 N to a class, based on its disutility function of the formP
l2LRli(pl=i)
xi: We begin by considering a system of ows that have a price-insensitive
payo, i.e., i =1 8i 2 N : This means that payo is solely a function of bandwidth, and
we have Fi() = Ui(x
()): However, even in this situation, ows must employ congestion
control, i.e., they must choose a protocol-prole. From Section (3.3), recall that since we
only have two protocols, the ow i's choice of protocol prole is dened by a scalar value
i: Also note that Tz 6=1 for each protocol z = 1; 2. The system-value is equal to the sum
of user payos, V () =
PN
i=1 Ui(x
()): We then have the following result.
Proposition 4. The system-value is maximized when the protocol choices made by all
users are the same. Thus, if S = argmax2E V (), and (

S)i is used to denote the protocol
choice made by-prole of user i; then (S)i = (

S)j ; 8i; j 2 N :
Proof. We rst derive an upper bound for system-value V () and then show that the upper
bound is achieved when all sources choose the same protocol. Suppose that X = fxjRx =
cg. Let x^ = argmaxRx=c
PN
i=1 Ui(xi). Note that equilibrium rate x
() 2 X , since Rx = c.
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Then the value of
PN
i=1 Ui(x) evaluated at x
() satises
V () =
NX
i=1
Ui(x

i ()) 
NX
i=1
Ui(x^i):
We showed in Proposition 2 that the equilibrium rate x(), is the unique maximizer of
the convex problem maxx>0;Rx=c
PN
i=1
1
i
Ui(xi); where i = i + (1  i)(TsTl ). Then, x()
can be made equal to x^, the optimal point in set X , by choosing i = j 8i; j 2 N . Such a
choice means that
i = j ) i + (1  i)(Ts
Tl
) = j + (1  j)(Ts
Tl
);
) i = j :
Thus, if S = argmax2E V () ) (S)i = (S)j ; 8i; j 2 N . Therefore, the system value
is maximized when the protocol choices made by all the users are identical. Also, the
maximum value does not depend on the parameters of the selected protocol.
We next consider the game in which ows are allowed to choose their protocols selshly.
Proposition 5. Let G =< N ; E ;F > be a strategic game with payo function of user i
is given as Fi() = Ui(x

i ()). Then there exists a Nash equilibrium for game G; and the
equilibrium prole for any user i 2 N is (G)i = 0.
Proof. Dierentiating Fi w.r.t i, and using Proposition 3
@Fi
@i
= U 0(xi ())
@xi ()
@i
 0
Hence, Fi() is maximized when i = 0. Therefore, (

G)i = 0; 8i 2 N .
Eciency Ratio: We showed in Proposition 4 that the value function is maximized
when all ows pick the same protocol-prole. In Proposition 5 we saw that when each
ow selshly maximizes its own payo, there exists a Nash equilibrium under which every
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source chooses the lowest priced protocol, i.e., the protocol with the higher value of T:
Such a prole is a special case of all ows choosing the same protocol-prole. Thus, value
of the social optimum and the value of the game are identical and Eciency Ratio () is
unity.
Example-1: Consider the case in which a single link with capacity c = 10 is shared
by 2 price-insensitive ows. Users have -fair utility functions with  = 2, w1 = 100 and
w2 = 100: We use price-interpretation functions (
p
2)
2 and (p5)
2. Note that the simulation
parameters ;  and threshold values are chosen arbitrarily. These parameters may not
correspond to any particular protocol used in practice. Nevertheless, the observations made
here hold true for any values of   1;  > 1 and Ts; Tl; i > 0.
In Figure (3.1) we show the system value for dierent choices of protocol proles. The plot
illustrates that system value is maximized when both ows choose the same prole. Figure
(3.2) shows how the payo function of a ow varies with its protocol prole. We nd that
regardless of the value of the protocol prole chosen by the other ow, the payo function
is maximized when it picks the lower price protocol.
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Figure 3.1: System Value with price-insensitive ows as a function of the protocol-prole.
We observe that the system value is maximized when both ows choose the same protocol-
prole.
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Figure 3.2: Payo of a price-insensitive ow as a function of its protocol-prole. We observe
that payo is maximized when the ow chooses the more lenient price interpretation,
regardless of the other ow.
3.5 Mixed environment
We now consider the case where a network is shared by ows with dierent disutilities.
We identify the optimal protocol prole that maximizes the system value, and compare it
with and the Nash equilibrium. We rst study the case of a network consisting of a single
link.
3.5.1 Single link case
Consider a single link system with capacity c shared by N ows. The payo of user
i 2 N is Fi() = Ui(xi ()) 

p()
i

xi (). Then, the system value is V () =
PN
i=1 Fi().
Proposition 6. The system- value is maximized when all users pick the protocol with
lowest threshold, i.e., if S = argmax2E V (), then (

S)i = 1; 8i 2 N .
Proof. (Sketch) Recall that i  1 by our assumption. Given this assumption, it can
be shown through straightforward dierentiation that ~Ui(i) is a monotonically decreasing
function of i. Now, the value function V is maximum when U() is maximized and ~U()
is minimized. We already know from Proposition 4 that U() is maximized when all ows
choose the same protocol-prole. Coupling this result with the fact that ~Ui(i) is decreasing
in i; we see that system value is maximized when i = 1; 8i 2 N .
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We now study the strategic game in which users individually maximize their payo as in
(3.17). We show that there exists a Nash equilibrium and characterize the protocol-prole.
Proposition 7. Let G =< N ; E ;F > be a strategic game with payo of user i is Fi() =
Ui(x

i ())  (p
()
i
)xi (). Then there exists a Nash equilibrium (NE) for Game G. At NE,
ows with greatest sensitivity to price choose the strict protocol, i.e., if i = Ts; then i = 1.
Proof. We will show that Fi() is quasi-concave, and use the Theorem of Nash to show
existence of a NE. Dierentiating Fi w.r.t i,
@Fi
@i
= (U 0i(x

i )  di(p))
@xi
@i
  d0i(p)xi
@p
@i
; (3.28)
where di(p
) = (p

i
) and d0i(p
) is its derivative. Now, substituting the results from (3.26)
and (3.27), in the above equation, we get
@Fi
@i
= B(U 0i(x

i )  di(p))

1  jPN
r=1 r

(3.29)
 B d0i(p)xi
(ms)0(p)
PN
r=1 r
; (3.30)
where B =
(1 (Ts
Tl
)ms(p)
U 00i (x

i )
and i =
xi
ims(p) . Note that B < 0 since U
00
i is a negative
function.
From (3.19) along with the denitions of i and di(p
), the above expression can be
simplied as follows:
@Fi
@i
=
Bms(p)
PN
r=1;r 6=i
xr
rPN
r=1
xr
r
 
i + (1  i)

Ts
Tl

 

Ts
i
!
 Bm
s(p)PN
r=1
xr
r

Ts
i

xi : (3.31)
We show that if the above expression has a root, then it is unique. The roots are
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characterized by
i + (1  i)(Ts
Tl
) = (
Ts
i
)
 
1 +
xiPN
r=1;r 6=i
xr
r
!
: (3.32)
First observe that the left side of the above expression is strictly increasing in i (since
Ts < Tl). Since
@xi
@i
< 0 and @x

r
@i
> 0 if r 6= i (from Proposition 3 and Corollary 5), the
right side of the above expression is strictly decreasing. Therefore, the set of roots of the
equation, @Fi@i (x) = 0 is a singleton or null set. Thus, Fi is unimodal or monotonic in i for
any xed  i and hence quasi concave.
Since i 2 [0; 1] is a non-empty compact convex set, by the theorem of Nash, the quasi
concavity of Fi(i;  i) guarantees that there exists a G, such that for all i = 1;    ; N ,
(G)i = arg max
i2[0;1]
Fi(i; (

G) i):
Hence, the rst part of the proof is complete.
Now, consider a ow with disutility (per unit rate) ( pi )
; where  = Ts. Replacing
i with Ts in (3.31), we observe that
@Fi
@i
> 0 (Note that B < 0). Therefore, payo is
maximized when i = 1.
In the next section, we study the characteristics of the NE and show that it is unique.
3.5.2 Nash equilibrium characteristics
We have established the existence of NE of the strategic game (3.17) in the previous
section. We conduct further studies on the properties of NE in this section. First, we
derive conditions for the NE system protocol prole. Then, in Proposition 8, we show that
the game has a unique NE. Finally, in Proposition 9, we derive the NE strategies of ows
when there are large number of ows in the system.
Let ^ be a Nash equilibrium system protocol prole (action prole). Then, by denition,
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it must satisfy the condition that
^i = arg max
i2[0;1]
Fi(i; (^i) i); 8i 2 N :
Then, from the rst order optimality condition, we have
@Fi(^)
@i
(i   ^i)  0:
Consequently, from (3.31), we get that, 8i 2 N ,
(^i) =
 
1
T s
^ 1
T i
 
1 +
xi (^)PN
r=1;r 6=i
xr(^)
r
!!
_ 1
T l
: (3.33)
where a^ b = minfa; bg, a_ b = maxfa; bg and (i) = i( 1Ts ) +(1  i)( 1Tl ). In addition,
the Nash equilibrium prole must also satisfy,
xi (^) =

wi
(^i)(p)
 1
i
; (3.34)
NX
i=1
xi (^) = c : (3.35)
Here, (3.34) follows from (3.19) and the denition of Ui(x). Also, (3.35) follows from the
assumption that every link has one ow using that link alone. Now, we show that the set
of Nash equilibria, characterized by (3.33)-(3.35), is singleton.
Proposition 8. The strategic game, G =< N ; E ;F >, has a unique Nash equilibrium.
Proof. To prove by contradiction, assume multiple Nash equilibria exist. Let two distinct
NE system protocol proles be ^1 and ^2. Also, let x1i = x

i (^
1); x2i = x

i (^
2); p1 = p(^1),
p2 = p(^2), 1i = (^
1) and 2i = (^
2). Then, by reordering the ow indices, we get that,
for some k 2 f0; 1;    ; Ng,
1i > 
2
i for i = 1; 2;    ; k; (3.36)
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1i  2i for i = k + 1;    ; N: (3.37)
Also, if k = 0, there exist a ow i 2 N such that 1i < 2i . We show that the above
condition are infeasible for all values of k, under the NE conditions given by (3.33-3.34).
Initially, consider the case when k = N . Then, from (3.33), for i = 1; 2;    ; N , we have
x1iPN
r=1;r 6=i
x1r
r
>
x2iPN
r=1;r 6=i
x2r
r
) x
1
iPN
r=1
x1r
r
>
x2iPN
r=1
x2r
r
(3.38)
)
PN
r=1
x1r
rPN
r=1
x1r
r
>
PN
r=1
x2r
rPN
r=1
x2r
r
(3.39)
which is a contradiction. Hence, this case is not feasible. Similarly, we can show that the
case when k = 0 is also not feasible.
Now, consider the case when 1  k < N . Also, suppose that p1  p2. Then, from
(3.34), we have
x1i < x
2
i ; for i = 1; 2;    ; k:
Let
i = argmax
i
x1i
x2i
:
Note that i > k and hence, 1i  2i . Also, from (3.35), note that x1i > x2i .
Observe that,
x1i
x1i
=
x1i
x2i
x2i
x1i
x2i
x2i
 x
2
i
x2i
;
and strict inequality holds if i  k. It follows from the above result that,
x1iPN
r=1
x1r
r
>
x2iPN
r=1
x2r
r
) x
1
iPN
r=1;r 6=i
x1r
r
>
x2iPN
r=1;r 6=i
x2r
r
:
Finally, from (3.33) and the above result, we get 1i  2i . But, from the denition of
i, we know that 1i 6> 2i . In case 1i = 2i , then, from (3.34) and the assumption that
p1  p2, we get x1i  x2i , which also raises a contradiction. Hence, this case is also not
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feasible. In similar fashion, we can show that the case in which p1 < p2 is also not feasible.
Hence, our assumption that multiple NE exist is not true. Therefore, NE is unique.
Next, we characterize the NE in the asymptotic regime.
Proposition 9. When the number of ows in the system, N , is large, the protocol prole
of ow i at NE, ^i, satises
^i

1
Ts

+ (1  ^i)

1
Tl

=
 
1
Ts

^

1
i
!
_

1
Tl

:
Proof. Recall from (3.33) that, the NE protocol prole of ow i, satises,
(^i) =
 
1
T s
^

1
i
  
1 +
xi (^)PN
r=1;r 6=i
xr(^)
r
!!
_ 1
Tl

:
In order to prove the proposition, we claim that,
lim
N!1
xi (^i)PN
r=1;r 6=i
xr(^i)
r
= 0; (3.40)
holds true. Before proving the above result, we introduce a few notations: Let max =
maxi i; min = mini i; wmax = maxiwi and wmin = miniwi.
Now, the proof of the claim (3.40) is as follows: From (3.35), we can show that,
xi (^)PN
r=1;r 6=i
xr(^)
r
 maxc
xi (^)
  1 :
Also, from (3.34), we have,
xi (^) =

wi
(^i)(p(^))
 1
i 
 
wmaxT

l
(p(^))
! 1
min
: (3.41)
The above result follows from the fact that (^i)  ( 1Tl ).
From Corollary 5, we observe that the link-price is a decreasing function of protocol
prole of each ow and hence, the system protocol prole . Therefore, the link price
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achieves the lowest value, when every ow adopts the strict protocol. Then, from (3.34)
and (3.35), it is easy to show that
(p(^)))  wmin

Nmin
cmax

T s : (3.42)
Finally, from (3.41) and (3.42), we have
xiPN
r=1;r 6=i
xr
r
 maxc
xi
  1 
max
NK   1
where K is a constant. The upper bound in the above expression goes to zero for large
values ofN . Therefore, the claim in (3.40) holds true and hence, the proof is completed.
Example-2: We consider a link with capacity c = 10 shared by two ows with disu-
tilities (p2)
2 and (p5)
2; respectively, and w1 = w2 = 1: The other parameters are unchanged
from Example-1. We show the system value for dierent choices of protocol-proles in Fig-
ure 3.3. The value is maximized when both ows choose the strict protocol. Figure (3.4)
shows how the payo of each ow varies with its choice of protocol prole, given other's
is xed. We nd that for the rst (sensitive) ow, the payo function is maximized when
it chooses the strict protocol, regardless of the other ow. But the payo of the second
(less-sensitive) ow is maximized for some combination of protocols. The results validate
our ndings.
Example-3: We consider a link with capacity c = 1000. There are 40 ows sharing
the link. The strict and lenient thresholds are Ts = 2 and Tl = 7 respectively. In our
simulations, we have set  = 2,  = 2 for half of users and  = 3 for the other half. There
are 10 classes of ows, with each class containing 4 ows. The disutility threshold of a
Class i ow, given by i, is chosen according to the following relation: (
1
i
) = ( 1Tl )
 +
(( 1Ts )
   ( 1Tl ))(i=10).
We choose a candidate ow that belongs to Class 4. We assume that every other ow
has chosen their NE protocol prole. That means, the eective price interpretation of a ow
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Figure 3.3: System value against protocol choices (i): Two ows sharing a link.
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Figure 3.4: Payo against protocol choice (i): Two ows sharing a link.
belonging to Class i is ( pi )
. Figure (3.5) plots the payo of the candidate ow as a function
of its eective protocol choice (4) = 4(1=Ts)
 + (1  4)(1=Tl), where 4 is its protocol
prole. As claimed by Proposition 9, the payo is maximized when (4) = (
1
4
) = 0:17.
3.5.3 Network case
We consider a system of ows with log utility functions, which is a special class of an
-fair utility function with  ! 1. The payo of ow i 2 N is Fi() = wi log(xi ())  PL
l=1Rli(
pl ()
i
)xi (): Then the system-value is V () =
PN
i=1 Fi().
Proposition 10. The System-Value function is maximized when all ows pick the higher
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) = 0:17:
priced protocol, namely m1 =

p
Ts

. Let S = argmax V (), then (

S)i = 1; 8i =
1;    ; N ,
Proof. We can show through straightforward dierentiation that, the disutility function,
~Ui(i), is a monotonically decreasing function of i. The rest of the proof is similar to that
of Proposition 6.
We now consider a game with two types of ows: price-insensitive ows with zero
disutilities, and price-sensitive ows with disutility (per unit rate) (
pl
Ts
). In this special
case, there exists a unique Nash equilibrium. In Proposition 5 we saw that price-insensitive
ows pick the lenient protocol at Nash equilibrium irrespective of the choices of the other
players. We will now show that price-sensitive ows pick the strict protocol at Nash
equilibrium.
Proposition 11. Any ow i with disutility (per rate) (p=Ts)
 (i.e. i = Ts) picks i = 1
is the Nash equilibrium.
Proof. It can be shown through straightforward dierentiation that @Fi@i > 0 for any ow
i 2 N with disutility (per rate) (p=Ts), which completes the proof.
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3.6 Eciency ratio
We now characterize the loss of system value at Nash equilibrium, as compared to the
value of the social optimum. We focus on the case of a single link with capacity c.
Proposition 12. Assume i > 1; 8i 2 N . When the number of ows in the system is
large,
 =
VG
VS
< ^(
Tl
Ts
):
where ^ = maxi i.
Proof. Let  = [1; 2;    ; N ] be the system protocol prole at social optimum. From
Proposition 6, every user chooses the strict protocol at social optimum, i.e i = 1; 8i.
Hence, from (3.19), and the denition of Ui, we have
xi (
) =
 
wi

Ts
p()
! 1i
;
X
i
xi (
) = c: (3.43)
Interpreting

p()
Ts

as the dual variable, the above equations can be identied as the
KKT conditions of the optimization problem given below:
max
x
X
i
wix
1 i
i
1  i ; subject to
X
i
xi = c:
And, x() is the unique maximizer of the above problem. The payo of a ow at social
optimum, from (3.8) and the above results, is given by
Fi(
) = Ui(xi (^))

1 + 1i(i   1)(Tsi )

: (3.44)
where 1i = 1 if ow i is a price sensitive ow and zero otherwise. The system value at
social optimum is VS =
P
i Fi(
).
Now, let ^ = [^1; ^2;    ; ^N ] be the system protocol prole at Nash equilibrium. From
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Proposition 9, equation (3.19) and the denition of Ui, we have
xi (^) =
 
wi

Tl ^ (i _ Ts)
p(^)
! 1i
;
X
i
xi (^) = c: (3.45)
Recall that a^b = minfa; bg, a_b = maxfa; bg. Interpreting

p(^)
Ts

as the dual variable,
the above equations can be identied as the KKT conditions of the optimization problem
given below:
max
x
X
i
wi(
Tl^(i_Ts)
Ts
)x1 ii
1  i ; subject to
X
i
xi = c:
Also, x(^) is the unique maximizer of the above problem. Finally, the payo of a ow is
Fi(^) = Ui(x

i (^))

1 + 1i(i   1)

Tl^(i_Ts)
i

: (3.46)
The system value at NE is VG =
P
i Fi(^).
Now, from the above results and the fact that Ui's are negative, since i > 1 by the
assumption of this proposition, we can show that
VG  ^
X
i
 
~T
Ts
!
Ui(x

i (^))  ^
X
i
 
~T
Ts
!
Ui(x

i (

i ))
> ^

Tl
Ts
X
i
Ui(x

i (

i ))

1 + 1i(i   1)(Ts
Ti
)

(3.47)
= ^(
Tl
Ts
)VS ;
where ^ = maxi i and ~T = Tl ^ (i _ Ts). Since VG and VS are negative, the eciency
ratio , can be bounded as
 =
VG
VS
< ^

Tl
Ts

;
which completes the proof.
Example-4: The exact expression for eciency ratio is derived for the following special
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case: We assume that every ow has the same utility function, i.e, in (3.6), wi = w and
i = ;8i 2 N . We associate the ows, having disutility functions of the form ( pj )x
with Class-j. Assume that there are J   1 such classes with 1 < 2 < :: < J 1 and
j 2 [Tl; Ts]; 8j. The ows having zero disutility function is classied as Class J . For
algebraic convenience, we dene j = 1. Let Ni be the number of ows belonging to
Class i and ni = Ni=N . Then, the Value of social optimum (VS) and value of game
equilibrium (VG) are given by
VS =
N
1  
 c
N
1  JX
j=1
nj(1 + 1j(  1)

Ts
j

); (3.48)
and
VG =
N( cN )
1 S1
(1  )S2 ; (3.49)
respectively, where
S1 =
0@ J 1X
j=1
ni

j
Ts
( 

)(1 )
+ nJ

Tl
Ts
( 

)(1 )
1A
and
S2 =
0@J 1X
j=1
nj

j
Ts
 

+ nJ

Tl
Ts
 

1A1  :
Also, 1j = 0 when j = J and one otherwise. The eciency ratio, , is given by
 =
S1
S2
PJ
j=1 nj(1 + 1j(  1)(Tsj ))
: (3.50)
Now, we plot the eciency ratio for the following case. Let two classes of ows, namely
Class 1 and Class 2, are sharing a link. Also, let their disutility thresholds be 1 = Ts and
2 = Tl respectively. Letting  = 2 and  = 3, we plot the eciency ratio (), given by
(3.50), in Figure 3.6. The Figure 3.6 shows that  increases with ( TlTs ). Note that a higher
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Figure 3.6: Eciency Ratio () in the single link case, plotted against the fraction of
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ows for dierent ratios of Tl=Ts: Since VS and VG were negative in this example,
a higher ratio is worse.
ratio is worse. Hence, the performance deteriorates with ( TlTs ).
3.7 Paris metro pricing
We have shown in the previous section that when the ows selshly choose protocols to
maximize their own payo, the system performance at the resulting equilibrium, compared
to the socially optimal case, can be much worse. This is due to the fact that, as shown by
Proposition 9, the ows with relatively lower disutility functions choose relatively lenient
protocols, and hence capture a larger fraction of channel bandwidth leaving not enough
for the ones with larger disutility functions who choose stricter protocols. As a solution
to the aforementioned problem, we propose a scheme in which the network is partitioned
into virtual subnetworks each having its own queuing buer, independent price (queue-
length) dynamics and xed entrance toll. A ow is free to choose a protocol along with a
subnetwork so as to maximize his own payo. This scheme is similar to Paris Metro Pricing
(PMP) [51]. We show that the eciency of this scheme is superior to the conventional,
untolled, single network scheme.
We characterize the performance of the proposed scheme in a single link case. The
single link, with capacity c (bits/sec), is partitioned into J virtual subnetworks. Let Sj
represent the jth sub-network. The bandwidth and toll associated with Sj are denoted by
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cj and j respectively. Also, let c = [c1;    ; cJ ] and  = [1;    ; J ]. We refer to c and 
as bandwidth vector and toll vector respectively.
We assume that every ow has the same utility function, i.e, in (3.6), wi = w and
i = ; 8i 2 N . We associate the ows having disutility functions of the form ( pj )x
to Class-j. We assume that there are J   1 such classes and 1 < 2 < :: < J 1 with
j 2 [Ts; Tl]. The price insensitive ows are classied as Class-J . For algebraic convenience,
we dene J = 1. We also assume that there are a large number of ows in each class.
Let Nj represent the number of ows in Class-j.
A ow that seeks to maximize its payo picks a subnetwork that yields the maximum
payo. Thus, if k^ is the subnetwork chosen by ow i;
k^ = arg max
k2f1; ;Jg
Fjk j = 1    ; J
where Fjk is the payo of a Class-j ow in Sk. A Nash equilibrium (NE) here is a state from
which none of the ows has an incentive to deviate from its current choice of subnetwork.
Note that we already know the ow's choices of protocols in each network so no deviations
in protocol are possible. The desired NE is one in which all Class-j ows select Sj , i.e
Fjj  Fjk; 8j; 8k: (3.51)
Note that the payos received are uniquely determined by the PMP system parameters c
and . Now, we derive sucient conditions on the pair, c and  , so that (3.51) holds true.
Assume that the system is at the desired equilibrium, i.e, every Class-j ow is sending
its trac over Sj . Let p

k be the equilibrium price (per unit rate) in Sk. The throughput
received by a Class j ow (or anticipated by a Class j ow if it shifted to Sk) is given by,
xjk =

j
pk
 

and xJk =

Tl
pk
 

; 8k: (3.52)
The above results are due to the fact that the entry of a Class-i ow into Sk may not
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signicantly change its price, pk, since there are large number of ows in Sk. In (3.52), the
rst result follows from Proposition 9, (3.34) and the assumption that Tj 2 [Ts; Tl] when
j < J , while the second one follows from Proposition 5. The link price pk in Sk, follows
from the above results and the fact that rates of ows sharing a sub-network add up to its
bandwidth allocation, is given by
pk =

Nk
ck


k; if k < J; and p

J =

NJ
cJ


Tl (3.53)
The payo of Class j ow in Sk, from (3.8), is given by
Fjk(c; ) =
(xjk)
1 
1   

pk
j

xjk   k;
= Aik

ci
Ni
1    i; 8k; (3.54)
where Aik =

1 (
i
k
)(


)(1 ) for i; k < J , AiJ = 1 (
i
Tl
)(


)(1 ); AJk = 11 (
Tl
k
)(


)(1 );
k < J and AJJ =
1
1  . Also, (3.54) follows from (3.52) and (3.53).
The following lemma derives conditions on the pair (c; ) for (3.51) to hold true. Before
stating the lemma, we introduce some notation. Let
lik(c) = Aki(
ci
Ni
)1   Akk( ckNk )1 : (3.55)
uik(c) = Aii(
ci
Ni
)1   Aik( ckNk )1 ; (3.56)
Lemma 9. Suppose the pair (c; ) satisfy the following conditions: if 1  k < J ,
ck+1
ck
 Nk+1Nk

k+1
k
 

; (3.57)
cJ
cJ 1
 NJNJ 1

l
J 1
 

;
PJ
j=1 cj = c; (3.58)
lk(k+1)(c)  k   (k+1)  uk(k+1)(c); (3.59)
Then, (3.51) hold true and the state where all the Class-j ows choosing Sj, 8j, is a Nash
equilibrium.
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Proof. The Nash equilibrium conditions, (3.51), are equivalent to
lik(c)  i   k  uik(c); k > i; 8i; (3.60)
which follows from the denition of Fik given by (3.54). Recall the denitions of, lik and
uik from (3.55) and (3.56) respectively. Therefore, we prove the lemma by showing that
(3.60) hold true when (3.57)-(3.59) are satised.
Suppose (3.57)-(3.59) are true. Then, it is easy to observe that lik  uik;8k > i. Also,
we have
m 1X
t=k
lt(t+1)  k   m;8m > k; 8k: (3.61)
From the denitions of lik's and the fact that i < k if i < k, it is easy to show that
lk(k+j)   lk(k+j 1)  l(k+j 1)(k+j); (3.62)
for k < J and 1 < j  J   k. Then, we have,
lkm = lk(k+1) + (lk(k+2)   lk(k+1)) +   + (lkm   lk(m 1))

m 1X
t=k
lt(t+1)  k   m: (3.63)
In similar fashion, we can show that ukm  k   m. Then, (3.60) is proved and hence the
lemma.
The system-value is sum of payos of all the ows, which is given by,
VT (c; ) =
JX
i
NiFii =
JX
i=0
Ni
 
Aii

ci
Ni
1 
  i
!
: (3.64)
We must choose c and  that maximize (3.64) satisfying the NE conditions, (3.57) -(3.59).
Let (c^; ^) be one such optimal pair. Note that (3.64) is a decreasing function of toll vector,
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. Hence, from (3.58) and (3.68), we get
^J = 0; and ^k =
JX
i=k
li(i+1): (3.65)
Substituting the optimal toll values in (3.64), we get
VT (c) =
NJ
1  

cJ
NJ
1 
+
NJ 1
1  

cJ 1
NJ 1
1  
1  1


Tl
J 1
 

(1 )!
+
J 2X
k=1
 Nk
1  

ck
Nk
1  
1 

k+1
k
 

(1 )!
; (3.66)
where Nk =
Pk
i=1Ni. Then, dene,
VT = max
c
VT (c) subject to (3.57)  (3.58): (3.67)
We refer to VT as System value with tolling. Now, we have the following proposition, which
asserts that the system value achieved by the tolled multi-tier regime is superior to that of
the untolled single tier regime.
Proposition 13. The system value with tolling is no less than the value of single tier
network game. i.e, VT  VG. Also, the strict inequality holds if there exists a k < J such
that
(
NJNk
NJ Nk
)
1
  (Tl
k
)


 
1 

k+1
k
 

(1 )!
; (3.68)
Proof. Suppose c attains equality in (3.57)-(3.58), i.e a corner point of the constraint set.
Note that the elements of c, the bandwidths allocated to each subnetwork, that means to
each ow class, is equal to the total bandwidth received by the corresponding ow class
at the NE of the un-tolled single network game. Also, from (3.65) and (3.55), the optimal
entrance toll in each subnetwork drops to zero. Then, VT (c) = VG. Hence, we conclude
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that VT  VG.
Note that VT (c) is strictly concave and hence, (3.67) has a unique maximizer. When
(3.68) holds true, the unique maximizer lies in the interior of the constraint set of (3.67).
Then, VT > VG which completes the proof.
Next, we derive a bound on the eciency of the multi-tier tolling scheme. Let
 = 1 + 
J 1X
k=1
kX
i=1
ni: (3.69)
where ni =
Ni
N . Then, we claim that
T =
VT
VS
 minfG; g: (3.70)
where G is the eciency of single tier scheme without tolling. The claim can be proved
as follows: Let cj = Nj
c
N for all 1  j  J . Then, c = [c1;    ; cJ ] lies in the feasible set
of the optimization problem, (3.67). Then, VT (c)  VT . It can be shown that VT (c)VS < 
where VS is given by (3.48). Therefore, T < . Also, from Proposition 13, we get that
T  G. Together, we get the claim.
Note that, , does not depend on the ratio, TsTl ; but it scales up with the number of
classes in the system. Nevertheless, T is no more than the eciency of the single tier
networks without tolling. Therefore, we conclude that when the number of classes in the
system is not arbitrarily large, the eciency of multi-tier tolling schemes are superior to
the single tier networks and, it does not scale up with the ratio, TsTl . Note that there might
be Nash equilibria other than the one stated by Lemma 9. Therefore, (3.70) may be better
than the eciency of the worst Nash equilibrium. Now, we present a numerical example
to validate our analytical observations.
Example-6: Let two ow classes, namely Class 1 and Class 2, with disutility thresholds
1 = Ts and 2 = Tl are sharing a link with capacity c units. The link is partitioned into
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Figure 3.7: Comparison of Eciency Ratio () between PMP scheme and Game in a net-
work with price-insensitive ows and delay sensitive ows. Since VS and VG were negative
in this example, a higher ratio is worse.
two subnetworks, namely S1 and S2. Let Ni be the number of ows in Class i and dene
ni = Ni=(N1+N2), for i = 1; 2. The optimal bandwidth allocation to subnetwork S1, that
maximizes the system value with tolling, is given by
c^1 =
c
1 + n2
n1n
1

2

1 

Tl
Ts
( 

)(1 )  1 _ c1 + n2n1 ( TlTs )  :
Also, the optimal toll in S1 is given by ^1 =

N2
c c^1
 1   N1c^1 (TsTl )  1


 1 . Note that
S2 has no entrance toll and the optimal allocation to S2 is c^2 = c  c^1. We dene Eciency
Ratio (T ) here as the ratio of System-Value with tolling (VT ) to Social optimum (VS).
From (3.64) and VS ,(from (3.48)), we can show that
T =
VT
VS
=


(n1 + n2)

c^1
cn1
1 
+ n1

c^1
cn1
1 
K


1 + (  1)(n1 + n2(TsTl ))
 ;
where K =

1 

Tl
Ts
( 

)(1 )
.
In Figure (3.7), we have compared  attained using the PMP scheme versus that of a
single-tier. We have used  = 2,  = 3 and ( TlTs ) = 4 in our simulation. We observe that
in-spite of tolling, the PMP scheme always performs better than the single-tier scheme.
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Also, note that, unlike the single tier scheme, the eciency of the PMP scheme does not
scale with TlTs .
3.8 Conclusion
In this work we examined the consequences of the idea that a protocol is simply a way
of interpreting Lagrange multipliers. We showed that ows could choose the interpreta-
tions, based on criteria such as delay or loss sensitivity. We determined the socially optimal
protocol, as well as the choice that would result by ows taking their own selsh decisions.
We showed that the social good is maximized by using the strictest possible price inter-
pretation. However, based on dierent mixes of ow types a mix of interpretations could
be the Nash equilibrium state. We characterized the loss of eciency for some specic
cases, and showed that a multi-tier network with tolling is capable of achieving superior
system value. The result suggests the consideration of multiple tolled virtual networks,
each geared towards a particular kind of ow. In the future we propose to explore the idea
of virtual, tolled subnetworks further.
Having studied a transport layer control problem, we move to a routing problem that
arises in wireless networks. We consider a scenario in which multiple paths are available
between each source and destination. How do the sources split their trac over the available
set of paths so as to attain the lowest possible number of transmissions per unit time ? The
question becomes more dicult when certain routes can utilize the \reverse carpooling"
advantage of network coding to decrease the number of transmissions used. We call the
coded links as \Hyper-links". Due to network coding longer paths may become cheaper.
However, the network coding advantage is realized only if there is trac in both directions
of such routes. When the sources are allowed to choose their paths selshly, they may not
prefer these paths as the rst mover may see a disadvantage. Then, how do we incentivize
sources to use the routes with hyper-links ? Can we develop a distributed controller that
attains the lowest system cost in spite of the incentives provided to the sources ? We
answer these questions in the next chapter.
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4. NETWORK LAYER: A POTENTIAL GAME APPROACH TO MULTI-PATH
WIRELESS NETWORK CODING
There has recently been signicant interest in multihop wireless networks, both as a
means for basic Internet access, as well as for building specialized sensor networks. How-
ever, limited wireless spectrum together with interference and fading pose signicant chal-
lenges for network designers. The technique of network coding has the potential to improve
the throughput and reliability of multihop wireless networks by taking advantage of the
broadcast nature of wireless medium.
For example, consider a wireless network coding scheme depicted in Figure 4.1(a). In
this example, two wireless nodes need to exchange packets x1 and x2 through a relay node.
A simple store-and-forward approach needs four transmissions. However, the network
coding approach uses a store-code-and-forward technique in which the two packets from
the clients are combined by means of an XOR operation at the relay and broadcast to both
clients simultaneously. The clients can then decode this coded packet (using information
stored at clients) to obtain the packets they need.
Figure 4.1: (a) Wireless Network Coding (b) Reverse carpooling.
Katti et al. [25] presented a practical network coding architecture, referred to as COPE,
Part of the data reported in this chapter is reprinted with permission from \Multipath wireless network
coding: a population game perspective" by V. Reddy, S. Shakkottai, A. Sprintson and Gautam, N. Proc.
IEEE INFOCOM, 2010, Copyright@2010 IEEE.
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that implements the above idea while also making use of overheard packets to aid in
decoding. Experimental results shown in [25] indicate that the network coding technique
may result in a signicant improvement in the network throughput.
Eros et al. [14] introduced the strategy of reverse carpooling that allows two infor-
mation ows traveling in opposite directions to share a path. Figure 4.1(b) shows an
example of two connections, from n1 to n4 and from n4 to n1 that share a common path
(n1; n2; n3; n4). The wireless network coding approach results in a signicant (up to 50%)
reduction in the number of transmissions for two connections that use reverse carpooling.
In particular, once the rst connection is established, the second connection (of the same
rate) can be established in the opposite direction with little additional cost.
The key challenge in the design of network coding schemes is to maximize the number
of coding opportunities, where a coding opportunity refers to an event in which at least
one transmission can be saved by transmitting a combination of the packets. Insucient
number of coding opportunities may aect the performance of a network coding scheme
and is one of the major barriers in realizing the coding advantage. Accordingly, the goal
of this work is to design, analyze, and validate network mechanisms and protocols that
improve the performance of the network coding schemes through increasing the number of
coding opportunities.
Consider the scenario depicted in Figure 4.2. We have two sources with equal trac,
each of which is aware of two paths leading to its destination. Each has one path that costs
6 units, while the other path costs 7 units. If both ows use their individually cheaper
paths, the total cost is 12 units. However, if both use the more expensive path, since
network coding is possible at the node n2; the total cost is reduced to 11 units. Thus,
we see that there is a dilemma here|savings can only be obtained if there is sucient
bi-directional trac on (n1; n2; n3).
A commonly used framework in the study of routing problems is that of potential games.
Here, there exits a so-called potential function|a scalar value that can be thought of as
representing the global utility or cost of the system. The potential function is such that the
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Figure 4.2: Each ow has two routes available, one of which permits network coding. The
challenge is to ensure that both sources are able to discover the low cost solution.
marginal dierence in the payo received by an agent following from a unilateral change
in action is equal to the marginal change in the potential function. Intuitively, it seems
that the coupling between an individual agent's payo and that of the whole system ought
to ensure that the system state should converge under myopic learning dynamics. Indeed
Sandholm et al. present results under which potential games converge to the optimal
solution when it is unique [63], or when the number of players is suciently large and
a probabilistic approach can be taken [7]. Extensions in the context of systems with
inertia [38], as well as nding near-potential games with boundable error [10] have been
studied more recently.
However, the problem that we consider presents the issue of a game with a nite number
of players that has multiple equilibria, some which have lower cost than others. We can
think of the system in Figure 4.2 as a potential game, with the potential function being
the total cost given the trac splits. However, if each source attempts to learn its optimal
trac split based on the marginal cost that it observes, it could easily choose the inecient
solution. The rst mover here is clearly at a disadvantage as it essentially creates the route
that the other can piggyback upon (in a reverse direction). Our challenge in this work
is to extend the potential game framework to eliminate the rst-mover disadvantage. A
main contribution of this work is the development of the idea of state space augmentation
in potential games as a way of promoting optimal coordination in such situations.
Network coding was initiated by a seminal work by Ahlswede et al. [3] and since then has
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attracted a signicant interest from the research community. The network coding technique
was utilized in a wireless system developed by Katabi et al. [25]. The proposed architecture,
referred to as COPE, contains a special network coding layer between the IP and MAC
layers. Sagduyu and Ephremides [62] focused on the applications of network coding in
simple path topologies (referred to in [62] as tandem networks) and formulated several
related cross-layer optimization problems. Similarly, [21] considered the problem of utility
maximization when network coding is possible. However, their focus is on opportunistic
coding as opposed to creating coding opportunities that we focus on. The practicality of
utilizing network coding over multiple paths for low latency applications was demonstrated
by Feng et al. [16].
Sengupta et al. [64] consider a very similar problem to ours, and present a general linear
programming formulation to solve it. However, their objective was to nd a centralized
solution, as opposed to the distributed learning dynamics that we seek. Das et al. [13]
proposed a new framework called \context based routing" in multihop wireless networks
that enables sources to choose routes that increase coding opportunities. They proposed
a heuristic algorithm that measures the imbalance between ows in opposite directions,
and if this imbalance is greater than 25%, provides a discount of 25% to the smaller ow.
This has the eect of incentivizing equal bidirectional ows, resulting in multiple coding
opportunities. Our objective is similar, but we develop iterated distributed decision making
methods that trade o a potential increase in cost of longer paths, with the potential cost
reduction due to enhanced coding opportunities.
Marden et al. [39] considered a similar problem to ours, but unlike our focus on how
to align user incentives, their attention was largely on the eciency loss of the Nash
equilibrium attained. Thus, they considered the system as a potential game, and considered
the worst case and best case equilibria that the system might converge to. They showed
that under the potential game framework, the best case Nash equilibrium can be optimal,
while the cost of the worst case Nash equilibrium can be unboundedly large. To the best
of our knowledge, the initial version of our work that was presented at a conference [58]
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was the rst to propose a distributed algorithm that attains the optimal solution. The
underlying idea of state-space augmentation was presented in that work. In parallel with
our work, Marden et al. [40] described a \state-based game," which also augments the
potential game framework with additional state, and later used the framework in the
context of consensus formation in networks [33]. Also in parallel work, ParandehGheibi et
al. [54] presented an optimal solution specic to the network coding problem using classical
Lagrange multiplier ideas. In contrast to their work, we present a new technique whereby
we modify the potential function seen by players in order to ensure that they take system-
wide optimal decisions. From a methodological standpoint, we believe that our approach
can nd application in equilibrium selection in a wide range of coordination problems (eg.
in understanding how altruistic behavior can alter the set of achievable equilibria).
The key contribution of this research is a distributed two-level control scheme that
would iteratively lead the sources to discover the appropriate splits for their trac among
multiple paths. In a traditional potential game approach, the matrix of trac splits of
the dierent ows would be the state of the system. In our work, we introduce the idea
of augmenting the state space with additional variables that are controlled separately by
augmented agents. Unlike Lagrange multipliers, the additional state variables need not
correspond to a constraint set. Instead, these augmented variables are used to modify
the potential function seen by the original agents in such a way that they are directed
towards the optimal equilibrium. In this sense, the idea can be thought of as a generalized
Lagrange multiplier. We also illustrate that our approach can coexist with the usual
Lagrange multiplier approach to handle constraints.
We explore the idea of state space augmentation using the network coding problem.
Here, at one timescale we have sources that selshly choose to split their trac across
available multiple paths using marginal costs on each path to direct their actions. The
learning dynamics that they use are consistent with a potential game approach. However,
the costs that they see are set by augmented agents as well as Lagrange multipliers, both
of which operate at a dierent timescale from the source dynamics. The augmented agents
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in our problem are so-called hyper-links that consist of a node and two links over which
the node can broadcast using network coding, as exemplied by the node n2 in Figure 4.2.
These hyperlinks provide a rebate for usage of the coded path in order to incentivize ows
to explore their usage. The rebate takes the form of a hyper-link capacity, which simply
means that the the hyper-link does not charge the ows for usage up to its chosen capacity.
Besides the need to encourage ows to explore codable paths, we also impose a constraint
that each link has a maximum rate that it can support due to scheduling or spectrum
limitations. This constraint is realized via a Lagrange multiplier approach.
Hence, our approach consists of two control loops, with the inner employing well-studied
learning algorithms such as BNN dynamics [9] assuming a xed rebate by hyperlinks, as
well as a price that corresponds to the Lagrange multiplier. The outer loop consists of
gradient-type controllers that modify the rebate and price, respectively. All controllers
only use local information for their decisions. The process of iteration continues until the
entire network has reached local minimum which, since our formulation is convex, is also
the socially optimal solution. We prove that this process is globally asymptotically stable.
Note, however, that our optimality result involves two nested asymptotic results, so we
cannot implement the idea directly. In practice, we have can only run each loop for a nite
number of steps before switching to the other.
We illustrate this approach using numerical experiments. For comparison, we numeri-
cally solve the problem as a linear program to nd the optimal solution. The experiments
indicate that: the convergence of the augmented potential game is fast; the costs are re-
duced signicantly upon using network coding; more expensive paths before network cod-
ing became cheaper and shortest paths were not necessarily optimal. Thus, the iterative
algorithm that we develop performs well in practice.
This work is organized as follows: Section-4.1 develops a system model and problem
formulation assuming no scheduling constraints on the maximum number of transmissions
at each node. In Section-4.2, we introduce the concept of hyper-links. In Section-4.3
we reformulate the problem with constraints on peak transmissions from each node and
106
present a bi-level distributed controller - a combination of rate controller and hyper-link
controller- to solve the problem. The rate controller is presented Section-4.4 and the
hyper-link controller is presented in Section-4.5. Section-4.6 contains simulation results
and Section-4.7 concludes the work.
4.1 System overview
Our objective is to design a distributed multi-path network coding system for multiple
unicast ows traversing a shared wireless network. We model the communication network
as a graph G(N ; E), where N is a set of network nodes and E is a set of wireless links.
For each link (ni; nj) 2 E, where ni and nj are any two nodes, there exists a wireless
channel that allows the node ni to transmit information to the node nj . Each link (ni; nj)
is associated with a cost ij . The value of ij captures the cost (in expected number
of required transmissions) of sending a packet successfully from ni to nj . Due to the
broadcast nature of the wireless channels, the node ni can transmit to two neighbors nj
and nk simultaneously at a cost maxfij ; ikg.
In wireless networks, even though broadcasting enables simultaneous transmission to
neighboring nodes, it also acts as interference at those nodes which are listening to some
node other than the broadcasting node. This type of interference in wireless networks,
called Co-Channel Interference, is handled by upper MAC protocols (for example CSMA)
which schedules transmission periods of links in the network such that interference is min-
imized. We assume that a perfect schedule of wireless links is given to us and, therefore,
there is no interference at the receivers. However, this imposes a constraint on the max-
imum number of transmissions per unit time on the nodes. In this section, we develop a
basic framework, while ignoring these scheduling constraints. We will include these con-
straints in Section 4.3.
We assume that the network supports ows f1; 2; : : : ; g, where each ow is associated
with a source and destination node. Each ow i is also associated with several paths
fP 1i ; P 2i ; : : : g that connect its source and destination nodes. Our goal is to build a dis-
tributed trac management scheme in which the source node of each ow i can split its
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trac, xi (packets per unit time), among multiple dierent paths, so as to reduce the total
number of transmissions per unit time required to support given trac demands. Note
that on some of these paths there might be a possibility of network coding.
We will rst examine a simple network with coding opportunities and derive system
cost associated with the network, in terms of the total number of transmissions required.
Then we will study how the coding helps in reducing the system cost.
Example Consider the network depicted on Figure 4.2. The network supports three ows:
(i) ow 1 from n1 to n4, (ii) ow 2 from n4 to n6, and (iii) ow 3 from n5 to n1. We denote
by xi the trac associated with ow i, 1  i  3. Suppose that the packets that belong to
ow 1 can be sent over two paths (n1; n2; n3; n4) and (n1; n2; n5; n4). We denote these paths
by P 11 and P
2
1 . The trac split on paths P
1
1 and P
2
1 is given by x
1
1 and x
2
1, respectively,
such that x11 + x
2
1 = x1. Similarly, ow 2 can be sent over two paths P
1
2 = (n4; n3; n2; n6)
and P 22 = (n4; n8; n6) at rates x
1
2 and x
2
2, such that x
1
2 + x
2
2 = x2. Finally, ow 3 can be
sent over two paths P 13 = (n5; n7; n1) and P
2
3 = (n5; n2; n1), at rates x
1
3 and x
2
3, with sum
x3.
Note that path P 21 = (n1; n2; n5; n4) of ow 1 and path P
2
3 = (n5; n2; n1) of ow 3 share
two links (n1; n2) and (n2; n5) in the opposite directions. Thus, the packets sent along
these two paths can benet from reverse carpooling. Specically, the node n2 can combine
packets of ow 1 received from the node n1 and packets of ow 3 received from the node
n5. Similarly, the node n3 can combine packets of ow 1 received from the node n2 and
packets of ow 2 received from the node n4. Note that the cost saving at the node n2 is
proportional to minfx21; x23g, while the saving at the node n3 is proportional to minfx11; x12g.
Recall that we are ignoring scheduling constraints in this section.
The cost (transmissions per unit time) at the node n2 when coding is enabled is
Cn2(x
2
1; x
2
3) = maxf21; 25gminfx21; x23g (4.1)
+25(x
2
1  minfx21; x23g)
+21(x
2
3  minfx21; x23g):
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Here, the rst term on the right is the cost incurred due to coding at the node n2: This
is because a coded packet from n2 is broadcast to both destination nodes, n1 and n5, and
so the cost per packet is maxf21; 25g. The second and third term are \overow" terms.
Since it is possible that x21 6= x23; the remaining ow of the larger (that cannot be encoded
because of the lack of ow in the opposite direction) is sent without coding at the regular
link cost.
The cost at the node n2, given by (4.1), can be re-written as shown below:
Cn2(x
2
1; x
2
3) = 25x
2
1 +21x
2
3 +
n
maxf21; 25g
 (21 + 25)
o
minfx21; x23g:
Using the fact that maxfx1; x2g+minfx1; x2g = x1 + x2, we obtain
Cn2(x
2
1; x
2
3) = 25x
2
1 + 21x
2
3 (4.2)
  minf21; 25gminfx21; x23g:
The above equation can be interpreted as the cost at the node n2 without coding minus
the savings obtained when coding is used. Thus, the cost saved at the node n2 due to
network coding is minf21; 25gminfx21; x23g . Similarly, for the node n3 the cost saved is
minf32; 34gminfx11; x12g:
The total system cost can be expressed as:
C(X) =
3X
i=1
2X
j=1
ji x
j
i   minf21; 25gminfx21; x23g (4.3)
  minf32; 34gminfx11; x12g;
where X = fx11; x21; x12; x22; x13; x23g is the state of the system and ji is the uncoded path
cost (equal to the sum of the link costs on the path) j used by ow i. For example,
11 = 12 + 23 + 34, for path P
1
1 = (n1; n2; n3; n4). Thus, the rst term on the right in
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(4.3) is the total cost of the system without any coding, while the second and third terms
are the savings obtained by coding at nodes n2 and n3:
In the next subsection, we present a system model and derive a general expression for
system cost. Then we formulate an optimization problem which minimizes system cost by
nding an optimal trac split of each ow, over the multiple paths available to them.
4.1.1 System model
Our system model consists of a set of nodes N = fn1; : : : ; nNg and a set of ows
F = f1; : : : ; Fg. Each ow, f 2 F is dened as a tuple (nsf ; ndf ; xf ), where nsf 2 N is the
source node, ndf 2 N is the destination node, and xf packets/sec is its trac demand. A
ow may be associated with multiple paths connecting its source and destination nodes.
Let Pf be the number of such paths available to ow f and x
s
f be the trac sent by the ow
over path s associated with it. Then,
PPf
s=1 x
s
f = xf . Let xf = fx1f ;    ; x
Tf
f g represent a
trac split of ow f . Then, the state of the system X is dened as a set of trac splits of
all ows in the system. i.e X = fx1;    ;xF g.
A node participating in more than one path may have the opportunity to combine traf-
c and save on transmission if the paths traverse the node in reverse directions. Suppose
paths q and r, associated with ow i and j respectively, traverse the node nk in reverse di-
rections. Assume the node nk receives packets belonging to ow i which are sent over path
q and transmits those packets to the node ni. Similarly, it collects packets belonging to ow
j traversing over path r and forwards them to the node nj . Thus, the packets sent along
these paths can benet from reverse carpooling and there exists a coding opportunity for
ows i and j at the node nk. We represent this coding opportunity at the node nk, which
is associated with two neighboring nodes and two ows, as h = nk[(i; q; ni); (j; r; nj)]
1. For
example, consider the network shown on Figure 4.2. In this network, the coding opportu-
nity available at the node n2 can be represented as n2[(1; P
2
1 ; n3); (2; P
1
2 ; n1)]. Finally, we
1In all the futute references of h, we may assume that it is associated with
nk(h)[(i(h); q(h); ni(h)); (j(h); r(h); nj(h))]. For notational convenience, we may drop the reference
to h in the previous representation and simply use nk[(i; q; ni); (j; r; nj)]
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assume that H such coding opportunities are present in the system.
From (4.2), the cost (transmissions per unit time) at the node nk after coding enabled
is given by
Cnk(x
q
i ; x
r
j) = kix
q
i + kjx
r
j (4.4)
  minfki; kjgminfxqi ; xrjg:
The total system cost can be expressed as:
C(X) =
FX
f=1
PfX
p=1
pfx
p
f   (4.5)
HX
h=1
minfki; kjgminfxqi ; xrjg
where X is the state of the system and pf is the uncoded path cost (equal to the sum of
the link costs on the path) p used by ow f .
Our goal is to build a distributed trac management scheme in which the source node
of each ow f can split its trac, xi (packets per unit time), among multiple dierent
paths, so as to reduce the system cost (4.5), total number of transmissions per unit time
required to support a given trac demands. We formulate the objective of minimizing
cost, subject to the trac requirements of each ow, as an optimization problem given
below:
min
X0
C(X); (4.6)
subject to
PfX
p=1
xpf = xf f = 1; : : : ; F:
The problem poses major challenges due to the need to achieve a certain degree of
coordination among the ows. For example, for the network depicted in Figure 4.2, in-
creasing of the value of x23 (the decision made by the node n5) will result in a system-wide
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cost reduction only if it is accompanied by the increase in the value of x21. In the next
section, we develop a distributed trac management scheme, that does not require any
coordination among ows on deciding their trac splits.
4.2 Augmented state space and hyper-links
The optimization problem in (4.6) can be solved eciently in a centralized manner.
But centralized implementations are not practical in large and complex systems. In this
section, we propose a simple way of decomposing it into subproblems that can be solved in
a decentralized fashion. We do this by means of adding extra state variables to the system,
which we refer to as state-space augmentation.
It can be observed from (4.5) that decisions of ows i and j are coupled through the
term min(xqi ; x
r
j). In general, for any given x
q
i and x
r
j , this term can be expressed as an
optimal value of the following optimization problem,
minfxqi ; xrjg = maxy>0

y   1(y  minfy; xqi g)
 2(y  minfy; xrjg)

; (4.7)
where 1; 2  1 are any arbitrary constants. Note that the right hand side of the above
equality does not have any coupling term, due to the presence of the augmented variable y.
Therefore, we can convert the coupled problem (4.6) into a decoupled one by replacing each
`coupled' term (minfxqi ; xrjg) with an equivalent `de-coupled' expression from (4.7). Since
each coupling term is associated with a coding opportunity h, the augmented variable yh
is introduced in association with each coding opportunity. Let Y = fy1; y2;    ; yHg. Now,
dene C(X;Y ) as
C(X;Y ) =
PF
f=1
PPf
p=1 
s
fx
s
f  
PH
h=1(minfki; kjg)yh
+
PH
h=1

!1h(yh  minfyh; xqi g) + !2h(yh  minfyh; xrjg)

;
where !1h; !2h  minfki; kjg are any arbitrary constants. It can be seen that the cost
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function (4.5) can be re-written as
C(X) = min
Y0
C(X;Y ): (4.8)
Choosing !1h = ki and !2h = kj , we get
C(X;Y ) =
FX
f=1
PfX
p=1
sfx
s
f  
HX
h=1
(minfki; kjg)yh
+
HX
h=1
(ki(yh  minfyh; xqi g)
+kj(yh  minfyh; xrjg)

: (4.9)
The cost function has thus been augmented using the variables yh: For any xed value of
Y; the cost function only depends on X; and the sources can attempt to modify X nd
their individually lowest cost solution. The augmented variables Y can then be modied
to change the cost function. In Sections 4.4{4.5 we will formally show how this is accom-
plished. We now show that our choices for !'s lead to an appealing interpretation for the
function C(X;Y ).
Consider coding opportunity h = nk[(i; q; ni); (j; r; nj)], where the node nk encodes
packets coming from ith and jth ows, and then broadcast them to nodes ni and nj respec-
tively. Grouping the terms associated with coding opportunity h in (4.9), we get
C(h) = kix
q
i + kjx
r
j  minfki; kjgyh +
ki(yh  minfyh; xqi g) + kj(yh  minfyh; xrjg);
= maxfki; kjgyh + ki(xqi  minfxqi ; yhg)
+kj(x
r
j  minfxrj ; yhg): (4.10)
In the above expression, C(h), the rst term corresponds to the cost of broadcasting coded
trac, if we restrict the total coded (broadcast) trac between the two ows at the node nk
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to be less or equal to yh, and the last two terms are the transmission costs associated with
the remaining uncoded trac. This leads to the concept of hyper-link, which can be thought
of as a broadcast link with capacity yh. It is composed of physical links (nk; ni) and (nk; nj)
and carries only encoded trac from ows i and j. And the remaining uncoded trac is
sent through uni-cast links (nk; ni) and (nk; nj) respectively. Formally, a hyper-link and a
hyper-path are dened as follows:
Denition 2. A hyper-link is a broadcast-link composed of three nodes and two ows. A
hyper-link h = nk[(i; q; ni); (j; r; nj)] at the node nk can encode packets belonging to ow i
(sending packets on path q) with ow j (sending packets on path r). Here, the nodes ni
and nj are the next-hop neighbors of nk; for ow i along path q and for ow j along path
r, respectively. Also, yh denotes capacity of the hyper-link (in packets per unit time).
A hyper-path p 2 Si between source nsi and destination ndi is a virtual path over a
physical path between nsi and n
d
i . A hyper-path contains zero or more hyper-links on it and
at each node on the underlying physical path there can be atmost one hyper-link. It follows
that the set of all paths are a subset of the hyper-paths.
The cost at hyper-link h, given by (4.10), can be re-written as:
C(h) = kix
q
i + kjx
r
j   T (h), where (4.11)
T (h) = kiminfxqi ; yhg+ kj minfxrj ; yhg
  maxfki; kjgyh: (4.12)
Recall that the rst two cost terms are the total cost at the node nk when coding is disabled.
The remaining cost, T (h) can be thought of as the rebate obtained by using hyper-link
h = nk[(i; q; ni); (j; r; nj)]. Note that the rebate could be negative (hence adding to the
total cost), which might happen when one of the ow rate is 0 and the other ow rate is
less than the hyper-link capacity.
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Now the function C(X;Y ) in (4.9) can be written as follows:
C(X;Y ) =
FX
f=1
PfX
p=1
sfx
s
f  
HX
h=1
T (h); (4.13)
which represents the total system cost without coding minus the total rebate of all the
hyper-links. Here, C(X;Y ) - total number of transmissions per unit time required to
support a given trac load- is the system cost given the system state (X;Y ), where X is
the set of trac vectors of all ows in the system and Y is set of hyper-link capacities.
Our objective is to minimize the cost function which can be formally stated as
min
X;Y0
C(X;Y )
subject to
PfX
p=1
xpf = xf 8f = 1;    ; F : (4.14)
In the next section, we will also account for the fact that the transmission rate of each
node is limited due to scheduling constraints.
4.3 Peak transmission constraints
In a practical scenario, the maximum number of transmissions per unit time from a
wireless node is limited by scheduling. In this section, we assume that the schedule has
been predetermined, and imposes a constraint on the maximum amount of trac that can
be accommodated on any particular link. In doing so, we will illustrate the fact that the
state space augmentation can be used in conjunction with Lagrange multiplier that enforces
a constraint. reformulate problem (4.14) taking into account the transmission constraints
at each node.
Let Rfpki be a routing variable. It takes a value equal to 1 if any path p associated with
ow f passes through link (nk; ni) and otherwise 0. Similarly, dene Z
h
k which takes 1
if hyper-link h is associated with the node nk and otherwise 0. Let Tk be the maximum
number of allowable transmissions per unit time at the node nk. Then, at each node nk,
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the total number of uncoded transmissions minus the saved number of transmissions (using
hyper-links) should be less than or equal to Tk. Therefore,
NX
i=1
FX
f=1
PfX
p=1
Rfpki kix
p
f  
HX
h=1
ZhkT (h)  Tk: 8nk 2 N :
Now, incorporating these constraints on transmission rate, the problem (4.14) can be re-
written as
min
X0;Y0
C(X;Y ) =
FX
f=1
PfX
p=1
pfx
p
f  
HX
h=1
T (h);
subject to
PfX
p=1
xpf = xf ; 8f = 1;    ; F; (4.15)
NX
i=1
FX
f=1
PfX
p=1
Rfpki kix
p
f  
HX
h=1
ZhkT (h)  Tk;
8k = 1;    ; N; (4.16)
where X is the set of trac vectors of all ows in the system and Y is set of hyper-link
capacities. Note that the augmented cost C(X;Y ) is jointly convex in X and Y . The
constraint sets are also convex. Therefore, the above problem is convex. We assume
that the feasible sets of the above problem -set of trac vectors X and set of hyper-link
capacities Y which satisfy both trac demands (4.15) and peak transmission constraints
(4.16)- is nonempty. We can use dual decomposition techniques to construct a distributed
algorithm to solve this problem. The Lagrangian function is
C(X;Y;) =
FX
f=1
PfX
p=1
pfx
p
f  
HX
h=1
T (h) +
NX
k=1
kVk
where Vk =
0@ FX
f=1
PfX
p=1
Rfpki kix
s
f  
HX
h=1
ZhkT (h)  Tk
1A : (4.17)
Note that k is a non-negative Lagrange multiplier associated with the transmission con-
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straint of the node nk. We can interpret k as the `price' charged by the node nk for each
transmission. Let  = [1;    ; N ] be a set of node-prices.
We dene C(X;Y;) as our new system function given the system state (X;Y;),
where X is the set of trac vectors of all ows in the system, Y is the set of hyper-link
capacities and  is the set of node-prices. Our objective is nd an optimal state of the
problem given below.
max
0
min
X;Y0
C(X;Y;);
FX
f=1
xpf = xf ; 8f = 1;    ; F:
We propose a bi-level distributed iterative algorithm to nd an optimal state for the
above problem.
1. Trac Splitting: In this phase, each source node nds the optimum trac assign-
ment given the hyper-link capacities and node-prices. For any given (Y;),
TS: min
X0
C(X;Y;);
FX
f=1
xpf = xf f = 1;    ; F:
We model this part as a traditional potential game. The reason for our choice is that
there exist several simple, well-studied controllers for routing in potential games.
Thus, for any xed value of the augmented variables and Lagrange multipliers, we
can use any of these controllers to obtain convergence. Details of our game model
and the payos used are discussed in Section 4.4. Note that signalling is required to
ensure feedback of node-prices and hyper-link rebates to the source nodes, but this
overhead is small.
2. Node Control: In this phase, we adjust the augmented variables (hyper-link ca-
pacities) and Lagrange multipliers (node-prices) assuming that potential game of the
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sources has attained equilibrium.
NC: max
0
min
Y0
C(X; Y;);
where X is the assignment matrix at equilibrium. We use gradient decent controllers
to modify the optimal hyper-link state and node-price. Details are discussed in
Section 4.5.
We call our controller as Decoupled Dynamics. The two phases operate at dierent
time scales. Trac splitting is done at every small time scale and the node-control is done
at every large time scale. Thus, sources attain equilibrium for given hyper-link capacities
and prices, then the hyper-link capacities and prices are adjusted, and this in turn forces
the sources to change their splits. This process continues until the source splits, hyper-link
capacities and prices converge.
4.4 Trac splitting: multi-path network coding game
We model the trac-splitting process of decoupled dynamics as a potential game with
continuous action space, which we refer to as theMulti-Path Network Coding Game (MPNC
Game). A potential game with continuous action space is dened by,
1. a set of players, F ,
2. an action space, X = fXi; 8i 2 FjXi  RM ;M 2 Ng, where Xi is an action set of
player i,
3. a set of continuously dierentiable payo functions of players, C = fCi : X! R; 8i 2
Fg,
4. a continuously dierentiable potential function,  : X! R, such that
rai(ai; a i) = raiCi(ai; a i); (4.18)
where ai 2 Xi; a i 2 XnXi.
118
Now, having dened the components of a potential game, we identify the corresponding
entities in the case of MPNC game.
First of all, the ows are the players in the MPNC game. Then, the set of players is
given by F = f1; 2;    ; Fg. The action set of player i (ow i) is dened as
Xi = f~xi = (x1i ; x2i ;    ; xPii )j
X
j
xji = xig;
where xi is the trac demand of ow i and Pi is the number of hyper paths available to
it. Note that each action ~xi corresponds to, an instance of distribution of trac demand
seen by ow i, over the set of available hyperpaths. Then, the action space, X, is given by
X = fX1;    ; XF g.
Finally, the payo function of a player i is dened as
Ci(~xi; ~x i) = C((~xi; ~x i); Y;)  C((~0; ~x i); Y;) (4.19)
where C is the system cost function given by (4.17). In the above denition, ~xi is the
action of player i, ~x i is a set of actions of other players and ~0 is a null vector. Also Y
is the set of hyper link capacities and  is the set of node prices which remain invariant
during each realization of MPNC game. The utility dened above is sometimes referred to
as the Wonderful life utility (WLU) [18]. It is well known that payo as in (4.19) results
in a potential game with potential function  = C [18].
In the context of MPNC game, it is clear that the payo function, given by (4.19), is
equal to the total transmission cost incurred by player i, while sending its own trac over
the set of available hyperpaths. Hence, in this game, the objective of each player is to
minimize its own payo.
But there is a caveat in using the system cost function C as the potential function and
Ci's as the payo functions. Recall from the conditions (3) and (4) of the denition of
potential game that, the potential function and the utility functions must be dierentiable.
But, from (4.17) and (4.12) note that, the system cost function contains \min" terms over
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the hyper-link capacity and the ow rates, which makes the function non-dierentiable.
In order to have a continuously dierentiable cost function we approximate these \min"
terms using a generalized mean-valued function.
Let a = fa1; : : : ; ang be the set of positive real numbers and let t be some non-zero real
number. Then the generalized t-mean of a is given by:
Mt(a) =
 
1
n
nX
i=1
ati
! 1
t
(4.20)
The \min" function over the set a is approximated using Mt(a) as:
minfa1; : : : ; ang = lim
t! 1Mt(a) (4.21)
Substituting forMt (4.20), instead of the \min" function in (4.17) we get the approximated
total system function as:
~C(X;Y;) =
FX
f=1
SfX
s=1
sfx
s
f  
HX
h=1
~T (h) +
NX
k=1
k ~Vk; (4.22)
where for a hyper-link h = nk[(i; q; ni); (j; r; nj)] 2 H:
~T (h) = ki

(xqi )
t+(yh)
t
2
 1
t
+ kj

(xri )
t+(yh)
t
2
 1
t
 maxfki; kjgyh (4.23)
and
~Vk =
FX
f=1
SfX
s=1
NX
m=1
Rfpkmkix
s
f  
HX
h=1
Zhk
~T (h)  Tk: (4.24)
The system function ~C(X;Y;) is continuous and dierentiable. So, we use the ap-
proximated function as our potential function. Similarly, the payo of player i, given by
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(4.19), is approximated as follows:
~Ci(~xi; ~x i) = ~C((~xi; ~x i); Y;)  ~C((~0; ~x i); Y;): (4.25)
The marginal payo obtained by ow i 2 F , given his action, ~xi, and the set of actions
of other players, ~x i, is
Fi(X;Y;) = r~xi ~Ci(X;Y;) = r~xi ~C(X;Y;); (4.26)
where X = (~xi; ~x i). The above result follows from denition of potential function and
(4.18). Note that Fi is a vector and let its p
th component be F pi . Then,
F pi (X;Y;) =
@ ~C(X;Y;)
@xpi
; 8i 2 F ; p 2 Pi (4.27)
= pi  
X
h2Hpi
@ ~T (h)
@xpi
+
NX
k=1
NX
m=1
Ripkmkkm
 
X
h2Hpi
NX
k=1
Zhkk
@ ~T (h)
@xpi
: (4.28)
where, Hpi the set of all hyper-links associated with ow fpi . From (4.23)
@ ~T (h)
@xpi
=
1
2
ki

xpi
Mt(x
p
i ; yh)
t 1
; (4.29)
and we have the min-approximation
Mt(x
p
i ; yh) =

(xpi )
t + (yh)
t
2

: (4.30)
As we will show below, our algorithm will converge to the optimal state for any given value
of t < 0: Thus, we can attain a solution that is arbitrarily close to the original problem by
choosing jtj as large as desired. Also note that the payo is the marginal cost incurred in
using an option, so the players try to minimize their cost. The source node of each ow,
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i 2 F observes the marginal cost, F pi , obtained in using a particular option (particular
hyperpath), p 2 Pi, and changes the mass on that particular option, xpi , so as to attain
equilibrium.
Next, we dene the concept of equilibrium in potential games. A commonly used
concept in non-cooperative games, is the Nash equilibrium. The game is said to be at
Nash equilibium, if ows do not have any incentive to unilaterally deviate from their
current action states. An action prole, X^ = (~^xi; ~^x i) 2 X, results in a Nash equilibrium
of MNPC game if
Ci(~^xi; ~^x i)  Ci(~xi; ~^x i); 8~xi 2 Xi; 8i 2 F :
The above NE condition also implies that
F pi (X^)  F p
0
i (X^) 8p; p0 2 Pi; 8i 2 F ;
where F pi is the marginal payo given by (4.27). The above result can be interpreted as
follows: At NE, for any player i 2 F , all the options (hyper paths) being used by that
player, yield the same marginal payo. Also, the marginal payo that would have been
obtained is higher for all those unused options.
The above concept refers to an equilibrium condition; the question arises as to how the
system actually arrives at such a state. A commonly used kind of population dynamics is
Brown-von Neumann-Nash (BNN) Dynamics [9]. The source nodes use BNN dynamics to
control the mass on each option. But since each source tries to minimize its payo, we use
a modied version of BNN dynamics:
_xpi =
0@xipi   xif PiX
j=1
ji
1A ; (4.31)
where, pi = max
8<: 1xi
PiX
j=1
F ji x
j
f   F pi ; 0
9=;
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where F pi is the marginal payo of player i given by (4.27). In the next subsection, we
prove the stability of our inner loop contorol.
4.4.1 Convergence of MPNC game
We show in this susection that the multi-path network coding game converges to a
stationary point when each source uses BNN dynamics. We will use the theory of Lyapunov
functions [28] to show that our population game G, is stable for a given hyper-link state Y
and node-price state . We use the approximated system function (4.22) as our candidate
Lyapunov function.
Theorem 5. The system of ows F that use BNN dynamics with payos given by (4.27)
is globally asymptotically stable for a given hyper-link state Y and node-price state .
Proof. We use the approximated system function ~C(X;Y;) (4.22) as our Lyapunov func-
tion. It is simple to verify that the cost function ~C(X; Y ; ), is non-negative and convex,
and hence is a valid candidate. For a given hyper-link state, Y , and node-price state, ,
we dene our Lyapunov function as:
L Y (X) = ~C(X; Y ; ):
From (4.27)
@L Y (X)
@xpf
=
@ ~C(X; Y ; )
@xpf
= F pf (X;
Y ; ):
Hence,
_L Y (X) =
PF
f=1
PSf
p=1
@L Y (X)
@xpf
_xpf ;
=
PF
f=1
PSf
p=1 F
p
f (X;
Y ; ) _xpf :
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From (4.31) we can substitute the value for _xpf and we have
_L Y (X) =
FX
f=1
SfX
p=1
F pf (xf
p
f   xpf
SfX
j=1
jf );
=
FX
f=1
xf
0@ SfX
p=1
FPf 
p
f  
0@ 1
xf
SfX
p=1
F pf x
p
f
1A SfX
j=1
jf
1A :
We dene
Ff ,
1
xf
SfX
p=1
F pf x
p
f ;
=)
FX
f=1
xf
0@ SfX
p=1
FPf 
p
f  
SfX
j=1
Ff
j
f
1A ;
=
FX
f=1
xf
0@ SfX
p=1
pf (F
P
f   Ff )
1A ;
  
FX
f=1
xf
0@ SfX
p=1
(pf )
2
1A  0:
Thus,
_L Y (X)  0; 8 X 2 X :
where equality exists when the state X corresponds to the stationary point of BNN dy-
namics. Hence, the system is globally asymptotically stable.
4.4.2 Eciency
The objective of our system is to minimize the system function for a given load vector
~x = [x1; : : : ; xQ] and given hyper-link state Y and node-price state . Here the system
function ~C(X; Y ; ) and is dened in (4.22). This can be represented as the following
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constrained minimization problem:
min
X
~C(X; Y ; ) (4.32)
subject to:
SiX
p=1
xpi = xi 8 i 2 F (4.33)
xpi  0:
The Lagrange dual associated with the above minimization problem, for a given Y and 
is
L Y (; h;X) = max;h minX

~C(X; Y ; )   (4.34)
FX
i=1
i
 SiX
p=1
xpi   xi

 
FX
i=1
SiX
p=1
hpi x
p
i

where i and h
i
p  0 , 8 i 2 F and p 2 Si, are the dual variables. Now the above dual
problem gives the following Karush-Kuhn-Tucker rst order conditions:
@L Y 
@xpi
(; h;X?) = 0 8 i 2 F and p 2 Si (4.35)
and
hpi x
?p
i = 0 8 i 2 F and p 2 Si (4.36)
where X? is the global minimum for the primal problem (4.32). Hence from (4.35) we
have, 8 i 2 F and 8 p 2 Si,
@ ~C
@xpi
(X?; Y ; )  i
@(
PSi
p=1 x
?p
i   x?i)
@xpi
+ hpi = 0
) @
~C
@xpi
(X?; Y ; ) = i + h
p
i (4.37)
) F pi (X?; Y ; ) = i + hpi (4.38)
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where the last equation follows from (4.26).
From (4.36), it follows that
F pi (X
?; Y ; ) = i when x
?p
i > 0 (4.39)
and
F pi (X
?; Y ; ) = i + h
p
i when x
?p
i = 0 (4.40)
8 i 2 F and 8 p 2 Si. The above condition (4.39, 4.40), implies that the payo on
all the options used is identical and for options not in use the payo is more, which is
equivalent to the NE condition given by (4.31). Notice that we use a modied denition of
Nash equilibrium, since each source tries to minimize it's cost (or payo). The following
theorem proves the eciency of our system.
Theorem 6. The solution of the minimization problem in (4.32) is identical to the Nash
equilibrium of MPNC game.
Proof. Consider the BNN dynamics (4.31), at stationary point, ~X, we have _xpi = 0, which
implies that either,
F^i = F
p
i (
~X; Y ; ) (4.41)
or x^pi = 0;
where, F^i , 1x^i
PQ
r=1 x^
r
iF
r
i (
~X; Y ; ) 8 i 2 F ; (4.42)
The above expressions imply that all hyper-paths used by a particular ow i 2 F yield
same payo, F^i, while hyper-paths not used (x
p
i = 0) yield a payo higher than F^i.
We observe that the conditions required for Nash equilibrium are identical to the KKT
rst order conditions (4.39)-(4.40) of the minimization problem (4.32) when
F^i = i 8 i 2 F
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It follows from the convexity of the total system cost that, there is no duality-gap between
the primal (4.32) and the dual (4.34) problems. Thus, the optimal primal solution is equal
to optimal dual solutions, which is identical to the Nash equilibrium.
4.5 Node control
Thus far we have designed a distributed scheme that would result in minimum cost for
a given hyper-link state or capacities Y , node-price state  and for a given load vector
~x = fx1; : : : ; xfg. In this phase of Decoupled Dynamics, the hyper-link capacities and
node-prices are adjusted based on the current value of system function. This phase runs at
a larger time-scale as compared to the trac splitting phase described in Section 4.4. It is
assumed that during this phase all the ows instantly reach equilibrium, i.e., changing the
hyper-link capacities and node-prices would force all the source nodes to attain Wardrop
equilibrium instantaneously.
The node control can be formulated as a convex optimization problem as follows:
max

min
Y
Q(Y;); (4.43)
subject to, yh; k  0; 8yh 2 Y and 8k 2 :
where, Q(Y;) is the minimum value of the system function for a given hyper-link state Y
and node-price state , i.e., Q(Y;) = ~C(X?; Y;), where, for a given Y and , X? is an
optimal state of the ows that results in minimum cost.2 We use simple gradient descent:
_yh =  @Q(Y;)
@yh
8yh 2 Y; (4.44)
_k = 
@Q(Y;)
@k
8k 2 : (4.45)
The partial derivative, @Q@yh , is over the variables yh 2 Y . Keeping  xed and changing
the hyper-link capacity yh, of some hyper-link h 2 H, would result in a dierent state of
2Notice, there could be many dierent states, X?, which result in a minimum cost but the minimum
value, ~C(X?; Y;), is unique.
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the ows, X?h and hence a dierent minimum cost,
~C(X?h; Yh;), where Yh corresponds to
the changed hyper-link capacity of yh while other capacities are xed, as compared to Y .
Thus for a hyper-link, h = nk[(i; q; ni); (j; t; nj)] with capacity yh,
@Q(Y;)
@yh
= @
~C
@yh
(X?; Y;)
+
PF
i=1
PPi
p=1
@ ~C
@xpi
(X?; Y;)
@xpi
@yh
(4.46)
= @
~C
@yh
(X?; Y;) +
PF
i=1 Fi
PSi
p=1
@xpi
@yh
;
where the last expression follows from the denition of F pi (Denition 4.27) and the fact that
for changes in the hyper-link state, the sources attain Wardrop equilibrium instantaneously.
In other words, before and after a small change in yh the system is in Wardrop equilibrium.
Hence, F pi = Fi 8i 2 F and 8p 2 Si. Finally,
PSi
p=1
@xpi
@yh
= 0; since the total load
xi =
PSi
p=1 x
p
i is xed. For hyper-link h = nk[(i; q; ni); (j; t; nj)],
@Q(Y;)
@yh
= @
~C
@yh
(X?; Y;) =  (1 + k) @ ~T@yh (h); (4.47)
where from (4.23),
@ ~T
@yh
(h) = ki4

yh
Mt(x
q
i ;yh)
t 1
+
kj
4

yh
Mt(xrj ;yh)
t 1
 maxfki; kjg;
and Mt(x
q
i ; yh) =

(xqi )
t+(yh)
t
2
 1
t
:
Similarly, we can show that
@Q(Y;)
@k
= @
~C
@k
(X?; Y;) = @
~Vk
@k
; (4.48)
128
where, from (4.24)
@ ~Vk
@k
=
0@ NX
m=1
FX
f=1
SfX
p=1
Rfpkmkix^
s
f  
HX
h=1
Zhk
~T (h)  Tk
1A :
Theorem 7. At the large time-scale, the hyper-link capacity control with dynamics (4.44)
and node price control with dynamics (4.45) is globally asymptotically stable.
Proof. We use the following Lyapunov function
G(Y;) =
1
2
HX
h=1
(yh   y^h)2 + 1
2
NX
k=1
(k   ^k)2 (4.49)
where y^h 2 Y^ and ^k 2 ^ are optimizers of (4.43). We will use LaSalle's invariance
principle [28] to show stability.
Dierentiating G we obtain
_G =
1

HX
h=1
(yh   y^h) _yh + 1

NX
k=1
(k   ^k) _k:
Now from (4.44) and (4.45),
_G =  
HX
h=1
(yh   y^h) @Q
@yh
+
NX
k=1
(k   ^k) @Q
@k
: (4.50)
We will show that _G  0; 8Y;8.
Note that Q(Y;) = ~C(X; Y;), where X is a minimizer of approximated cost func-
tion dened in (4.22) for xed Y and . Also, for any xed node-price state , the
approximated cost function is jointly convex in X and Y . Therefore, minimizing it over a
convex set of X yields a convex function. In essence, Q(Y;) is convex in Y for any xed
. It can be observed that for any xed hyper-link state Y and rate vector X, the approx-
imated cost function dened in (4.22) is a linear function of . Then the minimization
of ~C(X;Y;) over X can be thought of as a point-wise minimization of innite number
of linear functions of  which results in a concave function of . Therefore, Q(Y;) is
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concave in  for any xed Y . Therefore, from the convex-concave nature of Q(Y;) we
can show that
Q(Y^ ;)  Q(Y^ ; ^)  Q(Y; ^); 8Y; 8: (4.51)
where Y^ and ^ are optimizers of the problem (4.43). Now, using the rst order properties
of convex and concave functions,
Q(Y^ ;)  Q(Y;) +
HX
h=1
(y^h   yh) @Q
@yh
; (4.52)
Q(Y; ^)  Q(Y;) +
NX
k=1
(^k   k) @Q
@k
: (4.53)
From equations (4.50-4.53), we can write
_G =  
HX
h=1
(yh   y^h) @Q
@yh
+
NX
k=1
(k   ^k) @Q
@k
 0
In order to apply La Salle's invariance priniciple, let us consider a set of points E for which
the condition _G = 0 is satised. The largest invariant setM is a subset of points such that
@Q
@yh
= 0; 8yh 2 Y and @Q@k = 0; 8k 2 . Pick any point ( ~Y ; ~) 2 M. We can show from
the properties convex-concave nature of function Q(Y;) that Q( ~Y ; ~)  Q(Y; ~); 8Y and
Q( ~Y ; ~)  Q( ~Y ;);8. Therefore, the pair ( ~Y ; ~) satises the condition (4.51) and it
is an optimizer of (4.43). From La Salle's principle, the dynamics converge to the largest
invariant set M and therefore the convergent point is an optimal state of (4.43). Hence
the system is globally asymptotically stable [28].
4.6 Simulations
We simulated our system in Matlab to show system convergence. We rst performed
our simulations for our simple network shown in Figure 4.3(a). The load at the source
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nodes 1, 2 and 3 is given as 4:73, 2:69 and 3:56 respectively, which are randomly generated
values. We use the following costs on the individual links (ij): 12 = 2:8, 23 = 1:6,
34 = 1:8, 25 = 1:3, 54 = 2:1, 26 = 1:7, 48 = 2:9, 86 = 2:2, 57 = 1:9, 71 = 2:6;
we assume the costs on the links are symmetric. We use the approximated cost function
(4.22), with a value of t =  30 for the approximation parameter (4.21) for our simulations.
We have assumed that the maximum number of transmissions (per unit time) from each
node is limited to 15. The simulation is run for 50 large time units, and in each large time
scale we have 20 small time units.
We compare the total cost of the system for the following:
1. Decoupled Dynamics (DD): This is the algorithm that we developed under the aug-
mented potential game framework; we use our hyper-links to decouple the ows that
participate in coding.
2. Coupled Dynamics (no hyper-link) (CD): Here, there is coupling between individual
ows and coding happens at the minimum rate of the constituent ows. In other
words, this is the original potential game without augmentation. We use similar
game dynamics as that was used in DD. The total cost is specied in Equation (4.5).
3. No Coding: In this system no network coding is used. This gives an baseline with
respect to which the gains attained by coding can be quantied.
4. LP Optimal (LP): This is a centralized solution. We formulated our system as a
Linear Program (LP) of minimizing cost (4.17) over X and Y for a given load vector
that we obtain using an LP-solver.
As seen in the Figure 4.3(b), the total cost of the system (number of transmissions
per unit time) for our model (decoupled using hyper-link) is close to the optimal solution
obtained by solving it in a centralized fashion. We compared the nal system state of DD
and CD with that of the solution obtained using LP. We observe from Table 4.1 that the
values for the split (X) and the hyper-link capacities (Y ) generated by DD are near-optimal
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Figure 4.3: Performance evaluation of simple network topology
(LP results), but CD is very dierent. We have plotted time evolution of trac splits of
ow 3, over options 1 and 2, in the Figure 4.3(c), which shows that they converge to the
optimal values obtained by LP solver. In Figure 4.3(d), we have shown that the number
of transmissions from all the nodes is less than or equal to the maximum threshold.
Next, we perform our simulations on a bigger topology shown in Figure 4.4. This
network consists of 30 nodes shared by 6 ows. Flows 1, 2, 3 and 6 have two hyper-
paths each and ows 4 and 5 have three hyper-paths each. There are 6 hyper-links in the
system. Table 4.2 describes the source, destination nodes and the hyper-paths for each
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Table 4.1: Comparison of state variables for LP, DD and CD
Variable x11 x
2
1 x
1
2 x
2
2 x
1
3 x
2
3 y2 y3
LP 1.52 3.2 1.52 1.16 0.00 3.56 3.20 1.52
DD 1.6 3.12 1.71 0.97 0.09 3.46 3.29 1.58
CD 4.70 0.00 0.01 2.68 0.62 2.93 N/A N/A
ows. Notice, options 2 and 3 of ow 4 have the same physical path but dierent hyper-
links, y1 and y2 at node n7. This is because the sub-ow of x4 traversing the physical
path (16; 15; 11; 6; 7; 8) can be encoded with two dierent ows, x21 and x
2
2 traversing in the
reverse direction at node 7.
Figure 4.4: Complex network
We ran our algorithms on this network with random link costs. The simulation is run
for 150 large time units, and in each large time scale we have 50 small time units. As
seen in Figure 4.5, the total system cost for decoupled dynamics converges to the optimal
solution which is obtained by solving the problem in a centralized fashion. We observe from
Table 4.3 that the values for the split (X) and the hyper-link capacities (Y ) generated by
DD are near-optimal (LP results), but CD is very dierent.
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Table 4.2: Source, destination nodes and hyper-paths corresponding to each ow.
Id Src Node Dest. Node Hyper-Paths
1 8 1 (8,3,2,1) & (8,7,6,1)
2 8 6 (8,3,2,1,6) & (8,7,6)
3 5 26 (5,4,9,13,12,17,16,21,26) &
(5,10,14,19,24,29,28,27,26))
4 16 8 (16,17,12,8), (16,15,11,6,7,8) &
(16,15,11,6,7,8)
5 23 14 (23,22,17,12,13,14), (23,18,13,14) &
(23,24,19,14)
6 29 20 (29,24,19,20) & (29,30,25,20)
Table 4.3: Comparison of state variables for no coding, LP, DD and CD.
No Coding LP DD CD
x11 19.10 19.10 19.09 19.09
x21 0 0 0.01 0.01
x12 0 0 0.01 0.04
x22 21.08 21.07 21.07 21.07
x13 15.32 12.42 12.99 15.32
x23 0 2.90 2.33 0
x14 14.97 15.10 15.02 15.08
x24 0.06 0 0.0087 0.0087
x34 0 0 0 0
x15 0 8.69 8.8 0.05
x25 0 0 0.05 9.19
x35 11.6 2.90 2.79 11.54
x16 18.43 18.43 18.43 18.43
x26 0 0 0 0
y1 N/A 0 0 N/A
y2 N/A 0.17 0.63 N/A
y3 N/A 12.47 13.87 N/A
y4 N/A 8.69 9.15 N/A
y5 N/A 2.9 2.68 N/A
y6 N/A 2.9 3.98 N/A
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Figure 4.5: Comparison of total system cost (per unit rate), for dierent systems: DD and
non-coded against LP.
4.7 Conclusion
We considered a wireless network with given costs on arcs, trac matrix and multiple
paths. The objective was to nd the splits of trac for each source across its multiple
paths in a distributed manner leveraging the reverse carpooling technique where the peak
transmissions (per unit time) at each node is limited. For this we split the problem into two
sub-problems, and propose a two-level distributed control scheme set up as a game between
the sources and the hyperlink nodes. On one level, given a set of hyperlink capacities and
node-prices, the sources selshly choose their splits and attain a Nash equilibrium. On
the other level, given the trac splits, the hyperlinks and nodes may slightly increase or
decrease their capacities and prices using a steepest descent algorithm. We constructed
a Lyapunov function argument to show that this process asymptotically converges to the
minimum cost solution, although performed in a distributed fashion.
In designing the two level controller, we came up with an interesting formulation that
we believe might be useful in other coordination games. The idea is to augment the
state space of the system using additional variables that are controlled by unselsh agents.
Although these agents only have local information at their disposal, they are able to modify
the potential function of the system as a whole, and hence change the actions taken by
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the selsh routing agents. Essentially, these agents take on some of the system cost on
themselves in order to redistribute the overall costs. The system wide cost is minimized as
a result. We also showed that the idea can be coupled with a Lagrange multiplier approach
to enforce constraints as well.
We performed several numerical studies and found that our two-level controller con-
verges fast to the optimal solutions. Some of the bi-products of our experiments were that:
more expensive paths before network coding became cheaper and shortest paths were not
necessarily optimal. In conclusion, from a methodological standpoint we have a distributed
controller that achieves a near-optimal solution when the individuals are self-interested.
In the next chapter, we explore the benets of an auction based scheduling mechanism
that allocates channel resources to a large number of competing mobile applications in a
cellular network. We model the apps as queues that arrive and depart as they are turned
on and o. Conventional wisdom suggest to use Longest Queue First (LQF) policy in
which the server awards its service at each instant to the longest of queues at that instant.
LQF has many nice properties like achieving throughput optimality, fairness etc. However,
this policy requires knowledge of queues at the scheduler (base station), which may not
be possible in the case of cellular networks. The applications may be asked to provide
queue length information. In that case, the applications, being selsh, may attempt to
obtain unfair amount of resources by providing false informations to mislead the scheduler.
Then, how can we enforce the apps to report their queue lengths truthfully? One solution
is second price auction based scheduling. When the resource becomes available, the base
station conducts a second-price auction in which one unit of service is awarded to the
highest bidder at the payment of second highest bid. Now, the question we are interested
in answering is whether conducting such an auction repeatedly over time with queues
arriving and departing would result in some form of equilibrium? Would the scheduling
decisions resulting from such auctions resemble that of LQF? We attempt to answer these
questions in the next chapter.
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5. MAC LAYER: A MEAN FIELD GAMES APPROACH TO SCHEDULING IN
CELLULAR SYSTEMS
There has been a rapid increase in the usage of smart hand held devices for Internet
access. These devices are supported by cellular data networks, with the usage of these
data networks taking the form of packets generated by apps running on the smart devices.
The users of the apps terminate and start new ones every so often, and move around to
dierent cells as they do so. Scheduling uplink and downlink packets in a \fair" manner
under these circumstances is a topic of much recent research.
In this work, we consider a system consisting of smart phone users whose apps are
modeled as queues that arrive when the user starts the app, and depart when the user
terminates that app and starts a new one. Apps may generate packets (uplink) or might
request packets from else where (downlink), and these processes are captured by considering
jobs of dierent sizes that arrive to these queues. Users move around in an area that is
divided up into cells that each has a cellular base station, and scheduling a particular user
in a cell implies providing a unit of service to the queue that represents his/her currently
running app. At any time, the user might terminate the app with a xed probability, giving
rise to a geometric lifetime for each app. Note that the app may be terminated even if it
has packets queued up, i.e., the lifetime of a queue is unrelated to the amount of service
performed on it or the jobs waiting for service.
The problem of scheduling in wired and wireless systems has been a topic of much
recent research. Most have focused on the case where a nite number of innitely log lived
ows exist in the system, and the objective is the maximize the total throughput of the
system as a whole. A seminal piece of work in this regime is [74], in which the so called
max-weight algorithm was introduced. Essentially, the argument consisted of minimizing
the drift of quadratic Lyapunov function by maximizing the queue-length weighted sum of
acceptable schedules. Follow on works [15, 32, 34, 48, 49, 75] have illustrated its validity in
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a variety of network scenarios.
If queues arrive and depart in the system, then a natural scheduling policy in the single
server case is a Longest Queue First (LQF) scheme, in which each server picks the longest
of the queues requesting service from it, and awards it one unit of service. LQF has many
attractive properties, such a minimizing the expected value of the longest queue in the
system. It has also been shown [1] that with Bernoulli arrivals it minimizes the probability
of the shortest queue being shorter than a target value. In other words, it minimizes the
longest queue, and maximizes the shortest queue, eectively giving rise to queue that at
similar in length.
Critical to all the above work is the assumption that the queue length values are avail-
able to the scheduler. While the downlink queues would naturally be available at a cellular
base station, the only way to get the uplink queue information is to ask the users them-
selves. However, reporting a larger value of queue length implies a higher probability of
being scheduled under all the above policies, implying a strong incentive to lie about one's
queue length. How are we to design a scheduling scheme that possesses the good qualities
of LQF, while relying on self-reported values from the users?
An appealing idea is to use some kind of pricing or auction scheme to take scheduling
decisions for cellular data access. For instance, [20] describes an experimental trial of a
system in which day-ahead prices are announced to users, who then decide on whether or
not to use their 3G service based on the price at that time. However, these prices should
be have to be determined empirically.
The key objective of this work is to design an incentive compatible scheduling scheme
that behaves in an LQF-like fashion. Thus, we aim to systematically analyze an auction
theoretic framework in which each app bids for service from the cellular base station that
the device is currently located in. The auction is conducted in a second-price fashion,
with the winner being the one that bids highest, and the charge being the second highest
bid. It is well known that such an auction promotes truth-telling [29]. The question we
are interested in answering is whether conducting such an auction repeatedly over time
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with queues arriving and departing would result in some form of equilibrium? Would the
scheduling decisions resulting from such auctions resemble that of LQF?
In this work, we investigate the existence of such an equilibrium using the theory of
Mean Field Games (MFG). MFG has received a lot of attention in the recent years [2,22,79].
MFG oers a mathematical framework to approximate Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE)
in large player dynamic games which is otherwise intractable. PBE requires each player
to keep track of their beliefs on the future plays of every other opponent in the system.
This makes the computation of PBE computationally intractable when the number of
players is large. Henceforth, Mean Field Equilibrium (MFE), an equilibrium concept in
MFG is used to approximate PBE. In MFG, the players model their opponents through
an assumed distribution over their action spaces, and play the best response action against
this distribution. We say that the system is at MFE if this best response action turns out
to be a sample drawn from the assumed distribution.
Our main result is that the dynamic auction based scheduling mechanism has a MFE.
Also, we show that the equilibrium bidding strategy of each player is montone in their
queue length. That means, at each time the service is awarded to the longest of queues, a
policy that resembles LQF. Hence, we believe that auction theoretic scheduling mechanism
may attain the same benets as that of LQF policy.
5.1 Model
Consider a large geographical area that is uniformly partitioned into N cells each having
one base station. We assume that there are a large number of mobile users and assume that
they are randomly moving around the region passing from one cell to another cell. At every
unit interval, the mobile users are uniformly and randomly distributed across N cells such
that each cell contains exactly M users. Each base station conducts second price auction
among the users within its cell territory at unit intervals. And the winner receives one unit
worth of service. Let Qi;k represents the residual workload of agent (mobile user) i, just
before kth auction. We assume that Qi;k 2 [0;1) and note that it completely represents
the state of the queue at time k. Agent i's workload is inuenced by the following three
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processes.
1. Arrivals: After every auction, an arrival Ai;k occurs at agent i, where Ai;k is a random
variable independent of every other parameter and distributed according to A.
2. Service: Di;k is the random variable representing the amount of service delivered at
the k-th time instant. We assume that the server serves at-most a unit amount of
workload of the winner in any auction. Di;k = minf1; Qi;kgWi;k, where Wi;k = 1(i
wins at time k).
3. Regeneration: We assume that after participating in an auction agent i may regen-
erate its workload with probability 1   where 0 <  < 1. We assume that the new
workload is a random variable distributed according to 	R.
Hence, the state of agent i at time k + 1 is,
Qi;k+1 =
8>><>>:
Qi;k  Di;k +Ai;k agent i does not regenerate at k
Ri;k otherwise;
(5.1)
where Ai;k  A and Ri;k  	R. Below we state the assumptions on the arrival and
regeneration processes.
Assumption 1. The arrivals fAi;kg are i.i.d random variables distributed according to
A. We assume that Ai;k 2 [0; A]. Also, these random variables have a bounded density
function, A. (kAk < c.)
Assumption 2. The regeneration values fRi;kg are i.i.d are random variables distributed
according to 	R and they have a bounded density  R. (k Rk < c .)
Each agent bears a holding cost at every instant, that corresponds to the dis-utility due
to unserved workload. The holding cost of agent i at time k is C(Qi;k), where C : R
+ ! R+.
The agent also pays for for service if it wins the auction. This is called bidding cost. Let
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Xi;k is the bid submitted by agent i in the k-th auction and
X i;k = max
j2Mi;k
Xj;k;
where Mi;k is the set consisting of all other agents participating in at time k with agent
i. Then, the bidding cost of agent i is X i;k Wi;k. We make some assumptions on the
holding cost function as stated below.
Assumption 3. The holding cost function C : R+ 7! R+ is continuous, increasing and
strictly convex. We also assume that C is O(qm) for some integer m.
5.1.1 Optimal bidding strategy
In this section we begin to understand the strategy space available to an agent. We
note that the information available with any agent, about the market at any time prior to
the auction, only includes the following:
1. The bids it made in each of the previous auction from point of last regeneration.
2. The auctions it won.
3. The payments made for the auctions won.
Let, Hi;k be the vector containing the above information available to agent i at time k.
An agent is unaware of any information concerning other agents. Each agent holds a belief
that is a distribution over future trajectories which gets updated via Baye's rule as new
information arrives at the occurrence of each auction event. Let i;k be the belief of agent i
at time k.
Let pure strategy i be the history dependent strategy of agent i, i.e i(Hi;k) = Xi;k.
We dene  i to be the vector of strategies of all agents except agent i and  = [i; i].
We refer to  as strategy prole.
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Given a strategy prole , a history vector Hi;k and a belief vector i;k, expected cost
is,
Vi;i;k(Hi;k;) = E;i;k
264T
(k)
iX
t=k

C(Qi;t) + X i;t1(Wi;t = 1)
375 ; (5.2)
where T
(k)
i is the time at which player i regenerates after time k.
We are now ready to introduce the notion of Nash equilibrium in dynamic games, called
Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE).
Denition 3 (Perfect Bayesian equilibrium). A strategy prole  is said to be a Perfect
Bayesian Equilibrium if
1. For each agent i, after any history Hi;k, i(Hi;k) 2 argmax0i Vi;i;k(Hi;k; 0i; i)
2. The belief vectors i;k are updated via Bayes' rule for all agents.
The above equilibrium requires each agent to keep track of complex beliefs over other
agents and update them using Bayes' rule at each time. As the number of agents grow
large, this imposes large computational constraints on the agents. Also, the equilibrium
bid calculation of an agent depends on the entire histories and the strategies of all the
agents. So this equilibrium characterization is intractable.
5.2 Mean eld model
In the mean eld model we approximate the model parameters of the above stochastic
game as the number of agents in the game approaches innity. According to the belief
of a single agent, as the number of the other agents increases, we conjecture that the
distribution of a random agent's state does not change under Bayesian updates. Further,
we can also conjecture that the bid distributions of the m   1 agents in an auction are
independent, as it is unlikely that they would have interacted from the point of earliest
regeneration of the all the agents in the auction. Since, in any auction the identity of other
agents is unimportant, agent i needs to only maintain belief over the bid of a random agent.
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In the following sections, we formalize these ideas and dene the concept of mean eld
equilibrium (MFE).
5.2.1 Agent's decision problem
In this section, we address a single agent's decision problem. Let the candidate be
agent i. As described above, the agent needs to maintain a belief over the bids of a random
agent. Suppose this cumulative distribution is . We assume that  2 P where,
P = fj is a continuous c.d.f;
Z
(1  (x))dx < Eg;
where E < 1 and independent of . Under this belief model, the expected cost of the
agent (5.2), can be re-written as,
Vi;(Hi;k;) = E
24 TkiX
t=k
[C(Qi;t) + r(Xi;k))]
35 (5.3)
where the expectation is over T ki and future state evolutions. Note that Xi;k = i(Hi;k).
Also, r(x) = E[ X i;kIf X i;k  xg] is the expected bidding cost when the agents bids x
under the assumption that the bids of other agents are distributed according to . We see
that in replacing the belief with , we have made an agent's decision problem independent
of other agents' strategies, hence we represent the cost by Vi;(Hi;k; i).
We now give the expression for r in terms of . Given , the winning probability in a
second price auction is
p(x) = Pr( X i;k  x) = (x)M 1: (5.4)
where M is the number of agents selected for participating in an auction. The expected
payment when bidding x is
r(x) = E[ X i;kIf X i;k  xg] = xp(x) 
Z x
0
p(u)du: (5.5)
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Since, T ki is a geometric random variable, the above expression reduces to
Vi;(Hi;k; i) = E
" 1X
t=k
t[C(Qi;t) + r(Xi;t)]
#
: (5.6)
Here, the state process Qi;k is Markov; the future state is independent of past states and
past actions given the current state and current action. The transition kernel of the process
is
Pr(Qi;k+1 2 BjQi;k = q;Xi;k = x) =p(x)Pr((q   1)+ +Ak 2 B) (5.7)
+ (1  p(x))Pr(q +Ak 2 B) + (1  )	R(B):
(5.8)
where B  R+ is a Borel set and x+ , max(x; 0). Recall that Ak  A is the arrival
between (k)th and (k+1)th auction and 	R is density function of the regeneration process.
In the above expression, the rst two terms correspond to the event that the agent does not
regenerate. In particular the rst corresponds to the event that agent wins the auction at
time k. The last term captures the event that the agent regenerates after auction k. Also,
note that the transition kernel is time invariant. Therefore, the agent's decision problem,
which is to nd a policy that minimizes the cost given above, can be modeled as an innite
horizon discounted cost MDP. From Theorem 5.5.3 in [56], there exists an optimal Markov
deterministic policy to a discounted cost MDP. Then, from (5.6), the optimal value function
of the agent can be written as
V^i;(q) = inf
i2
E
" 1X
t=1
t[C(Qi;t) + r(Xi;t)] jQi;0 = q
#
: (5.9)
where  is the space of Markov deterministic policies.
Note that user index is redundant in the above expression as we are concerned with a
single agent's decision problem, In future notations, we will omit the user subscript i.
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5.2.2 Stationary distribution
Given cumulative bid distribution  and a Markov policy  2 , the transition kernel
given by (5.7) can be re-written as,
Pr(Qk+1 2 BjQk = q) =p((q))Pr((q   1)+ +Ak 2 B)+
(1  p((q)))Pr(q +Ak 2 B) + (1  )	R(B): (5.10)
Then, we have an important result in the following lemma:
Lemma 10. The Markov chain described by the transition probabilities in (5.10) is positive
Harris recurrent and has a unique stationary distribution.
Proof. From eq. (5.10) we note that,
Pr(Qk+1 2 BjQk = q)  (1  )	R(B)
where 0 <  < 1 and 	R is a probability measure. The result then follows from results in
Chapter 12, Meyn and Tweedie [43].
We denote the unique stationary distribution by ;.
5.2.3 Mean eld equilibrium
In this section, we dene the mean eld equilibrium for our stochastic game. Assume
that all agents conjecture the same bid distribution  and the decision problem in eq. (5.9)
has an optimal policy ^. This induces a dynamics with transition probabilities as in
eq. (5.10). We have shown in the previous section that the dynamics induced by the
transition kernel eq. (5.10) has a stationary distribution which we denote by  = ;^ .
The mean eld equilibrium requires the consistency check, that the bid distribution
induced by the stationary distribution  be equal to the bid distribution conjectured by
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the agent, i.e., . In other words we require,
(x) = (
 1
 ([0; x])): (5.11)
Thus, we have the following denition of MFE:
Denition 4 (Mean eld equilibrium). Let  be a bid distribution and  be a stationary
policy for an agent. Then, we say that (; ) constitutes a mean eld equilibrium if
1.  is an optimal policy of the decision problem in eq. (5.9), given bid distribution ;
and
2. (x) = (
 1
 ([0; x]));8x 2 R+.
We prove the existence of an MFE in Section 5.4. Before that, in the following section,
we establish monotonicity and continuity the optimal bid function. These properties are
essential in showing the existence of an MFE.
5.3 Properties of optimal bid function
In this section, we state the optimality equation for the single agent's decision problem
given in eq. (5.9) and describe an optimal strategy. We subsequently list some useful
properties of this optimal strategy. In this section we have a xed bid distribution , and
hence, omit  from the subscripts.
Note that the decision problem given by eq. (5.9) is an innite horizon, discounted
Markov decision problem. The optimality equation or Bellman equation corresponding to
the decision problem is
V^(q) = C(q) + EA(V^(q +A))
+ inf
x2R+
[r(x)  p(x)EA

V^(q +A)  V^ ((q   1)+ +A)

]; (5.12)
where A is the arrival process. In the following lemma we show that there exists a unique
solution to the above optimality equation and derive an optimal Markov stationary strategy
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to the decision problem.
We rst introduce some necessary notation.Let,
V =
(
f : R+ 7! R+ : sup
q2R+
 f(q)w(q)
 <1
)
; (5.13)
where w(q) = maxC(q); 1. Note that V is a Banach space with w-norm,
kfkw = sup
q2R+
 f(q)w(q)
 <1:
Also, dene the operator T as
(Tf)(q) = C(q) + EAf(q +A)
+ inf
x2R+

r(x)  p(x)(EA(f(q +A)  f((q   1)+ +A)))

; (5.14)
where f 2 V. Lemma 17 shows that inmum in the above operator occurs at maxf0; f(q)g,
where f(q) = EA(f(q + A)  f((q   1)+ + A)). Then, substituting r and p from (5.4)
and (5.5), the above expression can be rewritten as,
(Tf)(q) = C(q) + EAf(q +A) 
Z maxf0;f(q)g
0
p(u)du: (5.15)
Now, we are ready to state the lemma.
Lemma 11. Given a cumulative bid distribution ,
1. There exists a unique f^ 2 V such that Tf^ = f^. Also, for any f 2 V, Tn f ! f^
(as n!1).
2. The unique xed point f^ of operator T is a unique solution to the optimality equation
(5.12), i.e., f^ = V^.
3. Let ^(q) = max
n
0;EA
h
V^(q +A)  V^((q   1)+ +A)
io
. Then, ^ is an optimal
policy.
147
Proof. First and second statement in the lemma follows from Theorem 6:10:4 in [56] if the
following conditions are satised. Let Qk be the random variable denoting queue length at
time k. Then, the conditions to be satised are,
Tf 2 V ;8f 2 V; (5.16)
sup
x2R+
jC(q) + r(x)j  K1w(q); for some K1 > 0; 8q 2 R+; (5.17)
EQ1 [f(Q1)jQ0 = q]  K2w(q); for some K2 > 0; 8q 2 R+; 8f 2 V; (5.18)
and
jEQj (w(Qj)jQ0 = q)  K3w(q); for some 0 < K3 < 1; for some j; 8q 2 R+: (5.19)
To prove (5.16), one may observe from (5.15) that
C(q)  (Tf)(q)  C(q) + EAf(q +A): (5.20)
Here, the left most expression is positive. And, the rightmost expression is bounded by
some multiple of w(q) since A is a bounded random variable by Assumption 1. Together,
we get (5.16). Further, (5.17) holds true from the denition of w(q) and from the fact that
r(x)  lim
y!1 r(y) < (M   1)
Z
(1  (x))dx < (m  1)E:
Here, the last inequality is due to  2 P. Equation (5.18) holds true since
EQ1 [f(q1)jQ0 = q]  kfkwEQ1 [w(Q1)jQ0 = q]
= kfkw

p(b)EAw((q   1)+ +A) + (1  p(b))EAw(q +A)

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 kfkw [EAw(q +A)]
 kfkwK2w(q):
for some large enough K2 due to Assumption 3. Finally, we have eq. (5.19) since,
jEQj [w(Qj)jQ0 = q] = jEQj [C(Qj)jQ0 = q]
 jC(q + j A)
 C(q);
for large enough j. Here A. as dened in Assumption 1, is the maximum arrival possible
between any two adjacent auctions.
Since all the conditions of Theorem 6:10:4 are met, the rst result in the lemma holds
true. The second result can be obtained by comparing (5.14) and (5.12). The last part of
the lemma follows from Lemma 17.
Now, we establish that V^ and ^ are continuous and increasing functions.
Lemma 12. Given a cumulative bid distribution function , we have
1. V^ is a continuous monotone increasing function.
2. ^ is a continuous strictly monotone increasing function.
Proof. Let f 2 V. Suppose f is a continuous monotone increasing function. Now, we prove
that Tf is also continuous monotone increasing function. Since, T
n
 f ! V^ according to
statement 2 of the previous lemma, we can conclude that V^ also holds the same property.
First we prove that Tf is a monotone increasing function. Let q > q
0. Then,
Tf(q)  Tf(q0) =C(q)  C(q0) + EA(f(q +A)  f(q0 +A))
+  inf
x
[r(x)  p(x)EA(f(q +A)  f((q   1)+ +A))]
   inf
b
[r(x)  p(x)EA(f(q0 +A)  f((q0   1)+ +A))]
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EA(f(q +A)  f(q0 +A))
+  inf
b
[p(x)EA(f(q
0 +A)  f((q0   1)+ +A))
 EA(f(q +A) + f((q   1)+ +A))]
minEA(f(q +A)  f(q0 +A));
EA(f((q   1)+ +A)  f((q0   1)+ +A))
	  0:
The second inequality follows from the assumption that C(:) is an increasing function. And
the last inequality follows from the assumption that f(:) is an increasing function.
To prove that Tf is continuous consider a sequence fqng such that qn ! q. Since f is a
continuous function, f(qn+a)! f(q+a). Then, by using dominated convergence theorem,
we have EAf(qn+A)! EAf(q+A) and EAf((qn  1)++A)! EAf((q  1)++A). Also,
f(qn)  0 as f is an increasing function. Then, from (5.15), we get that
Tf(qn) =C(qn) + EAf(qn +A) 
Z f(qn)
0
p(u)du (5.22)
!C(q) + EAf(q +A) 
Z f(q)g
0
p(u)du = Tf(q): (5.23)
Hence, Tf is a continuous function. This yields statement 1 in the lemma.
Now, to prove second part of the lemma, assume that f is an increasing function.
First, we show that Tf is an increasing function. Let q > q
0. From (5.15), for any a < A
we can write
(Tf)(q + a)  (Tf)((q   1)+ + a)  (Tf)(q0 + a) + (Tf)((q0   1)+ + a)
= C(q + a)  C((q   1)+ + a)  C(q0 + a) + C((q0   1)+ + a)
+ EAf(q + a+A)  EAf((q   1)+ + a+A)
  EAf(q0 + a+A) + EAf((q0   1)+ + a+A)
 
Z f(q+a)
f(q0+a)
p(u) du+
Z f((q 1)++a)
f((q0 1)++a)
p(u) du
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= C(q + a)  C((q   1)+ + a)  C(q0 + a) + C((q0   1)+ + a)
+EAf((q + a  1)+ +A) EAf((q   1)+ + a+A)
 EAf((q0 + a  1)+ +A) +EAf((q0   1)+ + a+A)
+
Z f(q+a)
f(q0+a)
1  p(u) du+
Z f((q 1)++a)
f((q0 1)++a)
p(u) du
It can be easily veried that EA(f(q+a 1)++A) EA(f(q 1)++a+A) EA(f(q0+a 
1)++A)+EA(f(q
0 1)++a+A)  0 as f is increasing (due to statement 1 of this lemma).
From the assumption that f is increasing, the last two terms in the above expression are
also non-negative. Now, taking expectation on both sides, we obtain Tf(q) Tf(q0) 
C(q) C(q0) > 0. Therefore, from Statement 2 and 3 of the previous lemma, we have
(q)  (q0) = V^(q) V^(q0)  C(q) C(q0) > 0:
Here, the last inequality holds since C is a strictly convex increasing function.
We state a useful Corollary that denes the optimal policy of the agent.
Corollary 6. An optimal policy of the agent's decision problem (5.9) is given by
^(q) = EA
h
V^(q +A)  V^((q   1)+ +A)
i
The proof follows from Statement 3 of Lemma 11 and Statement 1 of Lemma 12
5.4 Existence of MFE
Now, we have the main result showing the existence of MFE.
Theorem 8. There exists an MFE (; ^) such that
(x) = 

^ 1 [0; x]

;8x 2 R+:
We prove theorem in the next section. Before moving to the proof, let us introduce
151
some useful notation. Let  = f : R 7! R; kkw < 1g: Note that  is a normed space
with w-norm. Also, let 
 be the space of absolutely continuous probability measures on
R+. We endow this probability space with the topology of weak convergence. Note that
this is same as the topology of point-wise convergence of continuous cumulative distribution
functions.
We dene  : P 7!  as (())(q) = ^(q), where ^(q) is the optimal bid given by
Corollary 6. It can easily veried that ^ 2 . Also, dene the mapping ^ that takes
a bid distribution  to the invariant workload distribution () = ;^(). Later, using
Lemma 13 we will show that () 2 
. Therefore, ^ : P ! 
. Finally, let F be a mapping
from P. We dene F as (F())(x) = (^ 1 ([0; x])):
Now to prove the above theorem we show that F has a xed point, i.e F() = .
Schauder's xed point theorem, stated below, yields the sucient conditions for the exis-
tence of a xed point to the mapping F .
Theorem 9 (Schauder's xed point theorem). Suppose F(P)  P. Then, F(:) has a xed
point, if F is continuous, F(P) is contained in a convex and compact subset of P.
In subsequent sections, we show that the mapping F satises the conditions of the
above theorem, and hence it has a xed point. Note that P is a convex set. Therefore, we
just need to show that the other two conditions are satised.
5.5 MFE existence: proof
5.5.1 Continuity of the map F
To prove the continuity of mapping F , we rst show that  and ^ are continuous
mappings. To that end, we will show that for any sequence n !  in uniform norm,
we have (n) ! () in w-norm and ^(n) ) ^() ( ) implies weak convergence).
Then, we show that F(P) 2 P. Finally, we use the continuity of  and ^ to prove that
F(n)! F() which completes the proof.
5.5.1.1 Step 1: continuity of 
Theorem 10. The map  is continuous.
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Proof. Dene the map V  : P 7! V that takes  to V^(). From Corollary 6,
0 <j^1(q)  ^2(q)j
=j[EA(V^1(q +A)  V^1((q   1)+ +A)  V^2(q +A) + V^2((q   1)+ +A))]j (5.24)
EAjV^1(q +A)  V^2(q +A)j+ EAjV^1((q   1)+ +A)  V^2((q   1)+ +A)j (5.25)
kV^1   V^2kwEA(w(q +A) + w((q   1)+ +A)) (5.26)
KkV^1   V^2kww(q) (5.27)
for some large K independent of q. The last inequality follows from the fact that the
random variable A has bounded support. Hence, k1   2kw  KkV^1   V^2kw and
continuity of the map V  implies the continuity of the map .
For any  2 P and f1; f2 2 V, from (5.15), we have
jTf1(q)  Tf2(q)j jEA(f1(q +A)  f2(q +A))j
+

Z f1(q)
0
M 1(u) du 
Z f2(q)
0
M 1(u) du

kf1   f2kK1w(q) +

Z f1(q)
f2(q)
jM 1(u)j du

kf1   f2kK1w(q) + jf1(q) f2(q)j
(K1 +K2)kf1   f2kw(q)
Therefore,
kTf1   Tf2kw  K^kf1   f2kw ) (A) (5.28)
for some large K^, independent of .
Now, let T1 and T2 be the Bellman operators corresponding to 1 and 2. We will
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bound jT1f   T2f j. From (5.4), we have
jp1(x)  p2(x)j =jM 11 (x)  M 12 (x)j
=jM 11 (x)  2(x)M 21 (x) + 2(x)M 21 (x)  M 12 (x)j
j1(x)  2(x)j+ jM 21 (x)  M 22 (x)j (since 1(x)  1)
Hence by induction, jp1(x)  p2(x)j  (M   1)j1(x)  2(x)j  (M   1)k1   2k. Also,
from (5.5)
jr1(x)  r2(x)j  xjp1(x)  p2(x)j+
Z x
0
jp1(u)  p2(u)jdu  2x(M   1)k1   2k
Now, using the denition of T from 5.15,
jT1f(q)  T2f(q)j = j
Z f(q)
p1(u)du 
Z f(q)
p2(u)duj (5.29)
 2(M   1)f(q)jj1   2jj
 2(M   1)K1kfkww(q)k1   2k;) (B) (5.30)
where the last statement is due to the fact that f 2 V .
Now, let j be such that T j1 is a -contraction.
kV^1   V^2kw =kT j1 V^1   T j2 V^2kw
kT j1 V^1   T j1 V^2kw + kT j1 V^2   T j2 V^2kw
=) (1  )kV^1   V^2kw kT j1 V^2   T j2 V^2kw (5.31)
It can be shown that
kT j1 V^2   T j2 V^2kw  kT j1 V^2   T j 11 T2 V^2kw + kT j 11 T2 V^2   T j 21 T 22 V^2kw
+   + kT1T j 12 V^2   T j2 V^2kw
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 K^j 1kT1 V^2   T2 V^2kw +   + kT1T j 12 V^2   T j2 V^2kw (5.32)
 (K^j 1 +   + 1)kT1 V^2   T2 V^2kw (5.33)
 2(m  1)Kk1   2k(K^j 1 +   + 1)kV^2kw (5.34)
Here (5.32) and (5.34) are due to (B) and (A) respectively. Now, from (5.31) and (5.34),
we get
kV^1   V^2kw 
2(m  1)K(K^j 1 +   + 1)
1   k1   2kkV^2kw (5.35)
 2(m  1)K(K^
j 1 +   + 1)
1   k1   2k(kV^1kw + kV^1   V^2kw) (5.36)
(5.37)
Therefore, if 2(m 1)K(K^
j 1++1)
1  k1   2k < 12 , then
kV^1   V^2kw 
4(m  1)K(K^j 1 +   + 1)
1   kV^1kwk1   2k (5.38)
Hence, the map V^ and ^ are continuous.
5.5.1.2 Step 2: continuity of the map ^
Recall that ^ takes  2 P to probability measure (:) = ;^(:). First we show that
(:) 2 
, where 
, as dened before, is the space of absolutely continuous (with respect
to Lebesgue measure) measures on R+.
Lemma 13. For any  2 P and any  2 , ;() is absolutely continuous with respect
to the Lebesgue measure on R+.
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Proof. ;() is the invariant queue-length distribution of the dynamics
q !
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
q +A with probability p((q))
(q   1)+ +A with probability (1  p((q))
R with probability (1  );
(5.39)
where, A  A and R  	R. This is the same as the dynamics
q !
8>><>>:
q0 +A with probability 
R with probability (1  );
where q0 is a random variable with distribution generated by the conditional probabilities
p(q0 = qjq) =p((q))
p(q0 = (q   1)+jq) =1  p((q))
Let 0 be the distribution of q0. Then for any Borel set B,
;(B) =(A 0)(B) + (1  )	R(B)
=
Z 1
 1
A(B   y)d0(y) + (1  )	R(B) (5.40)
If B is a Lebesgue null-set, then so is B   y 8y. So, A(B   y) = 0 and 	R(B) = 0 and
therefore (B) = 0.
We now develop a useful characterization of ;. Let

(k)
;(Bjq) = Pr(Qk 2 Bjno regeneration , Q0 = q)
be the distribution of queue length Qk at time k induced by the transition probabilities
(5.10) conditioned on the event that Q0 = q and that there are no regenerations until time
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k. We can now express the invariant distribution ;() in terms of (k);(jq) as in the
following lemma.
Lemma 14. For any bid distribution  2 P and for any stationary policy  2 , the
Markov chain described by the transition probabilities in eq. (5.10) has a unique invariant
distribution ;() given by,
;(B) =
X
k0
(1  )kE	R((k);(BjQ)); (5.41)
where E	R(
(k)
;(BjQ)) =
R

(k)
;(Bjq)d	(q).
Proof. For brevity, denote ;() be () and (k); = (k) . Let   be the last time before
0 the chain regenerated. We have
(B) =
1X
k=0
Pr(B;  = k) (5.42)
=
1X
k=0
Pr( = k)Pr(Bj = k) (5.43)
Since the regeneration events are independent of the queue-length and occur geometrically
with probability (1  ), Pr( = k) = (1  )k. Hence,
(B) =
1X
k=0
(1  )kPr(Q0 2 Bj = k) (5.44)
=
1X
k=0
(1  )kE(E(1Q02Bj = k;Q k = Q)j = k) (5.45)
=
1X
k=0
(1  )kE((k)(BjQ)j = k) (5.46)
=
1X
k=0
(1  )kE	R((k)(BjQ)): (5.47)
since Q k  	R given  = k.
We shall now prove the continuity of ^ in . Let 
(k)
 = 
(k)
;^
.
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Theorem 11. The mapping ^ : P 7! 
 is continuous.
Proof. To prove continuity of the mapping ^, we just need to show that for any sequence
n !  in w-norm and for any open set B, lim infn!1n(B)  (B). By Fatou's
lemma,
lim inf
n!1 n(B) = lim infn!1
1X
k=0
(1  )kE	R [(k)n (BjQ))

1X
k=0
(1  )kE	R [lim infn!1 
(k)
n (BjQ)] (5.48)
where Q  	R.
Recursively, dene functions 
(0)
B;(q) = 1(q2B) and 
(k)
B;(q) = E[
(k 1)
B; (Q
0)jq], where
Pr(Q
0 2 Cjq) = p(^(q))A(C   (q   1)+) + (1  p(^(q)))A(C   q): (5.49)
Using backward equations, it is easy to see that E	R [
(k)
 (BjQ)] = E	R [(k)B;(Q)],
where Q  	R.
We now prove that lim infn!1
(k)
B;n
(q)  (k)B;(q) for every q 2 R+. In fact we prove a
stronger result: if qn ! q is any converging sequence, then lim infn!1(k)B;n(qn)  
(k)
B;(q)
for every k.
We show the above result by mathematical induction on k. For k = 0, we have

(0)
B;n
(qn) = 1(qn2B) and, one can easily check that for any open setB, lim infn!1 1(qn2B) 
1(q2B). Hence, our hypothesis holds true for k = 0. Suppose that the hypothesis is true
till k = m   1. To prove the lemma, we just need to verify that the hypothesis holds for
k = m. Verify that Prqn;n() =) Prq;() by considering the integrals of a bounded
continuous function. Then, by Skorokhod representation theorem, there exists Xn and X
on common probability space such that Xn  Prqn;n , X  Prq; and Xn ! X a.s. We
have,
lim inf 
(m)
B;n
(qn) = lim inf E(
(m 1)
B;n
(Xn)) (5.50)
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E(lim inf (m 1)B;n (Xn)) (by Fatou's lemma) (5.51)
E((m 1)B; (X)) (by induction hypothesis) (5.52)
=
(m)
B;(q) (5.53)
which completes the proof.
5.5.1.3 Step 3: continuity of the mapping F
Now, using the results from Step 1 and Step 2, we establish continuity of the mapping
F . First we show that F() 2 P.
Lemma 15. For any  2 P, let ^(x) = (F())(x) = (^ 1 ([0; x])); x 2 R+. Then, ^ 2 P.
Proof. From the denition of , it is easy to note that ^ is a distribution function. Since
^ is continuous and strictly increasing function as shown in Lemma 12, ^
 1
 (fxg) is either
empty or a singleton. Then, from Lemma 13, we get that (^
 1
 (fxg)) = 0. Together, we
get that ^(x) has no jumps at any x and hence it is continuous.
To complete the proof, we need to show that the expected bid under the cumulative
distribution function ^ is bounded from above by a constant that is independent of ^. To
that end, dene a new Markov random process ~Qk with the probability transition matrix
Pr( ~Qk+1 2 Bj ~Qk = q) = 1(q+ A2B) + (1  )	R(B) (5.54)
where A is the maximum possible arrival between any two consecutive auction instants.
The process ~Qk has an invariant distribution which is given by,
~(B) =
1X
k=0
(1  )kE	R(1(q+kA^)2B): (5.55)
The proof of the above result is identical to that of Lemma 14. For any q given, the above
probability measure (5.54) stochastically bounds the probability measure in eq. (5.10),
Therefore, it can be shown that ~ stochastically dominates  for all  2 P, i.e,  4 ~.
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Now, the expected value of the optimal bid function ^(q) under  satises,
E [^(q)] E~[^(q)] (5.56)
E~[V^(q + A)] (5.57)

1X
k=0
(1  )kE	R(V^(q + (k + 1) A)) (5.58)
Above, the rst inequality follows from stochastic dominance of ~ and the second inequality
is due to the denition of optimal bid function.
From (5.12), we can observe that for any , V^(q) 
P1
k=0 
kC(q+ k A) independent of
. Since C(q) 2 O(qm) for somem, we have V^(q) 2 O(qm). Then, E	R(V^(q+(k+1)A^)) 2
O(km) as the moments of 	R are bounded. This directly gives that E [^(q)] is bounded
by the some constant that is independent of  and, hence independent of ^. This completes
the proof.
Now, we have the main theorem showing continuity of the map F .
Theorem 12. The mapping F : P 7! P given by (F())(x) = (^ 1 ([0; x])) is continu-
ous.
Proof. Let n !  in uniform norm. From previous steps, we have ^n ! ^ in w-norm
and n ) . Then, using Theorem 5.5 of Billingsley [8], one can show that
n(^
 1
n (B))) (^ 1 (B));
for any Borel set B. Then, F(n) converges point-wise to F() as it is continuous at every
x, i.e., (F(n))(x)! (F(n))(x) for all x 2 R+.
Now, we complete the proof by showing that in the norm space P, point wise con-
vergence implies convergence in uniform norm. Let n;  2 P and Fn ! F point-wise.
Given  > 0, choose L large enough so that (L) > 1  . Since  is continuous function by
denition, it is uniformly continuous on the compact set [0; L]. Therefore, we can construct
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a sequence 0 = x1 < x2 <    < xk = L such that and (xi+1)   (xi) < . Let J be
large enough so that for all n > J , j(xi)   n(xi)j <  for all i. For any y such that
xi < y < xi+1,
j(y)  n(y)j <(y)  (xi) + j(xi)  n(xi)j+ jn(y)  n(xi)j (5.59)
<j(xi+1)  (xi)j+ j(xi)  n(xi)j+ jn(xi+1)  n(xi)j (5.60)
<2j((xi+1)  (xi))j+ j(xi)  n(xi)j+ 2 (5.61)
<5 (5.62)
While if L < y, then
j(y)  n(y)j <jn(y)  n(L) + jn(L)  (L)j+ j(y)  (L)j (5.63)
<1  (L) + + + 1  (L) (5.64)
<4: (5.65)
Therefore, j(y)   n(y)j < 5 for all n > J and hence n converges to  uniformly. This
completes the proof.
5.5.2 F(P) contained in a compact subset of P
We show that the closure of the image of the mapping F , denoted by F(P), is compact
and is contained in P. As P is a normed space, sequential compactness of any subset
of P implies that the subset is compact. Henceforth, we just need to show that F(P)
is sequentially compact. Sequential compactness of a set F(P) means the following: if
fng 2 F(P) is a sequence, then there exists a subsequence fnjg and  2 F(P) such that
nj ! f . We use Arzela-Ascoli theorem and uniform tightness of the measures in F(P) to
show the sequential compactness. The version of Arzela-Ascoli theorem that we will use is
stated below:
Theorem 13 (Arzela-Ascoli Theorem). Let X be a -compact metric space. Let G be a
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family of continuous real valued functions on X. Then the following two statements are
equivalent:
1. Every sequence fgng  G there exists a subsequence gnj which converges uniformly
on every compact subset of X.
2. The family G is equicontinuous on every compact subset of X and for any x 2 X,
there is a constant Cx such that jg(x)j < Cx for all g 2 G.
Say the family of functions F(P) satises the conditions of Arzela-Ascoli theorem. Also,
let they satisfy the uniform tightness property, i.e, 8f 2 F(P), there exists an x such that
1  f(x) > 1  . Then, for any sequence fng  F(P), there exists a subsequence fnjg
that converges uniformly on every compact sets to a continuous increasing function . As
these functions are uniformly tight, uniform convergence on compact sets imply uniform
convergence. i.e. nj ! . Therefore, F(P) is totally bounded and hence so is its closure.
Finally, we have to show that F(P)  P. From the tightness property, the limit
function  satises that 1  (x)  (1  ) and therefore (1) = 1. Also, we have
Z
(1  (x))dx  lim inf
nj!1
Z
(1  nj (x))dx <1: (5.66)
The rst inequality is due to Fatou's lemma. And, the second inequality holds since
fnjg 2 P . Therefore  2 P and hence F(P)  P.
Now we just need to verify F(P) satises the conditions of Arzela-Ascoli theorem and
tightness property. First we verify the conditions of the Arzela-Ascoli theorem. Note
that the functions in consideration are uniformly bounded by 1. To prove equicontinuity,
consider an ^ = F() and let x > y.
^(x)  ^(y) = ((q)  x) ((q)  y) = (y < (q)  x) (5.67)
Lemma 16. For any interval [a; b], ([a; b]) < c  (b  a), for some large enough c.
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Proof. We know that ([a; b]j; ) = Pk0(1   )kE	R((k) ([a:b]jQ0)). Let Ak be the
net arrivals and Dk be the net departures till time k. Then,
(k) ([a; b]jQ0) =E(1(Q0+Ak Dk2[a;b])jQ0) (5.68)
= E(E(1(Q0+Ak Dk2[a;b])jDk; Q0)jQ0) (5.69)
= E(E(1(Ak2[a Q0+Dk;b Q0+Dk])jQ0; Dk)jQ0) (5.70)
 c1  (b  a): (5.71)
Above results holds since the random variable Ak is independent of Q0 andDk for any k and
it has a bounded density function. Therefore, E	R(
(k)
 ([a:b]jQ0))  c(b a) for all k > 0.
For k = 0, we know that 	R has a bounded density which implies 	R([a; b])  c1  (b a).
These two results prove that there is a large enough c such that ([a; b]) < c  (b  a).
The above lemma and equation eq. (5.67) imply that ^(x)  ^(y)  c( 1 (x)   1 (y)).
To show equicontinuity, it is enough to show that lim supy"x
^(x) ^(y)
x y  K(x) for some K
independent of ^. We have
lim sup
y"x
^(x)  ^(y)
x  y c lim supy"x
 1 (x)   1 (y)
x  y (5.72)
=c lim sup
y"x
 1 (x)   1 (y)

 1
 (x)   1 (y)
(5.73)
c lim sup
y0!x0
x0   y0
(x0)  (y0) (x
0 =  1 (x)) (5.74)
c lim sup
y0!x0
x0   y0
(C(x0) C(y0)) (5.75)
c 1
H(x0)
(5.76)
where eq. (5.74) due to strict monotonicity of  and where
0 < H(x0) =
8>><>>:
EA[C
0(x0 +A)  C 0(x  1 +A)] x0 > 1
EA[C
0(x0 +A)] x0  1
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and C 0(x) = dC(x)dx .
Now, we show uniform tightness property of F(P). We have already shown that F (P) 
P. Hence, the expected value of the bids distributed according to the functions in F (P)
are uniformly bounded. Now, using Markov inequality, it can be shown that functions in
consideration are uniformly tight.
5.6 Conclusion
We studied an auction theoretic scheduling mechanism for use in cellular networks
where the base station allocates resources to mobile applications via repeatedly conducting
second price auctions and serving the winner at each time with one unit of service. Here, we
have a dynamic game in which each app play against his opponents by choosing a bidding
strategy so as to minimize his expected cost. We established that the game has a MFE
(of strategies) that closely approximates its Bayesian equilibrium. Also, we have shown
that the equilibrium bidding strategy of each player is montone in their queue length. It
implies that at each time the service is awarded to the longest of all queues - a policy that
resembles LQF. Hence, we propose that auction theoretic scheduling mechanism can be
used as an alternative to LQF policy when the queue lengths not known at the scheduler.
5.7 Supplemental: Technical lemma
Lemma 17. Dene g(b; v) = r(b)  p(b)v. Then v 2 argminb2R+ g(b; v).
Proof. If v  0, then  p(bj)v  0 and g(b; v) is increasing in b. Hence the minimum
occurs at b = 0. If v > 0, then consider
g(b; v)  g(v; v) =bp(b) 
Z b
0
p(u)du  vp(b) +
Z v
0
p(u)du
=(b  v)p(b) +
Z v
b
p(u)du
=
Z v
b
p(u)  p(b)du
0
164
with equality at b = v. Hence we have the desired result
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6. CONCLUSION
In this thesis, we studied several instances of coordination problems in communication
networks using game theoretical tools. A summary can be found in Table 6.1. The scenar-
ios we considered involve interaction among a group of agents who compete for network
resources to attain their own private interests. For example, the agents may selshly choose
congestion controllers to maximize their payo that may be a function of the throughput
and the delay incurred in the network, or strategically choose routes that to yield the min-
imum transmission cost. In most of such scenarios, selsh interactions among the agents
lead to chaos or to bad equilibrium states. We characterized the price of selshness; and
devised mechanisms or rules that encourage cooperative behavior among these agents.
There are several extensions possible to the work presented here. The incentive design
problem for P2P systems can be further explored to consider heterogeneous classes of
users with varying degree of sensitivity to delay and price. Also, the current work can be
extended to study incentive schemes for streaming contents. In future, we may study the
protocol selection problem considering a larger set of protocol choices that contains UDP,
RTCP etc. along with TCP and its variations. Also, we propose to further explore the
idea of tolled, virtual networks. The benets of auction based scheduling can be further
investigated in the case of heterogeneous classes of applications.
One of the goals of the thesis is to create tractable analytical models of complex network
systems. As far as possible, I have validated the accuracy of these models with real-time
measured data. The nal objective, both in my thesis and my future research, is to work
towards an analytical approach to network design.
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Table 6.1: A summary of coordination problems studied
Coordination OSI layer Game Incentive
problems structure schemes
P2P incentive Application static game, action space, Booster incentives
problem layer payo structure
are known
Protocol game Transport static game, action space link tolls (delay)
layer payo structure
are known
Multipath routing Routing repeated game, action space rebate (link capacity)
game layer is known, payos
are learned
Scheduling game MAC dynamic game, action space second price auction
layer is known, payos
are learned
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